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The concept of virtue is a vital one for many current debates within philosophy. In 
particular, both virtue ethics and virtue epistemology have come to be viewed as 
legitimate contenders within their respective domains. The task of virtue theory – of 
giving an account of the virtues – is therefore an especially pressing one. If we do not 
have a satisfactory account of the virtues, then we will be unable to evaluate those 
virtue-centric approaches that have come to be accepted as legitimate contenders within 
both ethics and epistemology. 
 
This thesis focuses on the moral virtues and addresses two related issues. The first issue 
to be addressed concerns the nature of the moral virtues (or what the virtues are). I 
discuss three different positions on this issue: the skills model (on which a virtue is a 
type of skill); the composite model (on which a virtue is a combination of skill plus a 
characteristic motivation); and the motivations model (on which a virtue is a particular 
type of motivation). A chapter is devoted to each of these three models, explaining the 
reasons in favour of endorsing each account before then considering objections. I 
provide support for the motivations model by first arguing against both the skills and 
composite models (in Chapters One and Two). I then defend the motivations model 
against serious objections (in Chapters Three and Four). My aim is to demonstrate that 
the motivations model is a legitimate contender in this debate, and a live option for 
those working in virtue theory. 
 
The second issue to be addressed concerns the identity of the moral virtues (or which 
traits ought to be included on a list of moral virtues). I evaluate (in Chapter Five) three 
different approaches to identifying the moral virtues, before suggesting that we ought to 
consider a view whereby kindness and justice are taken to be fundamentally virtuous 
traits. I then (in Chapter Six) explain and defend this suggestion, by proposing a cardinal 
understanding of the moral virtues. I argue that this understanding is able to provide 
plausible accounts of specific virtuous traits, in addition to providing solutions to 
problems currently facing all virtue theorists. There is good reason to accept a cardinal 
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1. THE CONCEPT OF VIRTUE 
What does it mean to be a good person? In attempting to answer this question, it is 
important to think about the traits or features that we would expect a good person to 
possess. In particular, it is important to think about virtues. This thesis is an investigation 
into the concept of virtue, with a particular focus on the nature and identity of the 
moral virtues. The aim of this General Introduction is to provide a brief explanation of 
the concepts and issues that will be the focus of this work, as well as to provide a brief 
overview of each chapter. I will begin by making some general comments about the 
concept of virtue, and by highlighting the important position that this concept has come 
to occupy within philosophy. 
 
While there is much disagreement over what a virtue consists of, as well as over which 
traits or features ought to be accepted as being virtues, it is nevertheless possible to 
identify some widely accepted properties. Virtues are positive traits or features of a 
person’s character. They are internal features that make their possessor good in some 
way. And a moral virtue will be an internal feature of a person’s character that makes 
them morally good. An initial list of moral virtues might be expected to include traits 
such as: courage, kindness, generosity, honesty, justice, temperance, integrity and 
compassion (although the accuracy of such a list will be the subject of discussion in this 
work). Importantly, the virtues are not typically taken to be one-off mental occurrences, 
or the type of thing that will be reflected merely in one-off actions. Instead, such traits 
are ‘deep’ aspects of a person’s character, at least in the sense that they are expected to 
be relatively persistent, but also in the sense that they are expected to affect a person’s 
behaviour and feelings in response to a wide variety of circumstances. An honest person 
is not thought to be one who simply avoids saying anything false. Instead, they will be 
disposed to avoid deception in a variety of ways, and to experience certain feelings or 
emotions (such as aversion) in response to the possibility of deceiving others. These are 
all widely accepted features of a virtue. And the concept of virtue has come to be a vital 






When detailing the history of interest in the virtues in the Western world, writers 
commonly present the following familiar story:1 The virtues were a central feature of 
ethical theorising in Ancient Greece, with theorists such as Plato and Aristotle providing 
influential accounts of the nature of the virtues and of the importance of virtuous 
activity. The influence of this tradition remained strong until, at least, medieval times 
(augmented by the works of Augustine and Aquinas). However, so the familiar story 
goes, philosophical interest in the virtues subsequently waned and was not revived until 
after the publication of G. E. M. Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ in 1958. 2 In 
this work, Anscombe criticises the dominant ethical approaches of deontology and 
consequentialism, and suggests that the downsides of these approaches could best be 
resolved by ethicists refocusing on virtue terms (and on the related notion of human 
well-being). Following this, contemporary theorists began the process of attempting to 
provide and explain virtue-centric approaches to key ethical issues, leading to what has 
been widely referred to as a “resurgence” of interest in the virtues. 3 ‘Virtue ethics’ has 
since come to be widely regarded as a legitimate and distinct contender to both 
deontology and consequentialism within the ethical domain. 
 
The strict accuracy of this story has been questioned. In particular, the claim that the 
notion of virtue was significantly neglected for a substantial period of time has been 
disputed.4 However, regardless of its accuracy, it is clear that this story must now be 
amended to include details of the explosion of interest in (and subsequent discussion of) 
the virtues in recent times. As noted, virtue-centric approaches are now well established 
within the ethical domain, with influential contemporary contributions being provided 
by: Philippa Foot in Virtues and Vices (1978, re-printed 2002); Alasdair MacIntyre in After 
Virtue (1981); Julia Annas in Morality of Happiness (1993) and Intelligent Virtue (2011); 
Rosalind Hursthouse in On Virtue Ethics (1999); Michael Slote in Morals from Motives 
(2001); Christine Swanton in Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (2003); Robert Adams in A 
                                                                 
1 Versions of this story (detailing the key role played by Anscombe’s paper) are presented in, for 
example: Timpe and Boyd (eds.) (2014); Baehr (2011), section 1.2.1; Battaly (ed.) (2010); Crisp and 
Slote (eds.) (1997); and Statman (ed.) (1997). 
2 Anscombe (1958) 
3 Timpe and Boyd (2014) p. 1 





Theory of Virtue (2006); and Daniel Russell in Practical Intelligence and the Virtues (2009).5 In 
these works, and elsewhere, theorists have carried out the task of addressing issues of 
central concern to ethicists in a distinctively virtue-centric way, and each of these 
representative texts has generated substantial discussion in its own right. Furthermore, 
theorists working within the other major ethical traditions have responded to this move 
towards virtue by providing accounts of the moral virtues in terms more suited to their 
own consequentialist or deontological approaches. For example, Julia Driver provides a 
consequentialist account of the virtues in Uneasy Virtue (2001), and Nancy Sherman 
discusses Kant’s approach to the virtues in Making a Necessity of Virtue (1997).6 The 
issues and problems raised by these contemporary ethicists (and the responses to them) 
provide ample material for critical discussion. In this work, I will focus on the 
contemporary debate and address two of the issues that have been raised by theorists 
interested in the moral virtues. These issues concern the nature of the moral virtues 
(what the virtues are) and the identity of the moral virtues (what traits ought to be 
included on a list of the virtues). An overview of the direction that this work will take is 
provided in Section 3, below. 
 
It is important to point out at this stage that ethicists have not been alone in turning 
their attention to the concept of virtue. A similar move has been made within 
epistemology, with competing versions of ‘virtue epistemology’ also coming to be 
viewed as legitimate contenders within that domain. Such accounts appeal to the notion 
of intellectual (or epistemic) virtue, and suggest that the issues of concern to epistemology 
(such as the attempt to define knowledge, and related issues) can be resolved by 
focusing on such traits. Influential accounts within the recent virtue epistemology 
movement include those presented by: Ernest Sosa in ‘The Raft and the Pyramid’ (1980) 
and A Virtue Epistemology (2007); Linda Zagzebski in Virtues of the Mind (1996); John 
Greco in Achieving Knowledge (2010); and Jason Baehr in The Inquiring Mind (2011).7 While 
my interest in this thesis lies with the moral virtues, much can still be gained from the 
virtue epistemology literature. What these theorists have to say about intellectual virtues 
                                                                 
5 This list is not presented as being by any means exhaustive. 
6 For more on a Kantian understanding of virtue see the contributions in Betzler (ed.) (2008), as well 
as Louden (1986). 





has implications for accounts of the moral virtues (and their possible connection to the 
intellectual virtues), and some of these theorists also work within ethics and discuss the 
moral virtues directly.8 I will, therefore, not limit the discussion to work more typically 
taken to be a part of the virtue literature within ethics. It will often be fruitful to 
consider the work of other contemporary theorists who concern themselves with the 
concept of virtue. 
 
I now want to highlight some important distinctions that exist within the virtue 
literature. In particular, it will be important to distinguish those debates that I will be 
attempting to address in this thesis from those (often closely related) debates that I will 
not. The following should, therefore, help to avoid any misunderstandings regarding 
what is or is not being claimed at later points in this work. 
 
2. CLARIFICATIONS AND DISTINCTIONS 
It is especially important to highlight that this thesis is an attempt to add to the debate 
within virtue theory, as opposed to an attempt to provide a version of virtue ethics. 
Drawing a distinction between virtue theory and virtue ethics is just one of the ways of 
understanding the different projects that theorists might be involved in when discussing 
the moral virtues. For example, David Solomon proposes a different three-way 
distinction between: (i) “radical” virtue ethics; (ii) “routine” virtue ethics;  and (iii) non-
virtue-ethical accounts which nevertheless seek to accommodate virtue-talk.9 Supporters 
of “routine” virtue ethics include those theorists who seek to give priority to the virtues 
when addressing the central concerns of ethics, but who are otherwise satisfied to work 
within the generally agreed-upon conventions of ethical theorising.10 Forms of “radical” 
virtue ethics, on the other hand, seek to challenge commonly accepted features of 
                                                                 
8 Indeed, as Hursthouse (1999, p. 5, footnote 7) acknowledges, Part II of Zagzebski’s Virtues of the 
Mind “is substantial enough to count as a book on virtue ethics in its own right”. 
9 Solomon (2003) 
10 Solomon (p. 66) suggests that Michael Slote can be understood as exemplifying a form of routine 
virtue ethics. Of course, this is compatible with Slote’s work being deserving of the label ‘radical’ for 
other reasons, or in other contexts. In Morals from Motives, Slote attempts to provide an “agent-based” 
approach to ethics that he takes to be without significant precedent. If this is correct, Slote’s view 
could certainly be classed as a “radical” contribution under some other understanding of the term. 





ethical thought, such as the assumption in favour of the importance of moral rules, or 
the tendency to view agents in an abstract or detached fashion. 11 This distinction 
between radical and routine virtue ethics (and non-virtue-ethics) is, then, one way of 
understanding different projects featuring the virtues within ethics. Another way is to 
draw a distinction between virtue ethics and virtue theory. This distinction is well 
explained by Daniel Russell (who attributes it to Julia Driver):  
 
roughly, a virtue theory is a theory of what the virtues are, whereas virtue 
ethics holds the virtues to be central to a theory of the ethical evaluation of 
action… To be sure, every virtue ethic must build on a virtue theory, but no 
virtue theorist – no one with a theory about the nature of the virtues – need 
for that reason be a virtue ethicist.12 
 
On this understanding, anyone who attempts to provide an account of the moral virtues 
will be engaged in virtue theory, even if they should not be classed as being in any way a 
virtue ethicist. This distinction is one that is now widely accepted and relied upon in the 
literature.13 And with this distinction in mind, it is worth emphasising that I will not, in 
this work, be attempting to propose or defend a form of virtue ethics. For example, I 
will not be concerned to provide an account of morally right action that places moral 
virtue at its foundation. I will instead be attempting to add to the debate within virtue 
theory, or the understanding of the virtues themselves. While this explanation of the 
distinction has been brief, it should be sufficient to clarify, and to demonstrate the 
importance of, virtue theory. Given the importance of the concept of virtue within both 
ethics and epistemology, the task of virtue theory is especially pressing. If we do not 
have an account of the virtues then we will be unable to work out (for example) how the 
morally virtuous agent would act, or what the intellectually virtuous agent would believe. 
In short, we will be unable to assess those virtue-centric approaches that are taken to be 
legitimate contenders within both ethics and epistemology. 
 
                                                                 
11 Solomon (2003) pp. 68–69 (It is worth noting again that this is just one way of making distinctions 
in this area. Daniel Statman, for example, describes virtue ethics in general in a way that would only 
include those theories listed as “radical” by Solomon. See Statman (1997) p. 3.) 
12 Russell (2009) p. ix 






It is also important to briefly clarify the three accounts of the nature of the moral virtues 
that I will be considering in this thesis. A more detailed explanation of these accounts is 
provided in the chapters dedicated to them (in addition to an explanation of why these 
accounts are worthy of consideration). It will, however, be useful to set out their basic 
claims in this introduction. The first account that I will consider is the skills model of the 
moral virtues. According to the skills model, the possession of a moral virtue consists in 
the possession of a particular type of practical skill (or set of skills). The second account 
that I will consider is motivated (to an extent) by the proposed failings of the skills 
model. According to the composite model of the moral virtues, a moral virtue consists of 
both the possession of skill(s) or know-how and the possession of a motivation that is 
characteristic of the virtue in question. The composite model therefore moves beyond 
the skills model by adding the requirement of a characteristic motivational component. 
And the consideration of possible problems for the composite model (in Chapter Two) 
justifies discussion of a third account of the virtues. According to the motivations model of 
the moral virtues, the possession of a moral virtue consists in the possession of a 
motivation of a particular sort. I explain (in Chapter Three) the central claim of the 
motivations model before then (in the remainder of Chapter Three and in Chapter 
Four) considering serious objections that have been raised for that account. The skills, 
composite and motivations models are the three accounts of the nature of virtue that  I 
will consider in this work. My aim when discussing the nature of the moral virtues is to 
provide a defence of the motivations model. 
 
The distinction between the skills, composite and motivations models of the moral 
virtues is importantly different from another distinction that has been made in the virtue 
literature. When focusing on the reliability of the virtues – or the extent to which virtues 
will lead an agent to reliably bring about good states of affairs – the available options 
can be divided up between three further approaches.14 An externalist account of the 
virtues will say that reliable effectiveness in bringing about good consequences is a 
defining feature of those traits that are rightly viewed as being virtues. A prime example 
of such an account is provided by Driver (2001). Alternatively, an internalist account will 
                                                                 





make no demands regarding the reliable production of good consequences when giving 
an account of the virtues. Instead, the virtues will primarily be defined by certain 
internal features, such as positive motivations or desires. The account of moral virtues 
provided by Slote (2001) is suggested by Baehr as a prime example of the internalist 
approach.15 Finally, a mixed view attempts to combine these two aspects by suggesting 
that a virtue involves both the presence of valuable internal states (such as motivations) 
and reliable effectiveness in producing good consequences. Zagzebski (1996) provides 
perhaps the best example of an account of this sort. 
 
The distinction between the skills, composite and motivations models will sometimes 
match up nicely with the distinction between the externalist, mixed and internalist 
accounts, respectively. For example, those who think that the virtues must be reliable in 
producing good outcomes may be expected to be more sympathetic to the idea that 
virtues are (or can be) skills, on the plausible assumption that skills allow an agent to be 
more effective in achieving positive goals. Furthermore, those who favour the internalist 
model tend to highlight the value of certain positive motivations or desires, and so can 
be expected to be more inclined towards either the composite or motivations models 
(on which motivation is a central feature of all virtues). Given the overlapping concerns 
involved in these two debates, it will often be possible to take arguments or ideas 
present in the debate between externalist, mixed and internalist approaches and apply 
them in the debate between the skills, composite and motivations models. However, it is 
worth also bearing in mind that the match between these two ways of carving up the 
terrain is not perfect. For example, a defender of the mixed view need not accept that all 
virtues consist of motivations plus skills, and a defender of an externalist account need 
not accept that all virtues will consist of a skill or set of skills. In general, it will be 
possible to hold a position in the externalist/mixed/internalist debate without being 
committed to any particular view in the debate between the skills, composite and 
motivations models. Even if it is sometimes possible to marshal the arguments used in 
one of these debates when evaluating options in the other, it will be important to 
                                                                 





remember that these two ways of dividing up (some of) the options regarding the nature 
of the moral virtues are not a perfect match. 
 
Explaining and clarifying these important distinctions should be helpful in avoiding 
possible misunderstandings regarding the claims that are made later on in this work. I 
will now conclude this introduction by providing a brief overview of the content and 
main aims of each of the chapters in this thesis. 
 
3. OVERVIEW 
The thesis begins with the evaluation of the skills model of the moral virtues. This 
model states that the possession of a moral virtue consists in the possession of a 
particular type of skill (or set of skills). Reasons in favour of the skills model are 
provided by considering the similarities between virtues and skills that have been 
highlighted in recent work from Julia Annas and Matt Stichter. I argue that three 
existing objections to the skills model are inconclusive at best, before then providing an 
important additional objection to that view. This objection reveals the inability of the 
skills model to accommodate the importance of an agent’s motivations when 
determining whether or not they possess a given moral virtue. The chapter concludes 
that the skills model is not a sufficient account of the moral virtues, and that we have 
good reason to consider an account that places greater importance on an agent’s 
motivations. 
 
Chapter Two sets out the composite model of the moral virtues on which a moral virtue 
consists of a motivational component as well as a component of relevant cognitive 
skill(s) or know-how. This chapter aims to demonstrate that the skills component is not 
necessary by considering two objections to the composite model. The first  objection 
builds on Julia Driver’s claims regarding the “virtues of ignorance”, and setting out this 
objection requires an extended discussion of the candidate moral virtue of modesty. The 
second objection to be considered claims that requiring an intellectually demanding 
component of relevant skill is problematically elitist. The two objections presented in 





the moral virtues on which virtue possession does not require a component of cognitive 
skill(s) or know-how. 
 
Chapter Three moves on to discuss the motivations model of the moral virtues on 
which a moral virtue consists of a deep motivation towards a characteristic end. Having 
set out the account in detail, three serious objections are then considered. These 
objections are: (i) the claim that the motivations model is incompatible with the idea 
that virtuous agents will be reliably successful when acting; (ii) the claim that the 
motivations model is unable to accommodate the intuitively appealing distinction 
between “actual” virtues and “natural” virtues; and (iii) the claim that accepting the 
motivations model amounts to the celebration of irrationality. I provide detailed 
responses to each of these objections with the aim of showing that the motivations 
model is a legitimate contender in this debate and a live option for those working in 
virtue theory. 
 
Chapter Four focuses mainly on the candidate moral virtue of courage. I first explain 
why the trait of courage is problematic for accounts such as the motivations model, 
before then arguing that this trait may also be problematic for other accounts of the 
virtues. I then propose an alternative understanding of the trait of courage on which 
courage is not a moral virtue. Courage ought instead to be viewed as an enabler for moral 
virtue. Having explained this approach, I then demonstrate why understanding courage 
in this way would allow us to avoid the problems posed by that trait.  
 
Having argued that moral virtues consist of deep motivations towards characteristic 
ends, it then becomes important to identify which deep motivations ought to actually be 
accepted as moral virtues. In Chapter Five, I consider two influential attempts which 
identify virtuous traits with reference to some further concept: Driver’s consequentialist 
approach and Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian approach. By arguing against these 
approaches, I provide justification for considering the merits of the rival fundamental value 
approach. I set out and argue against Slote’s care-based version of such a view in order 
to suggest that we have good reason to consider an approach on which kindness and 






In the final chapter, Chapter Six, I expand on and defend the suggestion that kindness 
and justice be viewed as fundamentally virtuous traits. This suggestion is best 
understood from within an overall cardinal understanding of the moral virtues. On such 
an account, kindness and justice are viewed as fundamental (or cardinal) moral virtues, 
while any other moral virtues are subordinate in the sense that they can be understood as 
simply restricted forms or exercises of either kindness or justice. I defend this 
suggestion in two ways. Firstly, I explain how the proposed account leads to plausible 
understandings of other candidate moral virtues, such as honesty, modesty and 
compassion. Secondly, I explain how the account would allow us to resolve two 
important problems that currently face all virtue theorists: the “conflation problem” and 
the “enumeration problem”. This chapter will demonstrate that there is good reason to 
revive a cardinal understanding in relation to the moral virtues. 
 
Having provided an introduction to the issues covered in this work, as well as an 
overview of each chapter, it is now possible to move on to the first issue to be 
addressed: the issue of determining the nature of the moral virtues. The first account to 









CHAPTER ONE: THE SKILLS MODEL OF THE MORAL VIRTUES 
 
0. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to consider the prospects of the skills model of the moral 
virtues. This view states that possessing a moral virtue is simply (or primarily) a matter 
of possessing particular skills or know-how. Such a view was common in the ancient 
world, with Plato and the Stoics counting among the early adherents of the skills 
model.1  However, fewer contemporary theorists have explicitly endorsed this account 
of the moral virtues, preferring instead to endorse the weaker claim that moral virtues 
are “like” or “analogous to” certain skills.2 And yet, there remains good reason to 
consider the stronger claim. First of all, the idea that skills or abilities can be virtues is 
treated as a live option in contemporary debates regarding the intellectual virtues.3 If the 
skills model is a plausible contender regarding one class of virtue then it is worthwhile 
considering whether or not it can also account for the moral virtues. Secondly, recent 
work in the virtue literature has highlighted many similarities between virtues and skills. 
As will be set out below, these similarities make the view that virtues just are skills 
understandably appealing. And thirdly, it is worth noting that many of the objections 
that have been raised for the skills model are less than compelling. If the arguments 
against this view are weaker than has been thought, then this also provides us with some 
reason to re-consider its plausibility. For these reasons, it will be worthwhile to consider 
the prospects of the skills model of the moral virtues. 
 
It will be useful to clarify the general type of skill to which the skills model will typically 
refer. As will become clear below, those theorists who provide support for the skills 
                                                                 
1 Annas (2003) 
2 As will be explained in detail below, Julia Annas is one of the most forthright defenders of the skills 
model, often preferring the stronger claim that moral virtue just is a kind of skill. Those who compare 
possession of moral virtue to possession of perceptual skill (the ability to see what is required or what 
action would be best) can also be classed as being at least sympathetic to this view. For example, see 
Jacobson (2005) and also McDowell (1998). (Note: McDowell’s view is discussed at some length by 
Jacobson, who provides reason to suppose that McDowell is less than fully committed to the truth 
of the perceptual account, seeing it as merely a useful metaphor. I will not engage with this issue 
here.) 
3 Virtue epistemologists who are classed as “reliabilists” are more likely to think that intellectua l 
virtues are (or can be) skills. For one influential example, see Sosa (2007) Lecture 2.  For more on the 
distinction between reliabilists and responsibilists within virtue epistemology, see Code (1984) and 





model typically have in mind practical skills such as playing the piano, being an expert 
chef, or playing tennis. At the same time, however, the skills being referred to must not 
be mindless and will instead require an important aspect of cognitive engagement. This 
will become clearer when discussing the work of Julia Annas, below. 4 Even at this 
preliminary stage, however, it ought to be made clear that the skills being appealed to 
are cognitive or intellectual in the sense that they involve engaged reasoning and practical 
knowledge on the part of the agent. We are not here talking about purely physical 
“skills” such as the ability to tie shoelaces, or to intentiona lly dislocate a shoulder.5 
Furthermore, an agent will not count as possessing a particular cognitive practical skill 
purely in virtue of being able to bring about the same results as someone who does 
possess that skill. The ability to respond to explicit and constant instruction such that 
you can press the correct keys on a piano or accurately return a serve in tennis is not 
sufficient in order for you to class as having the relevant cognitive skill.6 To possess 
such a skill is to know how to act in response to certain situations and perhaps to be able 
to consciously identify relevant features of a situation as requiring a skilled response. The 
(expertly) skilled tennis player, in this more cognitive sense of a practical skill, is not 
simply able to return a serve when given explicit instruction about where to stand and 
how to swing their racquet. Instead, they will be able to anticipate opposing strategies, 
know how to read their opponent and to manoeuvre them around the court, see 
opportunities to attack rather than defend, and so on. It is this more cognitively 
demanding understanding of practical skill (or know-how) that is typically taken to be 
fruitfully compared to moral virtue. 
 
In this chapter I will first set out some of the possible benefits of accepting the skills 
model. This will involve highlighting the similarities between virtues and skills that have 
been suggested in the recent virtue literature. I will then discuss three objections which 
have been raised for the skills model, showing why these objections are not conclusive. 
Finally, I will present an alternative argument against the skills model and show why 
attempts to amend the view in order to respond to this objection will not be successful. 
                                                                 
4 And see Annas (2011) pp. 17–20. 
5 Annas contrasts the skills she is interested in with “physical skills” in Ibid. p.29. 





We ought to conclude that the skills model does not provide a sufficient account of the 
nature of the moral virtues. 
 
1. VIRTUES AND SKILLS 
The skills model of the moral virtues gains plausibility as a result of the apparent 
similarities that exist between virtues and (certain) skills. Even before considering the 
more theoretical insights offered in the recent virtue literature, it is possible to grasp 
some of the intuitive similarities that exist. As was mentioned in the General 
Introduction, virtues are taken to be persistent internal traits of an agent. We would not 
expect an agent to suddenly lose their virtue, or to have possession of a genuine virtue 
in a way that was sporadic or fleeting. The same is intuitively true of skills. An expert 
golfer will not be expected to suddenly lose their ability to find the fairway off the tee 
any more than a virtuously kind agent would be expected to suddenly lose their virtuous 
kindness. Similarly, virtues are taken to be features of an agent for which they can be 
appropriately praised. Again, this matches up nicely with the possession of a skill. Just as 
we might praise a student for exhibiting the virtues of conscientiousness or open-
mindedness when interacting with their classmates, we might also praise a sprinter for 
their fluid technique or praise a cellist for their immaculate bowing. It is clear, then, that 
our pre-theoretical understandings of both virtues and skills suggest certain similarities. 
This lends some weight to the idea that moral virtues just are a type of skill. And further 
similarities have been highlighted in the recent virtue literature. 
 
In recent articles, Matt Stichter has discussed similarities in the development of virtues 
and skills.7 That there is some similarity in this respect will come as no surprise to those 
familiar with Aristotle’s famous claim that “men become builders by building and lyre-
players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing 
temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.”8 However, Stichter sets out a particular model 
for the development of a practical skill and shows how this model is plausibly mirrored 
                                                                 
7 See Stichter (2007) and Stichter (2011). 





in the development of moral virtues.9 On “the Dreyfus account” of skill development 
(stemming from the work of Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus), skill possession can be divided 
into five stages: novice, advanced beginner, competent performer, proficient performer, 
and expert.10 At the earlier stages of development, an agent will tend to rely on very 
simple rules. For example, a novice chef will tend to rely on simple instructions from a 
cookbook regarding how to prepare certain ingredients, and at what temperature they 
ought to be cooked. As the agent gains more experience, they will become comfortable 
using less simple and more context-sensitive rules. For example, the chef may follow 
different rules for cooking the same ingredient depending on whether the accompanying 
dishes will be sweet or savoury, or depending on the taste preferences of their guests. As 
the rules become more complex and context-sensitive they will tend to pick up on 
increasingly subtle aspects of the situation, and it may be difficult for the agent to 
determine which rule best applies to their particular circumstances. As a result, the agent 
will be forced to make a choice regarding which rule to follow, and the competent  
performer will be one who is able to make this choice and to accept responsibility for 
the consequences of having done so. This willingness to recognise themselves as 
responsible for the outcomes of their various choices will mark an important step in the  
agent’s development. As Stichter explains: 
 
These outcomes provide the feedback that a person needs in order to 
improve her skill. The feedback, if positive, reinforces making that choice 
again in a similar situation. The feedback, if negative, prompts the person to 
make a different choice in that situation.11  
 
As the agent gains further experience and receives further feedback on previous choices, 
they may come to no longer make those choices consciously. A chef who has prepared a 
particular ingredient for use alongside a particular accompaniment on many different 
occasions will not feel the need to consciously reflect on which rule to follow when they 
are confronted with those same ingredients in future. Instead, they will instinctively 
perform those actions which have consistently led to positive feedback in the past. The 
                                                                 
9 Stichter (2011) pp. 77–82 
10 Ibid. p. 77 





greater the range of the agent’s experience, the fewer situations in which they will be 
required to consciously consider specific rules for action. Through exposure to a 
sufficient level of experience and feedback, it will be possible for the agent to develop 
into “an expert who sees intuitively what to do without applying rules and making 
judgements at all… [who] spontaneously does what has normally worked and, naturally, 
it normally works.”12 Stichter believes this to be a plausible account of how an agent can 
progress from novice to expert regarding a particular skill, and that the same model can 
be applied to the development of a moral virtue. 
 
When we consider an agent developing in their moral sophistication, it is plausible to 
imagine them starting out at the corresponding novice level whereby they are dependent  
on very simple rules. Perhaps the beginner regarding honesty will learn “Don’t Lie” as a 
simple rule, before going on to learn more detailed and context-sensitive variations. 
They will learn that lying is not the only way of being deceitful, and that other ways 
ought to be avoided also. They may learn that the wrongness of lying can vary from 
context to context, and perhaps even that lying need not be avoided in every situation. 
As they encounter increasingly complex situations it may become difficult for them to 
judge how severe the prohibition on lying actually is, or how best to exemplify the virtue 
of honesty in their particular circumstances. Ultimately, they will have to make a 
decision on such matters, and they will learn to alter their future actions depending on 
past experiences. At the final stage of development they will begin to see intuitively how 
they ought to act, without any need to consciously apply rules or seriously consider 
alternatives. At this stage they will be an expert regarding honesty. This is the picture of 
developing a moral virtue that would mirror the picture of skill development endorsed 
by Stichter. If we think that this picture is a plausible one then the similarity in terms of 
development will provide support for the skills model of the moral virtues.13 
                                                                 
12 Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1991) p. 235 (Quoted in Stichter (2011) p. 77) 
13 One possible challenge to Stichter’s account is that it is not obvious in the case of virtue 
development what the relevant feedback conditions will be. In the case of cookery skills, for 
example, the feedback will be fairly straightforward to pick up on. If the result is appetising then this 
will count as positive feedback and if it is not then this will count as negative feedback. A learner will 
be able to recognise which is which and adjust future behaviour accordingly. In the case of the 






While Stichter has argued that there are similarities in how virtues and skills are developed, 
Julia Annas has argued that there are similarities in how they are exercised. Indeed, Annas 
is one of the most forceful advocates of the view that “virtue is, or is importantly like, a 
skill”, and much of what she says on this topic can be used to support the stronger 
claim that virtues are skills.14 A first point to note regarding the exercise of a skill, 
according to Annas, is that it differs from routine performance. In the case of a mere 
habit or routine, the agent will be able to perform the action in a mindless, mechanical 
way. The example given by Annas is of driving a familiar route, where the driver may 
not always be fully conscious of what they are doing and may simply find themselves at 
their destination when the journey is over.15 The exercise of a skill, on the other hand, 
will require conscious and intelligent engagement on the part of the agent. In the case of 
a skilled pianist, for example, “The way she plays exhibits not only increased technical 
mastery but increased intelligence – better ways of dealing with transitions between loud 
and soft, more subtle interpretations of the music, and so on.”16 Annas believes that, 
just as the exercise of a skill will be responsive to the agent’s engaged intelligence, so too 
will the exercise of the virtues: 
 
A central feature of routine is that the reaction to the relevant situation is 
always the same, which is why routine can be depended on and predicted. 
But practical skill and virtue require more than predictably similar reaction; 
they require a response which is appropriate to the situation instead of 
merely being the same as that produced in response to other situations… 
Virtues, which are states of character, are states that enable us to respond in 
creative and imaginative ways to new challenges. No routine could enable us 
to do this.17 
 
The first similarity, according to Annas, between the exercise of a virtue and the exercise 
of a skill is that both require that the agent be engaged in an intelligent and flexible way 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
been successful or not. I will not further consider this possible objection to Stichter’s specific 
account. 
14 Annas (1995) p. 240 (See also Annas (2011).) 
15 Annas (2011) p. 13 
16 Ibid. p. 14 





with their situation.18 The second similarity that Annas proposes involves how the 
exercise of both skills and virtues feels to the agent. Annas suggests that the exercise of a 
skill is something that the agent will find enjoyable, and that this is also true of the 
exercise of a virtue.19 To defend this claim, Annas quotes work from psychology which 
suggests that people enjoy themselves most not when they are relaxed or at rest but 
when they are engaged in intelligent and skilful activity. 20 For example, the expert pianist 
will experience both an enjoyable level of focus and an enjoyable loss of self-
consciousness when engaging their skill in the performance of some challenging piece 
of music: “The activity is experienced as unhindered, unselfconscious, and effortless.”21 
And Annas believes that this is also an apt description of activity involving (fully 
developed) virtue. The virtuous agent will not experience temptation to act unvirtuously 
and so their actions will be similarly effortless and unimpeded by internal conflict. Here 
Annas is in agreement with Aristotle. “Honest actions [for example] will be experienced 
by the mature honest person in the ‘flow’ way; however complex and hard to navigate 
the circumstances are, there is no felt resistance to acting honestly, no interference with 
the direct having of honest responses.”22 In this way, the exercise of a virtue is thought 
to mirror the exercise of a skill. The agent who exercises a virtue has a “flow” 
experience in the sense that they take enjoyment from the activity at the same time as 
being simultaneously focused and lacking in self-consciousness. If we add the 
similarities proposed by Annas regarding how virtues and skills are exercised to the 
similarities proposed by Stichter regarding how they are developed, then this supports 
the claim that the skills model of the moral virtues is worthy of consideration.23 
 
                                                                 
18 Gilbert Ryle has also highlighted the differences between mere habits on the one hand and 
intellectual capacities, such as the “higher-grade dispositions of people”, on the other. See Ryle 
(1949) pp. 42–45. 
19 Annas (2011) Chapter 5 
20 The work relied on is Csikszentmihalyi (1991). 
21 Annas (2011) p. 72 
22 Ibid. p. 75 
23 While Annas and Stichter agree about the merits of comparing virtues and skills, it is perhaps 
worth noting that they disagree on what exactly the proper account of a skill will be. For example, 
Annas (2011, pp. 19–20) claims that possession of a skill requires that the agent be able to 
understand and articulate their reasons for acting as they do. Stichter (2007, pp. 186–188) disagrees 
with this claim. Such differences in the specific accounts favoured by these theorists will not impact 





The similarities between virtues and skills that have been highlighted in the recent 
literature provide support for the skills model of the moral virtues. In the next section I 
will consider three objections to that model with the aim of showing that these 
objections are not conclusive. Some further objection will be required in order to show 
that the skills model is not a sufficient account of the nature of the moral virtues. 
 
2. OBJECTIONS TO THE SKILLS MODEL 
The skills model says that to possess a moral virtue is to possess a type of cognitive skill 
or know-how, or perhaps some collection of related skills. If we are to accept, for now, 
a standard list of the moral virtues, then this would mean that traits such as honesty, 
compassion, justice and courage ought to be understood in terms of skills. For example, 
on this model the virtue of honesty might consist in the ability to identify situations as 
demanding honesty, being able to determine what action will best exhibit honesty in 
these circumstances, and, perhaps, being able to explain to others why honesty was 
demanded and why this particular action was the best to perform. Such skills are similar 
to those listed by Linda Zagzebski as being involved in other commonly accepted moral 
virtues: 
 
A just person understands what justice demands and is good at perceiving 
the details of a particular situation that are relevant to the application of 
rights and duties. A compassionate person understands the level of need of 
persons around him and can predict the effects of various forms of 
expressing compassion on persons with different personalities. 24 
 
Might possessing these kinds of skills be sufficient for possession of the corresponding 
virtue? In this section I will consider three arguments against this view. My aim is to 
demonstrate that these objections to the skills model are not successful, and that some 
other objection will be required.25 
 
                                                                 
24 Zagzebski (1996) p. 134 
25 Earlier versions of some of the arguments discussed in the following two sections appeared in my 





2.1 ARGUMENT 1 - DIFFERENT CONTRARIES 
In Virtues of the Mind, Zagzebski argues that skill possession is not sufficient for the 
possession of a moral virtue.26 Some of the arguments that Zagzebski provides are her 
own, while others are taken from the work of other theorists. However, Zagzebski 
herself does not believe that all of the arguments that she considers are successful. The 
need for some further objection to the skills model can be demonstrated by revealing 
the inconclusiveness of arguments endorsed by Zagzebski.  
 
A first objection from Zagzebski argues that virtues and skills must be distinct due to 
the fact that they have different contraries.27 On the one hand, the contrary of a virtue 
must surely be a vice – the opposite of a compassionate agent being an agent who is 
cruel, for example. However, the contrary of a skill, according to Zagzebski, is simply a 
lack of skill. The opposite of the skilled baker is simply someone who lacks the relevant 
skills. Given that the opposite of a virtue is a vice, and that a vice is not simply a lack of 
virtue (or of skill), virtues and skills must have different contraries. And this leads to the 
conclusion that virtues must not be skills.  
 
However, this first objection to the skills model is not successful. The reason for this is 
that a defender of the skills model could plausibly claim that Zagzebski is mistaken 
when saying that the opposite of a skill is simply a lack of skill. For example, consider 
the skill of good public speaking. When looking for the opposite of someone who is a 
skilled public speaker, one option would be to consider an agent who simply lacks the 
relevant skills and who is otherwise average. This agent will not be the true contrary. 
That role will be held by an agent who possesses actual deficiencies which make them 
further away from being skilled in this regard; someone who is notably monotone, 
inaudible, and fidgety, perhaps. If this is correct then we ought to reject Zagzebski’s 
claims about the true contrary of a skilled agent. The opposite of a skilled agent is one 
who possesses actual defects which make them further away from the relevant ideal. 
And note how this actually fits nicely with the case of the moral virtues, where the 
opposite of the virtuous agent (the vicious agent) may be taken to possess defects (the 
                                                                 
26 Ibid. Part II, Section 2.4 





vices) which make them further away from the moral ideal. Given this available 
response, we have good reason to abandon this argument against the skills model and to 
consider other possibilities. 
 
2.2 ARGUMENT 2 – NECESSARY EXERCISE 
A second argument endorsed by Zagzebski has been previously proposed by both 
Philippa Foot and Gilbert Meilaender.28 This argument points out that it is possible for a 
skill to exist as a mere capacity. That is, the possession of a skill is perfectly compatible 
with the agent failing to exercise that skill. For example, an agent may perfectly well 
possess the skills involved in being an expert baker while at the same time choosing not 
to exercise those skills. Indeed, it is generally the case that a skilled agent might even 
choose to act in a way that suggests the opposite of skill. An agent may nevertheless be 
a skilled baker even if they choose to bake a horrible birthday cake for someone they 
secretly dislike. On the other hand, it is taken to be incompatible with the possession of 
a moral virtue that the agent fails to exercise the trait. If an agent does not act in a 
compassionate way then this necessarily tells against their possession of the virtue of 
compassion. If an agent fails to act honestly then they are not virtuously honest. In this 
way, moral virtues differ from skills and so moral virtues must not be skills.  The skills 
model is incorrect. 
 
A first available response for the defender of the skills model is to suggest that an 
account of moral virtue possession ought not to be overly demanding. That is, it ought 
to be compatible with the possession of a genuine virtue that an agent might sometimes 
fail to live up to the standards expected of the virtuous. If this is correct, then it will be 
possible to question the claim that failure to act in accordance with a given virtue 
demonstrates that the agent must not possess that virtue. Consider the following 
example: 
 
                                                                 
28 Ibid. p. 107 (Zagzebski attributes the argument to Foot (in ‘Virtues and Vices’, which can be 





Personal Sorrows: Alex is widely regarded as extremely kind, and generally acts 
as we would expect a kind agent to act. Alex considers the feelings of others, 
successfully puts the interests of others before her own interests, spends a 
considerable amount of time working for charity, and so on. However, on 
one particular occasion, Alex finds her mood over-clouded by her own 
personal sorrows, and at this moment she is less sympathetic towards a 
friend than we might expect from a virtuously kind agent. 
 
In this example, Alex has failed to exercise the virtue of kindness. If virtue possession, 
unlike skill possession, is incompatible with the agent failing to act in a virtuous way 
then we must say that Alex does not possess the virtue of kindness. And yet, it does not 
seem right to say that this incident is sufficient to show that Alex lacks kindness. Those 
who are sympathetic to the idea that Alex may be a kind agent despite this incident will 
have to accept that virtue possession is compatible with an agent failing to act on or to 
exercise the relevant virtue. The stark difference between virtues and skills that is 
suggested by the ‘necessary exercise’ argument would then have to be denied.  
 
Of course, we might still think that there is some difference between virtues and skills in 
this regard. Even if possession of a virtue is not incompatible with the agent failing to 
exercise that virtue, we might think that such failure necessarily tells against the extent to 
which the agent possesses the virtue. Alex possesses the virtue of kindness, but the 
incident involving her friend shows us that she is less kind than someone who would be 
able to act kindly even in those difficult circumstances. Failure to act on a virtue tells 
against the extent to which an agent possesses that virtue, and this is not the case for 
skills. Therefore, there might still be an important difference here between moral virtues 
and skills. 
 
However, competing considerations can be provided by thinking about the possibility of 
moral dilemmas. In particular, it is useful to consider a case where different moral 
virtues appear to point in different directions. One example of such a case is described 
by Rosalind Hursthouse where we might think that “Honesty points to telling the 





lying”.29 One concrete example suggested by Hursthouse is “a teacher’s telling a 
dedicated, mature student that, contrary to his hopes and dreams, he was not capable of 
postgraduate work in philosophy”.30 In some of these cases the conflict will be merely 
apparent and a resolution will be possible. To lie would not really be kind, for example, 
or the suggested truth would actually mask a more important fact. However, in other 
cases we will be inclined to say that the clash is very real. The kind act would not be 
honest or the compassionate act would not be just. 31 In these cases it will not be 
possible for the agent to act in accordance with both of the conflicting virtues. If they 
have found themselves in the problematic situation through no fault of their own then 
we ought not to say that they will necessarily act wrongly. But we also cannot say that 
the agent who chooses to tell the unkind truth has nevertheless acted kindly, or that the 
agent who chooses the comforting lie has nevertheless acted honestly. The agent will 
have failed to act in the way characteristic of one who possesses the neglected virtue. 
However, given the problematic nature of the situation in which they found themselves, 
we should not take this as ruling out the possibility that they do in fact possess the 
neglected virtue, and to an extremely high degree. The agent who chooses the unkind 
truth may nevertheless possess the virtue of kindness. And, given the problematic 
nature of the situation, their failure to act in accordance with kindness does not even tell 
against the extent to which they possess that virtue. The situation was such that, 
whatever they chose to do, one virtue would be neglected. Given this, their action 
should not be taken as evidence that their possession of the virtue is deficient. Their 
failure to act in accordance with the virtue stems not from their inner characteristics but 
from the external situation in which they found themselves. If this is right, then it will 
be possible for an agent to fail to act in accordance with a virtue in a way which does 
not tell against the extent to which they possess that virtue. And this would weaken the 
suggested argument against the skills model.  
 
                                                                 
29 Hursthouse (1999) p. 43 
30 Ibid. p. 52 
31 These irresolvable cases are accepted as possible by Hursthouse (see Ibid. Chapter 3) and one such 
example is provided by Michael Slote (2011) pp. 29–30. I will not discuss here Slote’s interesting 





It will be possible to reject this response to the ‘necessary exercise’ objection by simply 
denying the possibility of irresolvable dilemmas, or of situations in which the virtues 
point in different directions. Some will be sympathetic to such a move.32 However, it 
would be more satisfying if our rejection of the skills model was not dependent upon 
the resolution of controversial issues such as the impossibility of virtues coming into 
conflict. If the present objection is dependent on the outcome of such a controversial 
issue then it will remain inconclusive so long as that issue is unresolved.  Rather than 
attempting to resolve such issues here, we ought instead to look for some alternative 
objection to the skills model. 
 
2.3 ARGUMENT 3 – VOLUNTARY LOSS 
Zagzebski also presents an argument taken from the work of Sarah Broadie which aims 
to highlight a further telling difference between virtues and skills. Broadie states that: 
 
it says nothing against the quality of a skill if its possessor voluntarily lets it 
go or decides to give it up as no longer worth the exercise. But it is not 
consistent with virtue that virtue voluntarily be allowed to slide 33 
 
Here we have another suggested difference between moral virtues and skills which tells 
against the claim that virtues just are skills. It is perfectly compatible with an agent’s 
possession of a skill that they would voluntarily choose to let it go – say, to stop 
practicing the skill and thereby eventually lose it.  For example, suppose that an agent 
decides to stop using, and thereby to lose, their skills as an expert baker in order to 
instead spend their time on some other pursuit. This does not tell against the level of 
baking skill that they have at the time of making their decision. On the other hand, the 
suggestion is that the decision to voluntarily give up the virtue of kindness, for example, 
would be proof that the agent in question did not truly possess that trait. It is not 
compatible with the possession of kindness, or any other moral virtue, that the agent 
                                                                 
32 Those sympathetic to the idea of the ‘unity’ or ‘reciprocity’ of the virtues are more likely to 
support the idea that virtues cannot conflict. For a detailed discussion of the unity thesis, and of the 
different rationales for supporting it, see Russell (2009) Chapter 11. 





would voluntarily let it go. This suggests that virtues differ from skills and so moral 
virtues must not merely be skills. 
 
A first thing worth saying in response to this argument is that it does not seem to be 
incompatible with the possession of a virtue that the agent, at least momentarily, wishes 
that they did not possess it. Consider the (surprisingly common) example of a mother 
whose sense of justice compels her to report her criminal child to the authorities.34 In 
such a case we can imagine the mother agonising over the decision and knowing that 
she could not live with herself if she were to turn a blind eye to the offense or conceal 
evidence from the police. The mother might say something like “I wish I could just let 
this go. I wish I didn’t possess this commitment to justice, as my life would be so much 
easier. But, alas, this is how I am and I must call the police.” Such a case would appear 
to provide an example of an agent who does possess the virtue of justice (they do, after 
all, report their own child to the police) but who also wishes that they did not possess 
that trait. They would (at least in that instant) voluntarily give up the trait if they could. 
While such examples might tell against the current objection to the skills model to some 
degree, they will not be enough. While the agent in this example wishes that they did not 
possess the trait of justice, they ultimately do not choose to give it up. And perhaps if 
they did forsake justice in order to protect their child this would lead us to question how 
just they were in the first place. Instead, what is required is an example where an agent 
actually does (or would) choose to give up a moral virtue, but where this does not tell 
against their actual possession of that virtue.35 Such an example would allow us to deny 
the suggested distinction between moral virtues and skills, and therefore show that the 
current objection is not sufficient. 
 
Consider the following example:  
 
                                                                 
34 Examples of such cases are reported every so often in the media. For two examples, see: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2052930/Mother-turns-in-sons-to-police-for-blinding-
man-in-drunken-assault.html# (accessed 29/06/2012) and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
scotland-glasgow-west-16658815 (accessed 01/07/2014). 
35 An alternative strategy would be to suggest that some skills are incompatible with voluntarily giving 





Remarkable Offer: Teresa typically values the well-being of others and spends 
a significant percentage of her time working for charity. She also listens 
carefully when others tell of their worries, and is always on hand whenever a 
friend or neighbour requires assistance. One day, Teresa is made a 
remarkable offer. She has the opportunity to improve the lives of a vast 
number of people. All that she needs to do is step into the “de-virtufier” 
machine and a great many benefits will be showered on the general 
population. Ailments will be lessened; happiness will increase, and so on. At 
the same time, the machine will weaken Teresa’s kindness to non-virtue 
status (whatever this requires). If Teresa chooses not to enter the machine 
then she will be free to go on her way as before. 
 
It seems possible in such a case that Teresa may both possess the moral virtue of 
kindness and yet (or even because of this) choose to enter the de-virtufier, thereby 
sacrificing her virtue. Furthermore, it is plausible that this would be a voluntary choice. 
No-one will be worse off if Teresa chooses not to enter the machine, and we can 
stipulate that Teresa herself will not suffer in any way if she chooses to pass up the 
opportunity. Therefore, Teresa is not being coerced into making the decision. This 
example suggests that it is compatible with the possession of a genuine moral virtue that 
the agent may voluntarily choose to give it up. This provides us with a reason to doubt 
the distinction between virtues and skills that was proposed as a means of challenging 
the skills model. 
 
The Remarkable Offer example provides us with a case where a genuinely virtuous agent 
might voluntarily and knowingly choose a course of action that leads to the loss of their 
virtue. This should be enough to show that it is not necessarily the case that virtue is 
incompatible with voluntary loss, and so virtues are not as different from skills as the 
present objection to the skills model requires. However, the case of Teresa must be 
accepted as being somewhat out of the ordinary. Given the fantastical nature of the 
example, we might worry about the trustworthiness of our intuitions in this case. It is 
worth pointing out, therefore, that far more common and realistic examples can also be 
provided. Imagine the virtuous soldier choosing to take part in a just war despite 
correctly anticipating that the horrors of war are likely to deaden her moral sensibilities. 





positive aspect of her character in order to further a just cause. The very virtue that 
prompts her decision will be lost as a result of that decision. On a more mundane level, 
we can imagine a virtuously generous prospective parent choosing to have a child 
despite knowing that the fatigue of parenthood in the early years will render her too 
tired to always fully satisfy the demands of generosity towards other people. So long as 
examples of this sort are available, there is no reason to doubt the intuition that is had in 
response to Remarkable Offer. There are cases where a genuinely virtuous agent can 
choose to perform an action that leads to the loss of their virtue. And this shows us that 
the proposed distinction between virtues and skills is not strong enough to rule out the 
acceptability of the skills model of the moral virtues. The objections considered in this 
section have all proven to be inconclusive. 
 
3. REJECTING THE SKILLS MODEL 
The arguments provided by Zagzebski have failed to show that moral virtues are not 
(merely) skills. And yet, Zagzebski is nevertheless right in rejecting the skills model. I 
will now provide one further objection to the skills model in order to properly 
demonstrate the insufficiency of that view. This objection reveals the importance of 
focusing on an agent’s motivations when determining whether or not they possess a moral 
virtue. 
 
According to the skills model, moral virtues consist of cognitive practical skills. That is, 
moral virtues are like practical skills (such as playing tennis or playing the violin), where 
these skills are taken to involve engaged reasoning and practical knowledge on the part 
of the agent (as opposed to being merely mindless or routine). An agent who possesses 
cognitive practical skill in playing tennis is not one who can merely follow instructions 
about where to stand and when to swing their racquet. They will instead be able to 
anticipate their opponent’s strategy, know when to attack and when to defend, and so 
on. When applied to specific moral virtues, the skills model suggests that (for example) 
the virtue of compassion will consist of something like the set of skills involved in 
understanding the needs of those around you and in working out how best to respond 





something like the set of skills involved in being able to identify situations as involving 
potential injustices and then working out how best to act in order to avoid any unfair 
outcomes (in your particular circumstances). However, this model leaves out something 
important about the nature of moral virtues. This can be shown by first focusing on a 
notable feature of practical skills. 
 
It will be useful to consider two examples mentioned in the work of Joel Kupperman. 
Kupperman discusses the examples of a skilled mechanic who “delights in inner 
fantasies of wheels falling off and brakes failing” and of a skilled mathematician who 
enjoys “deliberately miscalculating and spoiling proofs”. 36 These examples are 
particularly instructive for highlighting a problematic feature of skills. It is possible to 
possess a given skill, and to a very high degree, while at the same time being non-
instrumentally motivated to act in a way that runs directly contrary to the utilising of 
that skill. Kupperman’s mechanic possesses the skills necessary for car repair and 
maintenance while at the same time being motivated to see cars that are damaged and 
malfunctioning. Kupperman’s mathematician possesses the skills necessary for 
producing accurate proofs and yet at the same time is motivated to produce inaccurate 
proofs and to make mathematical errors. While the particular motivations involved in 
these examples are somewhat unusual, the general feature of skills that they point 
towards is not. It is entirely possible for an agent to possess a skill while at the same 
time being motivated in a way that runs directly contrary to the utilising of that skill. 
 
This general feature of skills is extremely damaging for the skills model of the moral 
virtues. Whereas the possession of a skill is compatible with a variety of motivations, 
including a non-instrumental motivation that runs directly contrary to that skill, the 
same is not true of the possession of a moral virtue. An agent does not possess the 
moral virtue of kindness if they are (non-instrumentally) motivated to harm other 
people. An agent does not possess the moral virtue of honesty if they are (non-
instrumentally) motivated to deceive. The skills model cannot explain this fact. It is 
possible to possess the skills involved in understanding the needs of those around you 
                                                                 





and how best to satisfy those needs while at the same time being motivated to ensure 
that the needs remain unsatisfied. But it is not possible to possess the virtue of 
compassion while having this same motivation. Similarly, it is possible to possess the 
skills involved in being able to identify situations as involving potential injustice while at 
the same time being motivated to ensure that those injustices actually come to pass. But 
it is not possible to possess the virtue of justice while being motivated in this way. 
Possession of a skill is compatible with motivations of this sort while possession of a 
moral virtue is not. Therefore, moral virtues must not merely consist in the possession 
of cognitive skill(s) or know-how. 
 
The problem with the skills model is that it fails to make demands regarding an agent’s 
motivations when determining whether or not the agent possesses a given moral virtue. 
This leaves open the possibility that an agent will count as being virtuously kind despite 
being motivated to harm others, or that an agent will count as being virtuously just 
despite being motivated to act unfairly. Such results are highly counter-intuitive and 
suggest that we ought to reject the skills model. In fact, these considerations suggest that 
we ought to reject any model of the moral virtues that fails to demand a necessary 
motivational component of an appropriate sort. If the skills model cannot be amended 
in ways that are sensitive to this problem then we will have sufficient reason to reject 
that model. 
 
4. AMENDING THE SKILLS MODEL 
The proposed objection to the skills model highlights the importance of motivation in 
determining whether or not an agent possesses a given moral virtue. One 
understandable response to this objection, therefore, would be to adopt an account of 
the nature of the virtues that demands the possession of a particular motivation as well 
as the possession of relevant cognitive skill(s) or know-how. There is more than one 
way of making such a move. A first way would be to adopt the view whereby the 
possession of a moral virtue consists of the possession of cognitive skill(s) plus the 
possession of a motivation that is specific to the trait in question. To make this move 





composite model. The prospects for this model will be the focus of Chapter Two. A 
second way of responding to the proposed objection would be to adopt the view 
whereby the possession of a moral virtue consists of the possession of a special type of 
cognitive skill, where this special type of skill necessarily involves some general 
motivation. If there are skills that necessarily involve some general motivation, and if we 
say that the moral virtues consist of skills of this special type, then it will be possible to 
retain the skills model while at the same time acknowledging that motivation plays a role 
in the possession of moral virtue. We can refer to the idea that moral virtues consist of 
this special type of cognitive skill as the amended skills model. 
 
If we return to the recent literature on this topic, it is possible to find support for the 
amended skills model. Theorists who are interested in the connection between virtues 
and skills have argued that there exist certain skills which necessarily involve the 
possession of a general motivation. When comparing virtues and skills, Stichter goes on 
to distinguish between two different types of skill. Drawing once more on the Dreyfus 
account of expertise and skill possession, Stichter distinguishes between “simple” skills 
and “subtle” skills.37 Subtle skills are taken to be those that are more difficult to acquire, 
such as playing the piano, while simple skills are those involved in basic tasks such as 
crossing the road. Stichter proposes that possession of a subtle skill will require that the 
agent also possess a motivation, and the motivations suggested as candidates for this 
role are the “motivation continually to improve” and the “commitment to excellence 
that manifests itself in persistence and in high standards for what counts as having done 
something right”.38 The idea that certain skills require the possession of a motivation is 
supported by Annas. Annas suggests that those skills which are most like virtues will all 
necessarily involve a “drive to aspire”.39 If there are skills which necessarily involve a 
general motivation then the objection that the skills model fails to acknowledge the 
importance of motivation in the possession of moral virtue may well be weakened. As 
Stichter makes the point: 
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if practical skills can already be divided into two categories based on 
motivational considerations, then it is unlikely that any special motivational  
elements of virtue would constitute a sufficient reason for thinking that 
virtues cannot be skills.40 
 
It is important to be clear about the dialectic here. The objection to the skills model is 
that it fails to account for the fact that virtue possession requires the possession of a 
certain motivation (or at least the absence of certain negative motivations). In response 
to this, the claim cannot simply be that both virtues and skills will be easier to develop if 
the agent possesses a motivation to improve or to aspire. The claim must be that the 
possession of both virtues and (at least some) skills is incompatible with the absence of 
this motivation.41 Furthermore, the claim cannot be that the possession of both skills 
and virtues involves the addition of a more specific motivation such as the drive to 
aspire in this particular domain or to improve in this particular way. If this is what is meant 
then we will have a version of the composite model (on which each virtue consists of 
specific skills plus a specific motivation) and not of the skills model. Therefore, if the 
amendment to the skills model is to address the objection raised above, then the claim 
must be that both virtues and (at least some) skills necessarily involve the kind of 
general motivation suggested by Stichter and Annas, and that this is sufficient to 
account for the importance of motivation in the possession of a moral virtue. I will now 
suggest that we have good reason to reject this response. 
 
5. REJECTING THE AMENDED SKILLS MODEL 
How are we to assess the claim that both virtues and (at least some) skills involve a 
general motivation such as a “drive to aspire” or “the motivation continually to 
improve”? A first response is to point out that this does not actually appear to be true of 
skills. The possession of a skill, even of a subtle skill such as playing the piano, does not 
require that the agent have a motivation to improve. One obvious example would be 
where a child is forced by an over-bearing parent to constantly practice and improve 
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their piano playing while at the same time despising the entire process. It would seem 
possible for the child to possess the skill of playing the piano even while they lack the 
motivation to improve or to aspire. Similarly, we can imagine an agent who was once 
greatly motivated to improve and who went on to became an expert baker. Even if this 
agent subsequently loses the motivation to improve, they will not simultaneously cease 
to possess their subtle baking skills. It therefore seems be to the case that skill 
possession does not require the suggested general motivation, and so the claims of the 
amended skills model should not be accepted. 
 
However, this response could simply be rejected by a defender of the skills model. 
When considering some of the more demanding aspects of her account of skills, Annas 
demonstrates a willingness to accept certain counter-intuitive implications of that 
account. For example, when discussing the drive to aspire, Annas states that “Where the 
aspiration to improve fails, we lapse into simple repetition and routine. This is a very 
demanding feature of a skill.”42 Annas would rather deny that any trait possessed 
without the accompanying motivation is a skill than accept that the possession of a skill 
does not require such a motivation. Similarly, when discussing further controversial 
aspects of her account of skills, Annas says that “this certainly flouts our everyday 
intuitions about what is and what is not a skill. But once again we must ask, ‘Does this 
matter?’”43 For Annas, it is not important whether or not there are skills which fail to 
match up with the account being suggested. So long as there exist some skills which have 
the suggested features then it will be possible to say that virtues are just like these skills, 
and the skills model could then be defended as having merit. Of course, it is not entirely 
clear that any skills do require the possession of a general motivation to improve or to 
aspire. One tactic, therefore, would be to maintain that no such skills exist and that, 
therefore, the claims of the amended skills model ought still to be rejected. However, it 
would be better if some other grounds for dismissal were also available. 
 
These grounds can be uncovered by reflecting once more on plausible candidate moral 
virtues such as honesty or compassion. The above objection to the skills model revealed 
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that possession of the relevant skills is not sufficient for the possession of a moral 
virtue. An agent can possess the ability to identify situations as requiring honesty , as well 
as having the ability to work out which action will best exemplify honesty in this 
particular situation, and yet fail to possess the virtue of honesty. This was shown by 
considering an agent who possessed these skills while also possessing a non-
instrumental motivation to deceive others. It should now be noted that possession of 
these skills plus the possession of a general motivation to improve or to aspire will also 
not be sufficient for moral virtue. The agent who possesses the skills relevant to honesty 
plus a general motivation to improve may nevertheless fail to possess the virtue of 
honesty. This will be the case, for example, if the agent does not consider the 
development of an honest character to be an improvement or if they possess an even 
stronger motivation to be deceitful. Similarly, an agent who strongly (and non-
instrumentally) desires to cause suffering will not possess the moral virtue of 
compassion, regardless of how skilled they happen to be at recognising needs and 
predicting the likely outcomes of possible actions, or how motivated they happen to be 
to improve or to aspire. Therefore, the combination of a relevant skills component plus 
a general motivation is not sufficient for the possession of a moral virtue. The amended 
skills model ought to be rejected. 
 
It is worth pointing out that the general motivations to improve or to aspire also do not 
appear to be necessary for the possession of a moral virtue. An agent’s honesty or courage 
does not appear to depend on their having a general motivation for self-improvement. 
It has more to do with how they respond to different situations and, perhaps, what their 
reasons are for responding in the way that they do. Similarly, an agent may very well be 
kind without at the same time believing it necessary, or even possible, to improve 
themselves. An agent who is satisfied with or resigned to their current levels of ability or 
status could nevertheless possess the virtue of kindness. As could a god for whom 
improvement would not be possible. The general motivation to improve or to aspire is 
not necessary for moral virtue. Of course, it was mentioned above that Stichter suggests 
a second possible motivation: the motivation to meet “high standards for what counts 
as having done something right”. But it is equally true that an agent can be kind without 





possess a commitment to high standards regarding kindness, but he need not be 
committed to high standards generally. A kind agent may have relatively low standards 
when it comes to bravery or honesty, or, less controversially, regarding what counts as 
hygienic or humorous or as a good football team. There is nothing about virtue 
possession that requires a general commitment to high standards across the board, and 
so even this motivation (when read in the general sense) is not necessary for virtue 
possession. What this suggests, then, is that the amended skills model will not be 
successful. Instead, we ought to consider an account whereby moral virtues involve a 
motivation that is specific to the given virtue. If we combine a specific motivation with 
a component of relevant cognitive skill(s) then we will be in line with the composite 
model of the moral virtues. We ought to now turn our attention to that approach. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has considered the prospects of the skills model of the moral virtues 
whereby a moral virtue consists solely of the cognitive practical skills relevant to that 
trait. This account has been found wanting as it fails to be sensitive to the importance of 
motivation in determining whether or not an agent possesses a given moral virtue. 
Therefore, we ought to move on to consider accounts of the moral virtues on which a 
motivational component features more prominently. One such account is the composite 




CHAPTER TWO: THE COMPOSITE MODEL OF THE MORAL VIRTUES 
 
0. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter focused on the skills model of the moral virtues and concluded 
that it fails to give sufficient weight to the importance of an agent’s motivations when 
determining whether or not the agent possesses a given moral virtue. The aim of this 
chapter is to consider the prospects of the composite model. On this view, a moral 
virtue consists in the possession of cognitive skill(s) or know-how as well as a 
characteristic motivation. I will first use suggestions present in the work of Linda 
Zagzebski in order to demonstrate what a version of the composite model would look 
like, and why we might think that it marks an improvement on the skills model. I will 
then consider two main objections to the idea that a component of cognitive skill is 
necessary for the possession of a moral virtue. The first objection stems from the work 
of Julia Driver who argues that the existence of “virtues of ignorance” can be used to 
tell against certain conceptions of the moral virtues. Evaluating the strength of this first 
objection will require considerable focus on the nature of Driver’s prime example of a 
virtue of ignorance: the trait of modesty. I will then propose a second objection which 
focuses on the charge that the composite model is problematically elitist. I will argue 
that the force of these objections provides us with good reason to consider an 
alternative understanding of the moral virtues. 
 
1. PRELIMINARIES – CLARIFYING THE COMPOSITE MODEL 
The skills model of the moral virtues was committed to maintaining the primacy of a 
skills component over any other possible component in an account of virtue. This 
meant that even the amended skills model of Chapter One was only able to 
accommodate a non-virtue-specific motivation, such as a general motivation to improve 
or to aspire. The composite model, on the other hand, faces no such requirement and so 
is free to posit virtue-specific motivations as being a part of every moral virtue. On the 
composite model, a moral virtue consists of just such a virtue-specific motivation plus 
the possession of the cognitive skill(s) or know-how that are relevant to that motivation.  
 
In order to evaluate the benefits of (and possible objections to) the composite model, it 





Zagzebski argues for an account of the virtues that also involves two separate 
components. It will be worthwhile for our purposes to examine the way in which 
Zagzebski explains her view. The main claim from Zagzebski is the following:  
 
A virtue therefore has two main elements: a motivational element, and an 
element of reliable success in bringing about the end (internal or external) of 
the motivational element.1 
 
In order to fully understand this view, it will be necessary to look at both components in 
some detail. Regarding the motivational component of virtue, Zagzebski provides the 
following example: 
 
I propose that a virtue has a component of motivation that is specific to the 
virtue in question. So the virtue of benevolence involves the tendency to be 
moved by benevolent motives, which is to say, it involves a disposition to 
have characteristic emotions that direct action in a particular direction, 
probably the well-being of others.2 
 
Zagzebski’s understanding of the motivational component is in-keeping with the 
composite model. Moral virtues involve the possession of a motivation that is specific 
to the virtue in question and which directs the agent in a particular direction. This will 
be important when showing that the account is an improvement on the skills model.  
 
However, it is less clear that Zagzebski’s account agrees with the composite model in 
proposing a required skills component. The first quote from Zagzebski refers to an 
element that will make the agent reliably successful in bringing about the specific end 
highlighted by the motivational component. This element might consist in the possession 
of relevant skill(s) or know-how, as this is one way in which an agent could become 
reliably successful in achieving virtuous ends. If so, the account suggested by Zagzebski 
would be a prime example of the composite model. Virtues would be viewed as 
consisting of a virtue-specific motivation plus the skill(s) or know-how relevant to that 
motivation. Indeed, there are several places in Zagzebski’s work where it looks like she 
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is sympathetic to the idea that her proposed success component consists in the 
possession of cognitive skill(s) or know-how. For example: 
 
I conclude that the “success” feature of a virtue is a component distinct 
from the motivational component. Virtue possession requires reliable 
success in attaining the ends of the motivational component of the virtue. 
This means that the agent must be reasonably successful in the skills and cognitive 
activities associated with the application of virtue in her circumstances .3 
 
And the idea that particular skills or abilities will be required is also suggested 
when Zagzebski goes on to discuss specific candidate moral virtues:  
 
A just person understands what justice demands and is good at perceiving 
details of a particular situation that are relevant to the applicat ion of rights 
and duties. A compassionate person understands the level of need of 
persons around him and can predict the effects of various forms of 
expressing compassion on persons with different personalities. 4 
 
Passages like this suggest that we ought to understand the success component posited 
by Zagzebski as a component of relevant cognitive skills. If so, Zagzebski’s account will 
be a prime example of the composite model. However, there are other places in 
Zagzebski’s work where she explicitly denies this reading. For example: 
 
we would normally expect a person with virtue to develop the associated 
skills. Still, it is possible for her to have a virtue and to lack the 
corresponding skills.5 
 
Typically, moral virtues have many skills associated with them, although 
there may be moral virtues that have no corresponding skills. 6 
 
These quotes suggest that it would be a mistake to understand Zagzebski’s success 
component as being similar to the skills component required by the composite model. 
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Indeed, there are several different ways in which we could understand the demand for a 
success component: 
 
The Composite Model Reading: The success component consists of the cognitive 
skills and know-how related to the end of the motivational component. 
 
The Pluralist Reading: The success component consists of whatever is required 
in order to make the agent reliably successful in attaining the end of the 
motivational component. This will sometimes require skills, but not always.  
 
The Reliabilist Reading: The success component is empty, and merely places a 
condition on which motivations can be virtues. Only those motivations 
which actually lead the agent to reliably attain the relevant ends are virtues.  
 
I will not here be arguing in favour of the Composite Model Reading over the other two 
readings, either as an interpretation of Zagzebski or in terms of independent plausibility. 
Indeed, it is clear that something like the Reliablist Reading is much more common in the 
secondary literature on Zagzebski.7 It is worth pointing out, however, that the latter two 
readings are at odds with other commitments present in Zagzebski’s work. On the 
Pluralist Reading the nature of different virtues will differ, depending on what happens to 
be required in order to make the agent successful in attaining their virtuous ends. The 
nature of specific virtues may even differ for different people, on the assumption that 
different people in different circumstances will require the addition of different 
attributes in order to ensure reliable success. The Pluralist Reading would therefore be in 
conflict with Zagzebski’s desire to present a uniform account of the nature of the 
virtues and to avoid the possibility of different virtues being of different types. 8 On the 
Reliabilist Reading, the success component simply places a condition on which 
motivations can be virtues, and so may actually leave us with a version of the 
motivations model. However, by demanding that a given motivation must lead to reliable 
success, this reading makes whether or not a given motivation is a moral virtue a 
hostage to luck. Many external factors could intervene to determine whether a given 
motivation leads to reliable success and, therefore, whether a given motivation is or is 
not a moral virtue. This would be at odds with Zagzebski’s belief that it ought not to be 
                                                                 
7 See, for example, Baehr (2011) pp. 132–138, and Greco (2000) pp. 179–184. 





the case “that whether a trait is a virtue or a vice is an accidental feature of it”. 9  Of 
course, these brief remarks are not intended to prove that the Composite Model Reading is 
the best account of Zagzebski’s position, or that Zagzebski actually holds a version of 
the composite model. The setting out of these three possible readings is instead 
intended to clarify precisely what is demanded by the composite model, which is the 
focus of this chapter. By using the two-component structure suggested by Zagzebski 
and then distinguishing the Composite Model Reading of the second component, we can 
come to a better understanding of the composite model itself.  
 
The main claims made by the composite model should now be clear. On this account, 
moral virtues consist of a motivation towards a characteristic end plus the cognitive 
skill(s) or know-how associated with reliable success in attaining that characteristic end. 
For example, the virtue of compassion might consist of a motivation to alleviate 
suffering plus certain cognitive skills such as the ability to identify instances of suffering 
and to work out the most effective means to alleviate it. There is good reason to 
consider such an account. Firstly, the general idea is in accordance with the Aristotelian 
claim that moral virtue requires both “aim[ing] at the right mark” and having the 
practical wisdom that allows one to “take the right means”. 10 The motivational 
component of the composite model ensures that virtuous agents will be directed 
towards the right ends, while the skills component performs the role of practical 
wisdom. In Practical Intelligence and the Virtues, Daniel Russell explains that an Aristotelian 
account will view practical wisdom (phronesis) as involving a suite of practical abilities or 
know-how.11 Practical wisdom consists of abilities such as “comprehension” 
(“something like ‘being quick on the uptake’”), “sense” (“an ability to see things from 
another’s point of view”), and “nous” (a “developed problem-solving ability resulting 
from experience”).12 It is because practical wisdom consists of such abilities that it 
allows the virtuous agent to reliably attain the ends of specific virtues. This account of 
practical wisdom also helps to de-mystify that capacity by demonstrating that it involves 
skills and abilities that we understand fairly well. As Russell says:  
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since phronesis is like a skill in the structure of its reasoning, phronesis is no 
mysterious faculty but of a piece with intellectual abilities we already find 
familiar.13  
 
This understanding of practical wisdom as consisting of (a suite of) cognitive or 
intellectual skills has been endorsed by other prominent neo-Aristotelians.14 The 
supporter of an Aristotelian understanding of moral virtue will therefore be sympathetic 
to an approach, such as the composite model, on which moral virtues consist of a 
motivational component plus a component of cognitive skill(s) or know-how. 
Throughout the revival of virtue ethics (and virtue theory) in recent times, the majority 
of writers have taken inspiration from the work of Aristotle. 15 We therefore have good 
reason to consider the prospects of an account that is in-keeping with a key Aristotelian 
idea. 
 
Further reason to focus on the composite model is provided by the fact that this 
account of the virtues will be able to explain the very same similarities between virtues 
and skills that were taken to provide support for the skills model. In the previous 
chapter, I set out Matt Stichter’s arguments regarding the similarities between the 
development of virtue and the development of skill. If virtues just are skills then this 
similarity in development can be easily explained. However, the similarity can also be 
explained if we accept that virtues partly consist of skills. On the composite model, 
possessing a given moral virtue will necessarily involve possessing certain relevant skills, 
and it is therefore unsurprising that someone will need to go through a similar process 
when developing their virtue as they would when developing a skill. The same point 
holds for the similarities between the exercise of a virtue and the exercise of a skill that 
were highlighted by Julia Annas. On the composite model, moral virtues partly consist 
of cognitive skill(s) or know-how and so it is unsurprising that the exercise of a virtue 
mirrors the exercise of such a skill. In short, the composite model can explain the 
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similarities between virtues and skills that were taken as evidence in support of the skills 
model. The same considerations give us good reason to now consider the prospects of 
the composite model. 
 
Additional support for the composite model also comes from the fact that it will be able 
to avoid the objections that were raised for the skills model in the previous chapter. The 
skills model was unable to rule out the possibility of an agent possessing a moral virtue 
while also possessing a non-instrumental motivation running contrary to that virtue.  
That is, it was unable to deny that a virtuously honest agent could be (non-
instrumentally) motivated to deceive, or that a virtuously kind agent could be (non-
instrumentally) motivated to harm others. However, this will not be a problem for the 
composite model. This model places demands on the motivations that are possessed by 
a virtuous agent. For example, on the composite model someone with the candidate 
moral virtue of honesty must possess something like the motivation to avoid deception, 
and this will be incompatible with also having a (non-instrumental) motivation to be 
deceitful. Someone with the candidate moral virtue of kindness must possess something 
like the motivation to protect and promote well-being, and this will be incompatible 
with a (non-instrumental) motivation to harm others. The composite model therefore 
avoids the main objection faced by the skills model. By retaining the benefits of the 
skills model (the ability to explain similarities between virtues and skills) while avoiding 
the drawbacks (the inability to rule out the compatibility of virtue with problematic 
motivations) the composite model looks to be a strong contender.  
 
These considerations demonstrate that the composite model of the moral virtues is 
worthy of our attention. I will now highlight two objections to this model with the aim 
of showing that we have good reason to consider an alternative approach. The first 
objection stems from the work of Julia Driver, and will require an extended discussion 






2. OBJECTION 1 – THE VIRTUES OF IGNORANCE16 
The arguments against the skills model in Chapter One were intended to demonstrate 
that cognitive skill or know-how is not sufficient for moral virtue. The arguments in the 
current chapter aim to cast doubt on the claim that such skill or know-how is necessary 
for moral virtue. One well-known attempt to deny that cognitive excellence is necessary 
for moral virtue is provided by Julia Driver. In Uneasy Virtue, Driver argues that there 
exist virtues which actually require a lack of cognitive skill or know-how, and that these 
traits can be classified as “virtues of ignorance”. 17 If correct, this would tell against 
intellectualist accounts of the virtues which demand such a component (including the 
composite model currently under consideration).18 As her prime example of a virtue of 
ignorance, Driver suggests the trait of modesty.19 In order to determine whether or not 
the virtues of ignorance pose a genuine threat to the composite model, it will be 
necessary to consider the account of modesty that is provided by Driver. If this account 
is acceptable then we will be able to ask whether or not Driver is right to claim that the 
trait of modesty tells against accounts such as the composite model. If Driver’s account 
of modesty is not acceptable then it will be necessary to spend time coming up with an 
alternative account before then asking about implications for the composite model. We 
must begin, therefore, with an assessment of Driver’s account of the trait of modesty.  
 
2.1 DRIVER’S UNDERESTIMATION ACCOUNT OF MODESTY 
The trait of modesty provides Driver with her prime example of a virtue of ignorance. 
And the ignorance that is involved in modesty is ignorance of one’s own true level of 
worth or ability. As Driver points out: 
 
What the analysis comes down to is this: for a person to be modest , she 
must be ignorant with regard to her self-worth. She must think herself less 
deserving, or less worthy, than she actually is (though it will turn out that 
how she makes the error is relevant). Since modesty is generally considered 
to be a virtue, it would seem that this virtue rests upon an epistemic defect. 20 
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17 Driver (2001) Chapter 2 (See also, Driver (1989) and Driver (1999).) 
18 Driver (2001) Chapter 2 
19 Ibid. pp. 16–28 





The caveat about the importance of how the ignorance comes about has the purpose of 
ruling out the possibility of agents who have simply never considered the issue of their 
own worth, but who would be disposed to rank themselves very highly if prompted. 21 
Such agents are currently ignorant, but their disposition suggests that they are not truly 
modest. Instead, the modest agent is one who systematically underestimates their own 
worth or ability, and who would be disposed to do so even in the face of evidence to 
the contrary. In Driver’s own words: “What I want to say about modesty is that it is not 
enough to be ignorant of self-worth; one also has to be disposed to be modest.”22 That 
is, one has to be disposed to continue to rate oneself less highly than would actually be 
deserved. 
 
If Driver’s account of modesty is correct then the modest agent will necessarily lack the 
skills involved in accurately assessing their own worth or abilities, or the value of their 
own accomplishments. They will continually get things wrong in this regard, even when 
they have access to relevant evidence. The picture that emerges of the virtuous agent is 
very different from the one proposed by the composite model, whereby a virtuous agent 
is one who possesses various cognitive skills rather than one who lacks them. Therefore, 
if Driver is correct (and if we accept that modesty is indeed a moral virtue) then this will 
be damaging for the composite model of the moral virtues. We ought to now evaluate 
the account that Driver has provided in order to assess the extent of the challenge 
posed for the composite model. 
 
Driver provides us with three broad reasons to accept the underestimation account of 
modesty. Firstly, Driver points out that it is a “desired feature of any account of 
modesty” that it can explain the strangeness of the phrase “I am modest”. 23 We would 
find it strange to hear someone making this claim, and the underestimation account can 
explain why. Modesty requires not only that the agent underestimate their self-worth, 
but also that they are not doing so knowingly. If they are aware of what they are doing 
then it is not true modesty: “I can be modest, but I cannot know it”.24 And this makes 
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the phrase “I am modest” self-defeating. If the statement was true then I would not be 
able to knowingly assert it. 
 
The second broad consideration in favour of the underestimation account is that it 
makes it easy to provide a corresponding account of false modesty. To be falsely modest, 
according to this account, is to understate your own self-worth or ability while actually 
having a perfectly accurate understanding of these matters. It is thereby deceptive in 
some way. As Driver says, “There is something ‘put on’ about false modesty that gives it 
the flavour of insincerity”.25 And this account also tells us something about why false 
modesty is considered an undesirable trait. One explanation is that we dislike insincerity, 
and so the aspect of deception is what tells against the value of false modesty 
(understood in this way).26 A second explanation is provided by Driver who points out 
some possible undesirable consequences of this trait. The falsely modest agent has been 
misleading people, and when this is uncovered it will have a negative social impact. 
People will feel “patronized or condescended to” and so the impact of the trait will be a 
reduction in good feeling.27 The underestimation account thereby provides a 
corresponding account of false modesty, as well as an explanation for why false modesty 
is an unappealing trait. 
 
A third and final possible benefit of any proposed account of modesty is that it be able 
to provide an explanation for the positive value of that trait. In accordance with Driver’s 
general account of what makes a trait a virtue, the trait of modesty is valuable because of 
the good outcomes that it produces.28 These outcomes are produced because a modest 
agent is less likely to provoke envy from other people. As Driver explains:  
 
The modest person has a charm similar to that of the unaffected person. 
Someone who doesn’t compare his appearance to those of others around 
him and, even better, seems unaware of it seems less likely to provoke an 
envious response in others. Thus, modesty involves ignorance, and the 
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ignorance is valuable because of what it indicates about a person’s ranking 
behavior.29 
 
The modest agent is ignorant of their own level of worth or ability, and this suggests 
that they will not be prone to problematic ranking behaviour. They seem less likely to go 
around comparing themselves to others, and avoiding such behaviour can be expected 
to have an ameliorating social impact. This, according to Driver, explains the value of 
the trait of modesty. With this in mind, it appears that the underestimation account of 
modesty is able to provide three important benefits. It can: (i) explain the strangeness of 
the phrase “I am modest”; (ii) provide a plausible corresponding account of false 
modesty; and (iii) explain why the trait of modesty is valued. It will be important to keep 
these benefits in mind if and when we come to consider an alternative to Driver’s 
account. For now, the apparent provision of these benefits speaks in favour of the 
underestimation account of modesty. 
 
Despite these supposed benefits, there is good reason to reject the underestimation 
account. I will focus on two main concerns: (1) the worry that the proposed explanation 
for the value of modesty is unconvincing; and (2) the worry that the conditions that 
have been suggested for genuine modesty are not sufficient. Regarding the first of these 
worries, Driver has argued that, on her view, modesty can be expected to reduce 
instances of envy in a society, and that this provides an explanation for why we value 
the trait. However, there is good reason to doubt these claims. First of all, there is good 
reason to think that the prevalence of modesty, on Driver’s account, would actually lead 
to an increase in envy within a society. As Daniel Statman has pointed out, the 
underestimation account suggests that modest agents will consider themselves to be less 
worthy or less able than they actually are. If modest agents are more likely to think that 
other people are better than they are, then those modest agents will also be more likely 
to be envious of others.30 Even if a modest agent is unlikely to provoke envy, they seem 
more likely to be envious themselves.  And this calls into question the claim that 
modesty is valued because it makes envy less likely in society.  
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The proposed explanation for the value of modesty is further called into question once 
we realise that a tendency to reduce cases of envy is not sufficient to make us value a 
particular trait. This is especially clear when we think again about the trait of false 
modesty. As understood by Driver, the behaviour of the falsely modest agent could be 
the same as that of the truly modest agent. The only difference between the two is that 
the truly modest agent has an inaccurate self-opinion whereas the falsely modest agent 
will have an accurate (or even inflated) self-opinion. Therefore, the social impact of 
both genuine modesty and effective false modesty can be expected to be identical. And 
if we are to understand the value of modesty as stemming from its impact in society, 
then we must also accept the equal value of effective false modesty. And yet, intuitively, 
we do not value effective instances of false modesty. It may be possible to avoid this 
conclusion by instead appealing to the inherent moral value of truthfulness (or the 
inherent moral disvalue of deceptiveness), but it is not clear how convincing such an 
appeal would be, or whether the appeal would be compatible with Driver’s overall 
consequentialist approach to the virtues. Furthermore, additional traits which appear 
likely to reduce cases of envy but which are not considered to be valuable have been 
proposed elsewhere.31 Therefore, even if we accept Driver’s claim that the trait of 
modesty has a positive impact due to the reduction in cases of envy, we still have good 
reason to question the adequacy of the proposed explanation for the value of modesty. 
 
The second and perhaps more damaging problem facing the underestimation account is 
that the suggested conditions for genuine modesty are not sufficient. Someone might 
satisfy the requirements proposed by the underestimation account and yet, intuitively, 
not class as a genuinely modest individual. In order to demonstrate this, we require an 
example where the agent genuinely underestimates their own self-worth or ability (and 
would continue to do so in the face of competing evidence) but where the agent still 
does not count as truly modest. The beginnings of such an example can be taken from 
Driver’s own work. When making the point that her proposed account is one of 
underestimation rather than low estimation, Driver provides the example of Albert 
Einstein: “if Albert Einstein viewed himself as a great physicist, just not the greatest 
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physicist of the 20th century – that’s modesty.”32 But suppose we now add to this 
example. G. F. Schueler asks us to consider someone who judges that they are a great 
scientist but who nevertheless (systematically) underestimates their own worth. They 
believe themselves to be the second greatest scientist of the century while in fact they 
are the greatest.33 Such an individual will meet the proposed conditions for modesty. 
However, they will continue to meet those conditions even if they are incredibly 
boastful about what they take to be their true level of ability. We can imagine them 
cruelly ridiculing colleagues for their relative lack of ability, or demanding that others 
show them respect in various humiliating and distasteful ways. As long as such an agent 
continues to underestimate their own worth or ability (and would do so in the face of 
contrary evidence) then they will meet Driver’s conditions for being modest. And yet, it 
does not seem right that the boastful scientist should be considered a modest agent. The 
underestimation account of modesty is not sufficient. It will be important to diagnose 
the failing that is highlighted by the boastful scientist example, and to re-consider the 
example when evaluating any alternative account. 
 
We are interested in Driver’s account of the candidate virtue of modesty because of 
Driver’s claim that this virtue requires a lack of cognitive skill and so can act as a 
counter-example to accounts of the moral virtues such as the composite model. 
However, we have now seen that Driver’s own account of the trait of modesty is 
unappealing. Rather than giving up on the objection to the composite model that is 
suggested by Driver, we ought instead to try and come up with an alternative account of 
the trait of modesty. Having done this, we will be able to reassess Driver’s claim that 
modesty can act as a counter-example to accounts such as the composite model. 
 
One thing that is important for our purposes here is to correctly diagnose the failing in 
Driver’s account that allowed for the damaging boastful scientist counter-example. And 
the correct diagnosis can be achieved by noting that rival accounts will be subject to 
similar counter-examples so long as they focus entirely on features internal to the agent. 
As Driver says, on her account “Modesty is something that is internal; it is basically an 
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attitude of ignorance that one has towards oneself.”34 And so long as an account 
remains purely internal, variants of the boastful scientist case will be possible. This is 
true for various rival accounts, including those which demand that the agent not over-
estimate their worth; those which demand that the agent acknowledge the equal moral 
worth of all humans; and those which demand that the agent regularly compare 
themselves against the standard of idealised agents. 35 In each case it will be possible for 
the agent to be both proud and obnoxiously boastful about some ability that they do 
possess. Perhaps, then, we would do better in avoiding the problems that afflict the 
underestimation account by tackling this issue in a direct way. What is needed is an 
external requirement – a restriction on how the truly modest agent will behave in their 
interactions with other people.36 If our account of modesty stipulates that the modest 
agent be disposed not to brag or boast or ridicule others for their relative lack of ability, 
then we can be confident in ruling out problems analogous to the boastful scientist 
objection.  
 
However, this stipulation will not be enough. We can easily imagine cases where an 
agent is disposed not to boast or to ridicule others but where we do not believe that the 
agent is truly modest. This will be the case when an agent just doesn’t care about the 
opinions of other people, or when an agent’s aim is to trick others in order to reap the 
benefits of a good reputation. An acceptable account of modesty will therefore need to 
include both a behavioural restriction and some other requirement in order to identify 
cases of genuine modesty. Only then will we have an acceptable account of modesty 
that we can use to evaluate the “virtues of ignorance” objection to the composite model. 
I will now propose such an account. 
 
2.2 MODESTY AS KINDNESS 
We now have four requirements that must be met by any successful account of 
modesty. When providing her own account, Driver highlighted three benefits that it 
would be desirable to provide: (i) an explanation for the strangeness of the phrase “I am 
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modest”, (ii) a plausible corresponding account of false modesty, and (iii) an explanation 
of why genuine modesty can be considered a valuable trait. We can add a further 
requirement to this list: (iv) the account should include a behavioural restriction in order 
to avoid the boastful-scientist-type objections that are problematic for other accounts. I 
will now propose an account of modesty that is able to satisfy these requirements.  
 
The trait of modesty ought to be considered as closely related to the more widely 
accepted moral virtue of kindness. It is at least part of the nature of kindness that the 
kind agent will be concerned to protect and promote the well-being of others. The 
modest agent is one who shares this concern and who is influenced by it in the way that 
they present themselves. The modesty-as-kindness account (MK) can be set out in the 
following way: 
 
To be modest is to be disposed to de-emphasise your accomplishments and 
positive attributes in a way that is sensitive to the potential negative impact 
on the well-being of others, where this disposition stems from a concern for 
that well-being. 
 
This account is able to satisfy the four conditions set out above. The account can (i) 
explain why there would usually be something strange about the phrase “I am modest”. 
Given that modesty is taken to be a positive trait, the agent who utters this phrase 
would be providing evidence that they lack a disposition that is a key part of genuine 
modesty. However, MK does tell us that the phrase is not necessarily incompatible with 
genuine modesty, as Driver appears to have thought. If the agent does not consider 
modesty to be a valuable trait or if they believe themselves to be in a situation where no-
one’s well-being would be negatively affected (for example, in a job interview or among 
close friends) then the statement could perfectly well be compatible with genuine 
modesty. This seems to be the correct result. And MK also appears to get things right 
with regard to (ii) giving an account of false modesty. To possess (the persistent trait of) 
false modesty is to possess the same disposition regarding how you present your 
accomplishments/attributes but where this disposition stems from the wrong kind of 





downplaying some positive attribute in order to ingratiate yourself with your boss, or to 
encourage the general public to like you so that they will buy your autobiography).  
 
Perhaps the most important benefit of MK is that it (iii) allows us to fully explain why 
modesty has been taken to be (and is) a valuable trait. First of all, the account suggests 
that modesty will have the very same social benefits that Driver claimed were provided 
by modesty on the underestimation account. The modest agent avoids bragging and 
boasting about their achievements out of a concern for the well-being of those who 
might do badly by comparison. One side-effect of this will be that the modest agent is 
less likely to provoke envy and dislike in others, and so will have the ameliorating social 
impact that was described by Driver. In addition to this, however, we can now also see 
that the possession of modesty is indicative of a kind and caring nature on the part of 
the modest agent. The modest agent is concerned to protect and promote the well-being 
of others through their self-presentation and so will be likely to also possess the virtue 
of kindness. Indeed, it would be possible on this view to see modesty as simply an 
expression or manifestation of the more fundamental virtue of kindness. Such a view of 
modesty as a restricted form of kindness would make it clear why modesty is a morally 
valuable trait, and would explain the intuition that modesty should appear on a list of 
the moral virtues.37 But even a more conservative view (on which modesty is merely 
good evidence for the separate virtue of kindness) will be able to explain that intuition. 
Either way, the modesty-as-kindness account is able to adequately explain the value of 
modesty. 
 
The three benefits suggested by Driver have been provided by the modesty-as-kindness 
account. Furthermore, by focussing on how the modest agent presents themselves to 
others, MK is able to (iv) avoid the boastful-scientist-type examples that are problematic 
for rival accounts. And this feature also allows MK to provide one further benefit. One 
interesting use to which the term “modest” has sometimes been put is as a description 
of someone who dresses conservatively and in a way that seeks to conceal their body 
from others. This usage can be explained by MK. Modesty is a matter of being sensitive 
in your self-presentation out of a concern for the well-being of others. And there is 
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more than one way in which the failure to be “modest” in one’s dress may have been 
thought likely to negatively affect the well-being of others. Most obviously, the failure to 
dress “modestly” might generate feelings of either disgust or inadequacy in others. In 
addition to this, in societies where sexual thoughts are judged sinful, the failure to be 
“modest” in one’s appearance may be considered damaging for encouraging others into 
sin. Indeed, the fact that this usage of the term has become less frequent may be 
connected to a reduction in such understandings of sin. MK gains further credibility by 
being able to explain this usage, in addition to being able to provide the other benefits 
listed above. 
 
We therefore have an account of modesty that is, prima facie, plausible. However, before 
using this account to re-evaluate the threat posed to the composite model, it is 
important to do more to demonstrate its acceptability. In order to further support the 
use of MK, and in addition to highlighting the benefits that have already been listed, it 
will be useful to consider some possible objections to the account and to show that 
responses to these objections are available. Once this task is complete, sufficient 
justification will have been provided for using the modesty-as-kindness account when 
determining whether or not the trait of modesty poses a challenge to the composite 
model of the moral virtues. 
 
2.3 POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO MK – (A) HIGH OPINION 
A first criticism that might be levelled at the modesty-as-kindness account is that it 
allows for the modest agent to have a high opinion of themselves. As long as the agent 
is disposed to present themselves in a way that is sensitive to the possible negative 
impact on the well-being of others, and as long as this disposition stems from a concern 
for that well-being, then the agent can think very highly of their own accomplishments 
or attributes and still be classed as modest. Consider a variation on the boastful scientist. 
A proud scientist may share with the boastful scientist the belief that their own work is 
very impressive indeed. But as long as they are motivated to downplay their 
impressiveness whenever failing to do so would harm the well-being of others, the 
proud (but kind) scientist can be counted as modest. Do we really think that having a 





actually a matter of wide consensus within the literature on modesty. For example, 
Driver’s underestimation account allows for a modest agent to have an extremely high 
opinion of their own worth as long as their assessment is slightly less positive than is 
actually deserved.38 And this is also a feature shared by a large number of the accounts 
put forward by rivals of Driver.39 Perhaps this is enough to show that it is not widely 
considered to be the case that having a high opinion of yourself is a barrier to 
possessing genuine modesty. Some people do have genuinely impressive attributes or 
accomplishments, and awareness of this should not automatically render the agent 
immodest. The scientist who uncovers a cure for some significant illness does not lose 
the potential for modesty upon realising the importance of their accomplishment. Roger 
Federer could perfectly well be modest despite being fully aware of the evidence that 
shows him to be more talented than almost anyone who has ever played tennis. In 
short, an agent can recognise their own high level of accomplishment while still being 
genuinely modest. MK is no worse off in allowing for this possibility.  
 
2.4 POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO MK – (B) INACCURATE OPINION 
In responding to the first possible objection regarding high opinion, I appealed to other 
accounts of modesty in order to show that MK is in line with the common consensus. 
In doing so, one important difference between MK and some of the other accounts was 
obscured. MK allows for the modest agent to have a high opinion of themselves that is 
not an accurate reflection of their true level of accomplishment or ability. That is, not 
only can the modest agent have a high opinion of themselves, the modest agent can even 
have a high opinion of themselves that is inaccurate. And this may appear to be a more 
worrying problem for the proposed account. There will be many (in the literature and 
beyond) who do not believe that a genuinely modest agent can go around 
overestimating themselves. To make matters worse, it is possible to generate a rival 
account that avoids this problem. All that would be required is to amend MK by adding 
a requirement that the modest agent have the ability to accurately evaluate their own 
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attributes and accomplishments.40 Call the amended version of modesty-as-kindness 
which requires this addition ‘intellectualised modesty-as-kindness’ (IMK). It seems clear 
that this account will retain many of the benefits that I have claimed are provided by 
MK. Intellectualised modesty-as-kindness therefore looks like a strong contender. And 
if we have the intuition that overestimation of self is incompatible with genuine modesty 
then we will have every reason to accept IMK and to reject my proposed account. The 
challenge, then, is to show that genuine modesty is indeed compatible with 
overestimation and that, therefore, we ought not to amend the modesty-as-kindness 
account. 
 
In order to meet this challenge, I want to consider two different types of case.  First of 
all, and as is often the case, things can be made clearer by imagining a brain-in-a-vat. 
Such a being will receive all of the same kinds of experience as a normal person but 
these experiences will be artificially created for them by scientists. In reality they are just 
a brain floating in a vat. In such a case, a great many of the brain’s beliefs will be 
inaccurate. For example, the brain-in-a-vat may evaluate themselves as being an 
exceptionally gifted break-dancer, and their available evidence may seem to back-up this 
self-assessment. But the truth of the matter, of course, is that the brain-in-a-vat is not 
able to break-dance. They are significantly overestimating their own abilities. 41 And yet, 
it does not seem correct to say that the brain-in-a-vat is incapable of modesty in this 
case. It would be overly harsh (as well as incorrect) to inform the brain that, not only 
can it not break-dance, but it could never have been modest about it either. As long as 
the brain is disposed to present their break-dancing ability in a way that is sensitive to 
the well-being of others, and the brain is motivated out of a concern for that well-being, 
then we have every reason to say that the brain is genuinely modest regarding (what it 
takes to be) its ability to break-dance. Indeed, even if it was revealed that we are all in 
fact brains-in-vats, this fact alone should not lead us to question the modesty of any of 
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those people who were previously accepted as possessing the trait. If this case is 
convincing (and if we believe that the brain could indeed be modest) then we ought to 
deny the claim that genuine modesty is incompatible with overestimation and dismiss 
the current objection to the modesty-as-kindness account. 
 
The second type of case that I want to consider in response to the overestimation 
objection is one where the inaccuracy in the agent’s judgements is much less 
widespread. Instead of a case such as the brain-in-a-vat example, we can instead 
consider a situation where a simple miscalculation or misremembering leads an agent to 
overestimate some accomplishment. Imagine a restaurateur who believes herself to have 
played a major role in catering for a party of five hundred people and who is proud of 
having accomplished this feat. The restaurateur, however, is careful in how and when 
she advertises her accomplishment. She listens politely when others tell of having 
catered for three hundred people and does not feel the need to belittle that (lesser) 
achievement. When colleagues complain of having to deal with (a mere) two hundred 
customers she holds her tongue and refrains from phrases such as “You think two 
hundred is bad?! I once catered for a party of five hundred!” And when she is pressed 
for details of the event she is sure to acknowledge the contribution of others who were 
working on that fateful day. In short, the restaurateur is disposed to de-emphasise her 
accomplishment out of a concern for the well-being of others, and is motivated by that 
well-being. The restaurateur is a paragon of modesty. And we should not change our 
assessment of her even if we find out that she has misremembered and the actual 
number of customers served was four hundred and fifty, or even four hundred. Her 
modesty lies in how she was disposed to act based on what she took her level of 
accomplishment to be, rather than in her accuracy when assessing that accomplishment. 
An agent can perfectly well be modest about what they take their level of 
accomplishment or ability to be, even if the true level is somewhat lower. The proposed 
account of modesty-as-kindness is no worse off in allowing for this possibility. 
Therefore, we ought to dismiss the current objection to MK and resist the suggested 






The above cases have shown that it is possible to possess genuine modesty despi te 
having an inaccurate high opinion of your own accomplishments or abilities. However, 
perhaps this is not enough. Even if we now accept that there are some cases where 
overestimation is compatible with genuine modesty (and so the move to IMK would be 
a mistake), isn’t there also something suspicious about certain cases of this type? 
Consider the philosopher who always grants a higher credence to the truth of their own 
theories, but who is nevertheless disposed to act in ways that conceal this fact. Can such 
an agent be considered truly modest? In order to answer this question, more detail 
regarding the case will be required. First of all, we need to clarify the agent’s motivation 
for concealing their belief that their own theories are generally superior to others. If the 
disposition stems from a desire to be well-liked or to gain a promotion then MK will say 
that this agent lacks modesty; they are being falsely modest. Genuine modesty requires 
that the agent be motivated by a concern for the well-being of others. Secondly, we 
need to confirm whether or not the agent is correct when thinking that their theories are 
generally superior. If they are then we will have a case of high but accurate opinion and 
we have already seen that MK (as well as many other theories) will rightly tell us that 
such an agent can indeed be modest. Thirdly, we ought to ask whether or not the agent 
has strong evidence for their evaluation, even if it is inaccurate. If they do then this 
might make the case similar to the two that were detailed above and I have already 
argued that we have good reason to accept those as cases of genuine modesty. 
Therefore, if the philosopher example is to significantly differ from those previously 
discussed, it must have three features: the agent must be motivated by a concern for the 
well-being of others, the agent must be overestimating the general superiority of their 
own theories, and the agent must lack good evidence for their self-evaluation. With 
these features in place we need to ask whether or not MK would class this agent as 
genuinely modest and whether or not that verdict is acceptable.  
 
It seems clear that MK is bound to classify the agent in this case as genuinely modest. 
They are disposed to be sensitive to the well-being of others when presenting what they 
take to be their level of accomplishment, and we have stipulated that they are motivated 
by a concern for that well-being. How then can we explain the suspicion that the 





superior) does not deserve to be classed as truly modest? One possibility is that the 
willingness to believe in one’s own superiority without good evidence indicates that the 
agent is being unkind when they evaluate other people. As an account that views 
modesty as closely related to kindness (and possibly even as a restricted form of 
kindness), MK can agree that we are justified in being suspicious about the agent’s 
modesty. Alternatively, it is possible that our suspicion is being caused by some other 
failing. The agent certainly appears to possess certain epistemic vices that would make 
us want to criticise their character, and it is possible that we simply misdiagnose their 
failing as a failing of modesty. Finally, it is possible that more work needs to be done to 
clarify the precise relationship between the trait of modesty and the trait of humility. It 
is often assumed that these two traits are one and the same, and this would explain why 
cases of a lack of humility (like the philosopher in our example) are assumed to be cases 
of a lack of modesty. If we instead reject the assumption that modesty is identical to 
humility, then we can accept the verdict of MK that the philosopher is being modest, 
while explaining the mistaken intuition to the contrary. As long as at least one of these 
explanations for our intuition in the case of the overestimating philosopher is plausible 
(appeal to evidence of a lack of kindness, appeal to an epistemic failing, or appeal to a 
distinction between modesty and humility) then we can happily accept the judgement of 
MK in such a case. This fact, coupled with the points made above, should lead us to 
deny that MK faces any serious threat from cases of inaccurate self-evaluation. 
 
2.5 POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO MK – (C) DECEPTION 
We have been considering objections to the modesty-as-kindness account in order to 
support the justifiability of using this account of modesty when evaluating a possible 
challenge to the composite model. It has been shown that MK should not be considered 
vulnerable to cases of high self-evaluation or to cases of inaccurate self-evaluation. A 
final objection that I want to consider is that the proposed account attributes genuine 
modesty in cases where an agent is being purposely deceptive. I have suggested that 
modesty is compatible with the agent having a false view of their own level of ability 
(like the brain-in-a-vat), but it might be thought that modesty is incompatible with 
having an accurate view of such abilities. To know very well how impressive you are 





disposition to do so is therefore an unappealing one, even when motivated by a concern 
for the well-being of others. And if the disposition being described is unappealing, then 
it either cannot be the correct account of modesty or it will have shown us that modesty 
must not be a moral virtue. 
 
This objection can also be dismissed. First of all, it is not clear that the modest agent will 
necessarily have to be deceptive. As Ridge points out, “A person may fail to emphasise 
some fact, say that he is a world-famous philosopher, without making any effort to get 
those around him to reject the proposition corresponding to that fact.”42 All that might 
be required is that the agent not go out of their way to draw attention to their 
accomplishments (or positive attributes) in cases where doing so might have a negative 
impact on others. And this is not deceptive. Secondly, it is not clear that the disposition 
to deceive in cases where another’s well-being is at stake is an unappealing one. Perhaps 
I should be disposed to lie or mislead when confronted with a situation where telling the 
truth will be (unnecessarily) harmful. This simply amounts to being tactful, and we 
intuitively think that this can be a perfectly nice, and perhaps even admirable, trait to 
possess. So even if modesty on the proposed account could involve deceit, it is not clear 
that this makes modesty unappealing. And, thirdly, it seems that if we did demand that 
the modest agent not have an accurate view of their own worth, then this might actually 
make it harder to support the idea that modesty is a virtue. A trait which is incompatible 
with self-knowledge may be even less appealing than one which simply allows for 
(benevolent) deceit. In terms of allowing for the value of modesty to be explained, we 
would be better off supporting MK than to demand ignorance from the modest agent.  
 
I have now demonstrated some of the ways in which the modesty-as-kindness account 
is able to respond to possible objections. Having established the plausibility of this 
account, MK can now be used to determine whether Driver was correct when claiming 
that the trait of modesty poses a significant challenge to certain theories of virtue, 
including the composite model. 
 
                                                                 





2.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COMPOSITE MODEL 
Julia Driver has claimed that the trait of modesty (as a prime example of a “virtue of 
ignorance”) poses a challenge to intellectualist accounts of the moral virtues, and this 
will include accounts which involve a necessary component of cognitive skill(s) or 
know-how. This is because, according to Driver, modesty is a virtue that actually 
requires a lack of such skill – the genuinely modest agent must be such that they will 
consistently fail to correctly assess their own level of worth (or accomplishment or 
ability). Given that the composite model includes a component of necessary skill, we 
have good reason to ask whether or not Driver’s objection is correct. However, I have 
shown that Driver’s underestimation account of modesty should not be accepted, and I 
have proposed an alternative account. With this alternative account in mind, we can 
now consider whether the trait of modesty really does pose a challenge to the composite 
model of the moral virtues. 
 
Consider again the modesty-as-kindness account. On this view, it is entirely possible for 
the modest agent to possess the same failures of cognitive skill that were mentioned by 
Driver. It can be the case that the agent is not capable of accurately assessing their own 
abilities or accomplishments (either through overestimating or underestimating them), 
they can fail to reliably pick up on evidence that ought to reveal to them the truth of 
such matters, and they can also lack the skills involved in accurately comparing 
themselves to other people. While these failings are not required by modesty-as-kindness, 
they are consistent with that account. And this looks to be equally bad news for the 
composite model. Moral virtue cannot necessarily involve a component of cognitive 
skill(s) or know-how if it is possible to possess a virtue while lacking precisely such 
relevant skills. Therefore, while we ought not to accept Driver’s own account of the 
nature of modesty, Driver may yet be correct when claiming that modesty poses a 
significant challenge to accounts such as the composite model.  
 
Of course, it will be possible for a defender of the composite model to simply deny that 
modesty is a moral virtue. But this response requires that some acceptable  method be 
provided for identifying which traits are moral virtues, as well as demonstrating that the 





out that MK does provide us with reason to think that a successful method for 
identifying the moral virtues would affirm the virtue status of modesty. In addition to 
the widespread acceptance of modesty as a virtue, the modesty-as-kindness account has 
shown that we have good reason to consider the trait to be morally valuable. As was 
highlighted above, MK reveals that the trait of modesty is likely to be both socially 
beneficial and to be strongly connected with the commonly accepted moral virtue of 
kindness. On such a view, therefore, there is reason to expect that a successful method 
for identifying moral virtues will accept the virtue status of modesty. In the absence of a 
worked out method for identifying the moral virtues, these considerations are not 
conclusive. However, they do suggest that the defensive move of denying the virtue 
status of modesty can be expected to face serious challenges.  
 
Another response to the challenge posed by modesty for the composite model would be 
to provide some further objection to the account of modesty that has been presented 
here. Even if a defender of the composite model accepts the virtue status of modesty, 
they may refuse to accept the modesty-as-kindness account. It may be claimed that the 
composite model will be perfectly able to accommodate the virtue of modesty once we 
have the correct account of modesty in hand. It is true that (as with any theory) the 
endorsement of MK will remain somewhat provisional until all possible objections have 
been considered. However, I have already demonstrated how a defender of modesty-as-
kindness will be able to respond to some of the more pressing objections that are likely 
to be raised. The above discussion ought to tell us that MK is a strong contender in this 
debate. To that extent, there is reason to believe that the challenge raised here is a 
significant one. 
 
In addition to the potential for future considerations to weaken the challenge posed to 
the composite model, it is also important to point out the potential for that challenge to 
be strengthened. The trait of modesty was only one of Driver’s original examples of a 
virtue of ignorance. In addition to the prime example of modesty, Driver also suggests 
the traits of blind charity, impulsive courage, trust, and a form of forgiveness. 43 There is 
no reason to believe that this list is exhaustive. It is possible that an acceptable account 
                                                                 





of any one of these additional traits will reveal that trait to be a genuine virtue of 
ignorance. I will not attempt to provide an account of these traits here, but it is 
important to note that future work on these candidate virtues may well provide us with 
further counter-examples to the composite model. If so, the challenge posed by the 
virtues of ignorance will be even more considerable. 
 
To conclude this section, I have proposed and defended an account of the nature of 
modesty on which modesty is compatible with a lack of relevant cognitive skill(s) or 
know-how. If the widespread acceptance of the virtue status of modesty is correct then 
this would suggest that modesty provides us with a counter-example to the necessity of 
cognitive skill for moral virtue. We would then have reason to reject the composite 
model of the moral virtues. While future considerations may prompt us to reassess the 
strength of this challenge, it is at least as likely that the strength of the challenge will 
increase once we come to consider the nature of other suggested virtues of ignorance. 
Therefore, it would appear that we have good reason to consider alternatives to the 
composite model. Further support for this conclusion can be gained by briefly 
considering a second possible objection. 
 
3. OBJECTION 2 – THE WORRY OF ELITISM 
The composite model posits that every moral virtue consists of two components. On 
this account, virtue will require an important element of cognitive skill(s) or know-how. 
The passages from Zagzebski quoted earlier in this chapter highlight that the virtuous 
agent is expected to be “reasonably successful in the skills or cognitive activities 
associated with the application of virtue”. They also provide some examples of the skills 
involved in specific candidate virtues, such as the skill of predicting the outcome of 
various alternative courses of action that is taken to be involved in the candidate virtue 
of compassion. These quotes suggest that the possession of a moral virtue will be 
intellectually demanding. And this idea gains further support when Zagzebski says that 
“the virtuous person has a superior form of moral knowledge. She is able to know the 
right thing to do in a way that cannot be predicted in advance”44 and that “Being 
reasonably intelligent within a certain area of life is part of having almost any moral 
                                                                 





virtue.”45 These quotes should lead us to suspect that the composite model, on which 
moral virtue requires the possession of relevant cognitive skill (s) or know-how, will be 
intellectually demanding. 
 
Zagzebski is far from unique among contemporary virtue theorists in holding the view 
that the possession of specific moral virtues requires the possession of cognitive skills 
that are potentially intellectually demanding. Just as Zagzebski lists the skills required for 
justice and compassion, the following quotes from Julia Annas and Paul Bloomfield, 
respectively, make a similar point for the candidate moral virtues of generosity and 
courage: 
 
Generosity requires intelligence about what people both need and want, and 
also about appropriate ways, times, and manners of giving, avoiding 
obtrusiveness and condescension.46 
 
the full story about courage… will require both an ability to discern real 
from apparent danger and knowledge of what is of value in life. So, courage 
requires an ability to manage fear, a conative achievement, but it also 
requires an intellectual understanding of what is worth taking risks for. 47 
 
An understandable response to these quotes – and to the general claim that this type of 
skill is required for virtue – is to worry that many agents will be ruled out as even 
potential possessors of moral virtue. Certainly, children and non-human animals are 
unlikely to possess the skills that are involved. The same applies to those with cognitive 
disabilities or who are suffering from mental illness. 48 It is likely that people will differ 
on how intuitive they find the claim that such agents cannot be morally virtuous. 
However, the class of people who cannot be in possession of moral virtue on the 
composite model may be even wider than this. Indeed, most people seem likely to 
struggle to meet the high intellectual standards demanded by the relevant cognitive 
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skills, including those who are otherwise regarded as being relatively intelligent.49 Can 
any of us be confident that we are capable of properly understanding the “application of 
rights and duties”, of accurately predicting “the effects of various forms of compassion 
on persons with different personalities”, or of being able to work out “what is of value 
in life”? If moral virtue requires the possession of such skills then it seems clear that the 
vast majority of people do not possess moral virtues and, indeed, cannot. The 
possession of moral virtue would then only be realistically possible for an intellectual 
elite. And we may well worry that such a conclusion speaks badly of an account of 
moral virtue. As Driver argues: 
 
Virtue must be accessible – to those who are not wise but kind… who are 
capable of showing the appropriate compassionate responses to human 
suffering; to those who, like most of us, possess some intellectual or moral 
flaw.50 
 
The composite model tells us that the vast majority of people are not (and realistically 
cannot be) just, compassionate, generous, courageous, honest, or kind, and this should 
give us cause to reflect on the acceptability of the account. Of course, a quick response 
to this worry would be to simply accept the implication. Annas suggests such a move in 
response to Driver, saying “We are not all wise, certainly, but it can be doubted whether 
we are all kind, either.”51 This response points out that it is not particularly surprising 
that kind people are as rare as are exceptionally wise people. That may be correct. 
However, what would be surprising, I propose, is if those people who are not kind just are 
those people who are not wise, and for the very reason that they are not wise. It is in 
leading to this surprising and unintuitive conclusion that the composite model of the 
moral virtues finds itself vulnerable to the charge of being problematically elitist. 52 
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It is possible to respond to any charge of elitism by appealing to other examples where a 
similar form of discrimination takes place but where this is not considered problematic. 
In the case at hand, the distinction between those who can be in possession of a moral 
virtue and those who cannot is being made (partly) on the grounds of the possession of 
a suitable level of intellectually demanding cognitive skill. Therefore, a defender of the 
composite model can respond to the worry of elitism by pointing to other cases where a 
distinction on these grounds is made and where that distinction is clearly acceptable. 
Such examples, it turns out, are numerous. When deciding whether or not someone can 
be, for example, a recognised doctor or lawyer, we tend to require proof that they are in 
possession of certain cognitive skills. The same applies in less formal settings such as 
when we are deciding who is or is not a suitable babysitter for our children, or who is an 
appropriate source of advice on some pressing matter. And while no explicit test of 
intelligence must be passed in order to vote, the exclusion of children from the 
electorate suggests that we do think that certain cognitive skills are required in order to 
properly fulfil the role of voter.53 What these examples suggest is that it is sometimes 
considered acceptable to deny people a certain role or status on the grounds of a lack of 
relevant skill or know-how. Why, then, should the composite model be regarded as 
problematically elitist for implying that such skills are required in order to be a possessor 
of moral virtue? What is important here is the availability of a proper justification for 
excluding agents from possessing a particular status on the grounds of a lack of skill. In 
cases where such a justification is available, the resulting approach should not be 
considered problematically elitist. This appears to be the case in the examples given 
involving doctors or lawyers, where an alternative system that failed to make the same 
distinction would be clearly undesirable. However, it is not yet clear whether a similar 
justification exists to vindicate the composite model. Until this has been shown it will 
also not be clear whether or not the composite model ought to be considered 
problematically elitist. 
 
The composite model of the moral virtues requires the possession of certain 
intellectually demanding cognitive skills, and this has the result that many people are 
excluded from being even potential possessors of moral virtue. This class of people will 
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certainly include children and those with cognitive disabilities or mental illnesses, but it 
is also likely to include many more people given the demanding levels of skill posited in 
the quotes above. Such exclusion should not be considered problematically elitist if it 
can be justified. That is, it should not be considered problematically elitist if an 
alternative account which fails to make the same distinction would be thereby inferior. 
Therefore, before we can know how seriously to take the worry of elitism, it will be 
necessary to consider the acceptability of an account of virtue that omits the 
requirement of a skills component. If such an account is found to be unacceptable then 
this will strengthen the prospects of the composite model by showing that it can be 
defended from the charge of elitism. However, if a model of moral virtue that avoids 
mention of a specific skills component can be defended, this would, at the same time, 
increase the challenge posed by the problem of elitism. We therefore have good reason 
to consider an alternative account of the moral virtues, both as a way of determining the 
force of the present challenge to the composite model and out of an interest in the 
independent merits of such an alternative. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this chapter has been to put pressure on the composite model of the moral 
virtues. Both of the objections considered in this chapter have challenged the necessity 
of the component of cognitive skill(s) or know-how posited by that model. The 
objection from the virtues of ignorance shows that counter-examples – such as the trait 
of modesty – can be used to deny that necessity, while the objection from elitism 
suggests that requiring such a component may be problematic in itself. Given these 
objections, we now have good reason to consider an alternative to the composite model. 
In particular, there is good reason to consider an account that does not include a 




CHAPTER THREE: THE MOTIVATIONS MODEL OF THE MORAL VIRTUES 
 
0. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter focused on the composite model of the moral virtues and argued 
that worries regarding the virtues of ignorance and the charge of elitism provide us with 
good reason to consider an alternative account. In particular, we have good reason to 
consider an account of the moral virtues which does not demand that virtuous agents 
possess a component of cognitive skill(s) or know-how. The motivations model 
provides us with an example of such an account. In this chapter I have three main aims. 
Firstly, I want to spend some time clarifying the commitments of the motivations model 
and setting out the version of the model that I will be defending. Secondly, in the largest 
section of this chapter, I will evaluate major objections that can be (and have been) 
directed against the motivations model and, indeed, against any model that fails to 
include a necessary component of cognitive skill(s) or know-how.1 By responding to 
these objections I will provide support for the claim that the motivations model is a 
sufficient account of the nature of the moral virtues. The chapter will then end with a 
consideration of some positive implications of endorsing the motivations model. By the 
end of this chapter it ought to be clear that the motivations model is a legitimate 
contender within this debate, and a live option for those working in virtue theory.  
 
1. PRELIMINARIES – CLARIFYING THE MOTIVATIONS MODEL 
The motivations model of the moral virtues states that a moral virtue consists of a 
motivation of a particular sort. Of course, it will be possible for theorists to agree with 
this basic claim (and so to endorse the motivations model) and yet to disagree over the 
best understanding of that claim. Different versions of the motivations model will be 
generated by focusing on different accounts of the type of motivation that is relevant 
for moral virtues. For that reason, it is important to be clear on the type of motivation 
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that I have in mind in this chapter. In the previous chapter, I suggested that Linda 
Zagzebski’s account of the virtues (when interpreted in a particular way) offers a prime 
example of the composite model – the virtues are taken to consist of a motivational 
component plus a component of those skills or abilities generally involved in being 
successful in attaining the end of the motivational component. In this chapter, I want to 
adopt Zagzebski’s understanding of the motivational component in order to explain the 
type of motivation that is relevant for moral virtues. In this way, the version of the 
motivations model considered in this chapter will differ from the prime example of the 
composite model considered in the previous chapter solely in virtue of the lack of a 
skills component. It is important to now say more about Zagzebski’s account of 
motivation. 
 
According to Zagzebski, a motivation is “a persistent tendency to be moved by a motive 
of a certain kind”.2 And a motive “is an emotion or feeling that initiates and directs 
action towards an end”.3 Motivations in general, therefore, can be understood as 
tendencies or dispositions to be moved (through feeling or emotion) towards some end. 
On the plausible assumption that not all motivations will be candidate moral virtues, it 
seems likely that only motivations of a particular sort ought to be considered here. There 
are two issues that I want to address at this stage. The first is how we ought to 
understand the end (or ends) towards which the relevant motivations are directed. The 
second is how best to understand the type of motivation that can plausibly count as a 
candidate moral virtue. 
 
The motivations that we are interested in here are tendencies or dispositions (of a 
particular type) to be moved (through feeling or emotion) towards some end. How 
should we characterise the end of motivations that are relevant to moral virtue? One 
option here will be to adopt an Aristotelian approach. According to Aristotle, in Book II 
of The Nicomachean Ethics, the virtuous agent chooses virtuous actions “for their own 
sakes”.4 One possible interpretation of this suggestion is that the virtuous agent is 
choosing acts as virtuous, or because they would be virtuous to perform. On this 
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reading, the ultimate end of a virtuous motivation will be to act or to live virtuously. 
Such claims are endorsed by Julia Annas, who explains the point in the following way:  
 
what is the virtuous person’s aim in acting? She has two. One is her telos or 
overall aim, of living virtuously and acting from motives of virtue. Virtue, 
after all, is a settled state of the person, with the overall aim of making the 
person’s life as a whole be one way rather than another, virtuous rather than 
evil or complacent… The virtuous person’s other aim is what the Stoics call 
her skopos or immediate target, which is what is aimed at in any particular 
case of acting virtuously.5 
 
The virtuous person will have immediate ends of course – saving this person from a 
burning building or helping this friend to study for an exam – but the ultimate end of a 
virtuous motivation is to live virtuously. This is one option for how to understand the 
end of motivations that are plausibly moral virtues, and it offers an interpretation of the 
Aristotelian claim that the virtuously motivated agent chooses virtue for its own sake.  
 
However, we ought not to accept the claim that the ultimate end of (all) virtuous 
motivations is to live virtuously. This can be shown by considering examples of agents 
who plausibly possess virtuous motivations but who cannot be understood as aiming 
towards virtue when they act. One such example is provided by Nomy Arpaly in her 
discussion of Huckleberry Finn. Huckleberry Finn, in the novel by Mark Twain, helps 
his friend Jim to escape from slavery by failing to report Jim to the authorities. 6 
However, Finn has internalised the racist assumptions of his society and so believes that 
what he is doing is wrong. When helping Jim, Finn takes himself to be failing to do the 
right thing. As Arpaly reports, “He accuses himself of being a weak-willed boy, who has 
not ‘the spunk of a rabbit’ and cannot bring himself to do the right thing”. 7 If the end of 
virtuous motivations is to act or live virtuously, then it is clear that Finn’s  motivation 
when helping Jim is not a virtuous one. Finn explicitly decides to abandon what (he 
thinks) is right and “to remain a bad boy” out of a preference for helping his friend. 8 
And yet, as Arpaly points out, Finn’s motivation – to help his friend or to respect his 
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friend’s personhood – plausibly is morally worthy, and perhaps even virtuous. The same 
point is made by Julia Driver who uses the Huckleberry Finn case in order to show that 
the virtues do not necessarily involve “good intentions”, understood as desiring to act in 
a way that one takes to be good.9 If we accept that it is possible for agents, such as 
Huckleberry Finn, to possess morally virtuous motivations without being motivated to 
act or to live virtuously then we ought to reject the suggestion that “living virtuously” is 
the unique end of those motivations which are moral virtues. 10 
 
Of course, an opponent might reply that we have failed to understand the suggestion 
charitably. The claim is not that virtuous agents have the end of living virtuously in the 
de dicto sense. Instead, the claim might simply be that the ends of moral virtues are such 
that if they are pursued successfully, then the agent will in fact be living in a way that is 
virtuous. If this is the suggestion then there seems to be little reason to deny it. 
However, it will not be helpful for our current purposes. It is not informative as to what 
the ends of moral motivations actually are, only that pursuing and attaining the ends of 
virtuous motivations will result in living virtuously. We ought to consider other 
possibilities. 
 
Bernard Williams considers several additional ways of interpreting the Aristotelian claim 
that the virtuous agent chooses virtue for its own sake. 11 One possibility, which appears 
to gain direct support from The Nicomachean Ethics, is that the virtuous agent is motivated 
towards “the noble” (to kalon). Aristotle tells us that “virtuous actions are noble and 
done for the sake of the noble”.12 Unfortunately, this suggestion faces the same 
problems as the previous one. For example, if understood in the de dicto sense it is 
incompatible with the idea that Huckleberry Finn’s motivation to help his friend was a 
morally virtuous one. And a further objection also applies to both the idea that virtuous 
motivations aim at “the noble” and that they aim at “living virtuously”. Williams points 
out that it is plausible that different moral virtues will have different ends. If we want to 
be able to differentiate the moral virtues by appeal to their different ends then we ought 
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not to claim that all virtues have the same end, be that the end of living virtuously or the 
end of nobility.13 Instead, we ought to consider the idea that different moral virtues will 
have different characteristic ends. 
 
One suggestion that is in-keeping with both the idea that different virtues have different 
ends and the idea that virtues are chosen “for their own sakes” is that the end of each 
virtue is to be virtuous in a particular way. That is, the end of the kind agent might be 
“to be kind”, the end of the courageous agent might be “to be courageous”, and so on 
for all of the candidate moral virtues. However, this suggestion is also false when read in 
the de dicto sense. As Williams points out, “courageous people rarely choose acts as 
courageous, and modest people never choose modest behaviour as modest.”14 Instead, 
we ought to accept that each virtue will direct an agent towards a different end (or a 
different set of ends) where these different ends have a content that does not necessarily 
refer to the virtue term itself.15 For example, the kind agent might be motivated to “help 
their friend” or to “tend to a sick relative”, while the ends that motivate the just agent or 
the honest agent may be different.16 Williams actually takes this to be the best way of 
interpreting Aristotle’s original claim and, when responding to Williams, Rosalind 
Hursthouse is in broad agreement.17 However, it is important to be clear that this is not 
my concern here. Regardless of whether or not it is an appropriate reading of Aristotle, 
the claim that different moral virtues will be directed towards different characteristic 
ends (or a range of different ends) looks to be a plausible one. 
 
Motivations are being understood here as tendencies or dispositions (of a particular 
type) to be moved (through feeling or emotion) towards some end.  On reflection, it 
appears likely that different moral motivations will be directed towards different 
characteristic ends. It will be worthwhile to consider some specific examples of plausible 
moral virtues in order to better demonstrate this approach. One plausible example is 
that the virtue of kindness (on the motivations model) will consist of a tendency or 
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disposition (of a particular type) to be moved (through feeling or emotion) towards the 
characteristic end of protecting and promoting the well-being of others. Perhaps the 
virtue of compassion will consist of a tendency or disposition (of a particular type) to be 
moved (through feeling or emotion) towards the characteristic end of alleviating 
suffering. And the virtue of justice might be understood as consisting in a tendency or 
disposition (of a particular type) to be moved (through feeling or emotion) towards the 
characteristic end of ensuring fair outcomes. Having said something about the ends of 
plausibly moral motivations, I now want to say something about the type of motivation 
that we need to consider. 
 
In the above explanation I frequently referred to tendencies or dispositions “of a 
particular type”. In order for it to be plausible for motivations to count as moral virtues, 
the motivations that we consider will need to have certain features. Take the example of 
the virtue of kindness when understood as a motivation to protect and promote well -
being. We do not think of the virtuously kind agent as one whose motivation can be 
sporadic or fleeting. Instead, the motivations that we are interested in must be 
sufficiently persistent. Furthermore, any virtuous motivation must be sufficiently strongly 
felt. That is, the motivation must not be so weak that, even if persistent, it would never 
be strong enough to actually prompt the agent into action. A persistent but weakly felt 
motivation to protect and promote well-being will not be sufficient for virtuous 
kindness. And thirdly, a virtuous motivation must be sufficiently robust in the sense that 
it will not be easily overridden by competing considerations. If an agent possesses a 
persistent and strongly felt motivation to protect and promote well-being, but their 
motivation is always overridden by the competing aim of making as much money as 
possible, then we will not want to say that their motivation for well-being is sufficient 
for virtue. It is only when sufficient levels of persistence, strength and robustness are 
achieved that we can say that an agent possesses the type of motivation necessary for a 
moral virtue. And we can call a motivation that meets the sufficient levels of persistence, 
strength and robustness a deep motivation. 
 
It is now possible to set out the main claim of the version of the motivations model that 





of a deep motivation, where this is understood as possession of a deep disposition to be 
moved (through feeling or emotion) towards some characteristic end. At this stage it 
would be possible to focus on two further clarifications. The first would be to settle 
what counts as the sufficient levels of persistence, strength and robustness for a deep 
motivation. The second would be to identify which motivations of this type ought to 
actually be accepted as moral virtues. I will not attempt to resolve these issues here .18 
Instead, when necessary I will aim to appeal only to examples likely to be accepted as 
clearly satisfying or not satisfying plausible levels of sufficiency. Similarly, for the time 
being I will aim to use as examples only those candidate moral virtues that would be 
widely accepted by other contemporary virtue theorists. Having made this clear, we can 
now ask whether or not the motivations model provides us with an acceptable account. 
This will primarily involve asking whether or not the possession of a deep motivation 
can be regarded as sufficient for the possession of a moral virtue.  
 
2. OBJECTIONS TO THE MOTIVATIONS MODEL 
I will now set out three objections and explain how a supporter of the motivations 
model ought to respond. The objections to be considered are: (i) the claim that the 
motivations model cannot account for the fact that virtuous agents ought to be reliably 
successful when acting; (ii) the claim that the motivations model is unable to 
accommodate an appealing distinction between “actual virtues” and “natural virtues”; 
and (iii) the claim that supporting the motivations model amounts to a celebration of 
irrationality.19 While these objections are related, it will be important to deal with them 
separately in order to ensure clarity regarding the responses that are required by each. By 
responding to these objections, I aim to demonstrate that the motivations model is a 
legitimate contender and a live option for those working in virtue theory.  
 
2.1 VIRTUE AND RELIABLE SUCCESS 
When looking to defend the claim that the motivations model provides a sufficient 
account of the nature of the moral virtues, it is important to examine considerations that 
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suggest the need for an additional component of cognitive skill(s) or know-how. One 
such consideration is the widely accepted idea that genuinely virtuous agents will be 
reliably successful when pursuing the ends of their virtuous motivations. Indeed, this 
idea has been taken to provide the most pressing challenge to accounts such as the 
motivations model, because it suggests that good intentions may not be sufficient for 
genuine virtue. That this idea is widely accepted can be shown by considering just a 
handful of quotes from influential contemporary virtue theorists. Philippa Foot states 
that “failures in performance rather than intention may show a lack of virtue.”20 
Rosalind Hursthouse explains that “Each of the virtues involves gett ing things right… 
In the case of generosity this involves giving the right amount of the right sort of thing, 
for the right reasons, to the right people, on the right occasions.”21 And Joel 
Kupperman points out that calling an agent virtuous implies that “she or he tends to 
perform very well on occasions of a certain sort”.22 Zagzebski expresses the general idea 
well when saying: 
 
It is clear that virtuous persons acting out of virtue have certain aims, and 
we generally think that it is not sufficient to merely have the aims in order to 
be virtuous, but that a virtuous person reliably produces the ends of the 
virtue in question. So compassionate persons are reliably successful in 
alleviating suffering; fair persons are reliably successful in producing fair 
states of affairs; generous persons are reliably successful in giving to those 
who are in need, and so on.23 
 
The assumption that a virtuous agent will be reliably successful in achieving their 
virtuous ends casts doubt on the sufficiency of the motivations model. It seems possible 
for an agent to have a disposition to be moved towards some virtuous end and yet to be 
utterly unreliable in actually achieving that end. Consider the agent who really is moved 
towards the protection and promotion of well-being but who never actually succeeds in 
protecting or promoting well-being. This might be possible in several different ways, 
and it will be important to discuss these different possibilities in some detail. For now it 
will suffice to get clear on the basic challenge that is being made: genuine moral virtue 
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requires an agent to be reliably successful in achieving virtuous ends, and we have 
reason to doubt that the motivations model will be able to explain this fact. If it cannot 
then this will suggest that something else is required in order to truly possess a moral 
virtue and that, therefore, the motivations model is not sufficient. We can call this the  
objection from reliable success. 
 
To make matters worse, the considerations highlighted by the objection from reliable 
success also provide direct support for the two rival models that have been considered 
so far. Both the skills model and the composite model require that a virtuous agent 
possess a set of cognitive skills relevant to the moral virtue in question. And, of course, 
the possession of these skills seems more likely to ensure that the virtuous agent will be 
reliably successful in pursuing virtuous ends. For example, if the virtue of compassion 
necessarily involves possessing the skills of identifying whenever someone is in need, as 
well as working out how best to alleviate that need, then we will have little trouble in 
explaining why the virtuously compassionate agent reliably succeeds in alleviating 
suffering. By failing to include a necessary component of relevant skills, the motivations 
model appears to find itself at a disadvantage. Considerations regarding the reliability of 
virtuous agents provide support for rival accounts, and cast doubt on the motivations 
model.  
 
My response to this objection will be in two parts. I want to first make some general 
comments in order to defend the motivations model against the claim that it cannot 
appropriately accommodate reliable success. I will then discuss different specific ways in 
which possessors of a deep motivation might fail to be reliably successful, and explain 
how the motivations model ought to respond in each case. 
 
The first move that ought to be made in response to this objection is to highlight the 
fact that no account of the moral virtues ought to demand perfectly reliable success from 
virtuous agents. Evidence for this comes from the fact that even Julia Driver’s 
consequentialist account of the moral virtues – on which virtue is explicitly tied to the 





“generally speaking”.24 Even for Driver, virtues “don’t infallibly lead to the good. There 
is room for accident in this account, which makes the account more plausible.”25 But 
why would demanding perfectly reliable success make an account of the moral virtues 
implausible? A first reason is that virtue possession ought to at least be possible for 
human beings. If virtue possession ceases to be a sensible and worthwhile goal for 
human beings to strive towards, then much of the reason for being interested in the 
virtues will have been lost. This looks to be a serious risk if we demand perfectly reliable 
success from our virtuous agents. Suppose we claimed that a virtuously kind agent 
should be perfectly reliable in the sense that they would never perform an action that 
fails to protect and promote well-being. This seems likely to lead to the result that no 
real agents actually possess virtuous kindness, despite there being people who intuitively 
should class as being kind. Imagine the following case: 
 
Hitchhiker: Angela is driving along an otherwise deserted rural road and spots 
a lonely hitchhiker. Out of a strong motivation to help, Angela offers the 
hitchhiker a lift. After a journey filled with pleasant conversation, Angela 
and the hitchhiker arrive at their destination, where the hitchhiker is just in 
time to brutally murder an old acquaintance. 
 
In this example, Angela has performed an action that has failed to protect and promote 
well-being. Had she not offered a lift to the hitchhiker, the hitchhiker would not have 
arrived in time to murder the acquaintance. And yet, despite the seriousness of the 
harm, this does not seem to be enough to rule Angela out as a possessor of genuinely 
virtuous kindness. It is important to note here that such an example will be possible 
even if we imagine that Angela possesses a significant number of relevant skills, and to a 
high degree. We can imagine an especially charming hitchhiker with a plausible 
alternative story of their immediate intentions, and perhaps even with convincingly 
crafted character references on hand if required. It will always be possible that a 
genuinely kind agent could be fooled and so perform an action that fails to protect or 
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promote well-being.26 Indeed, in order to make this impossible, the level of skill or 
know-how that we demand would need to be exceptionally high – perhaps even to the 
level that is sometimes ascribed to an “ideal observer”. 27 If we say that the possession of 
a moral virtue requires omniscience (knowledge of all non-moral facts) and 
omnipercipience (the ability to perceive the outcomes of all possible actions) then we 
really will have ensured that virtuous agents are perfectly reliable. But we will also have 
ensured that no human being can be a virtuous agent. Assuming that we take this to be 
an unappealing conclusion, it is clear that we ought not to demand perfectly reliable 
success in order to count as being genuinely morally virtuous. 28 
 
A second (related) reason why demanding perfectly reliable success would be implausible 
is that it makes virtue possession a hostage of moral luck to a problematic extent. An 
agent might fail to protect well-being as a result of a series of unpredictable and 
unfortunate events, and this ought not to rule them out as being genuinely kind. 
Similarly, an agent’s best efforts might be non-culpably thwarted by a widespread 
conspiracy or an evil demon, as in a case provided by Jason Baehr:  
 
Demon: Upon returning from a recent, eye-opening trip to an impoverished 
third-world country, Ted has resigned as the CEO of a lucrative but soulless 
corporation to start a nonprofit organization aimed at improving the plight 
of various poor and oppressed people groups across the globe… The 
demon, while not concealing the general nature of reality from Ted, 
nevertheless thwarts all of his moral efforts. Though Ted thinks that his 
fundraising is resulting in hundreds of thousands of dollars of aid being sent 
around the world, the demon systematically stymies the transactions, 
funneling the cash into slush funds at Ted’s former corporation.29 
 
Cases of moral luck, such as Demon, highlight the fact that an agent can qualify as being 
genuinely kind despite it being the case that unfortunate circumstances prevent them 
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from being perfectly reliable in protecting or promoting well-being. Even those who 
accept a general connection between moral virtue and reliable success can be expected to 
agree with this conclusion. We should not demand that the motivations model (or any 
other model) ensure perfect reliability in achieving virtuous ends. 
 
The first move in the general response to the objection from reliable success is to point 
out that no account should be expected to ensure perfect reliability from virtuous agents. 
The second move is to explain that the motivations model is perfectly able to 
accommodate the idea that virtuous agents can be expected to be more reliable in 
attaining the ends of their virtuous motivations. Interestingly, the beginnings of this 
response can be found in the work of theorists who would reject the motivations model. 
For example, Driver points out that “good intentions, good inclinations, and so on are 
conducive to good action. They are reliable directors of good action.”30 This idea is also 
supported in the following quote from Zagzebski: 
 
A virtuous motivation makes the agent want to act effectively, and this 
has both general and particular consequences. The former include the 
desire to gain knowledge appropriate to the area of life that is the 
focus of the virtue and to develop the skills associated with virtuous 
effectiveness in that area of life. Particular consequences include the 
desire to find out the relevant nonmoral facts about the particular 
circumstances encountered by the agent in which action on the 
virtuous motivation may be called for.31 
 
Consider again the motivation that I have suggested will be involved in the moral virtue 
of kindness: the deep motivation to protect and promote well-being. The motivations 
model may be rejected as insufficient if possessors of this motivation cannot generally be 
expected to be reliable in actually protecting and promoting well-being. However, the 
quote from Zagzebski highlights some of the likely consequences of possessing a deep 
motivation to protect and promote well-being. The agent will be driven to work out 
what well-being actually consists in, as well as the means that are usually effective in 
protecting and promoting it. They will be driven to develop the relevant skills and know-
                                                                 
30 Driver (2001) p. 61 





how that will enable them to act effectively and, in any given situation, they will 
endeavour to uncover facts that may be relevant to well-being. They will also take as 
much care as possible to avoid unnecessary harm to others. 32 As a result, agents with this 
motivation will, in general, be more likely to be successful in the protection and 
promotion of well-being. The motivations model can therefore accept that there is a 
connection between virtue and reliable success – not because the virtues partly consist in 
some set of relevant skills, but because virtue drives the agent to develop those skills. A 
defender of the motivations model can therefore agree with the intuition that, in general, 
being virtuous tends to involve being reliably successful in achieving virtuous aims.  
 
I said above that my response to the objection from reliable success would have two 
parts. The first involved making some general comments in order to demonstrate that 
the motivations model is able to explain why virtuous agents, in general, can be expected 
to be more reliable in achieving their virtuous ends, and why perfect reliability ought not 
to be demanded by any account. The second part involves discussing particular ways in 
which an agent with a deep motivation might nevertheless fail to be reliably successful, 
and explaining how the motivations model ought to respond to such cases. I will now 
move on to this second part. 
 
The following examples highlight three different ways in which an agent might 
consistently fail to achieve the ends of a virtuous motivation:  
 
Case 1: George takes himself to be motivated to promote well-being. 
Unfortunately, George has seriously incorrect views about what well -being 
consists in, with the result that his actions typically fail to benefit anyone.  
 
Case 2: Nick takes himself to be motivated to promote well-being, and has a 
good understanding of what well-being consists in. Unfortunately, Nick is 
misguided regarding the best means of carrying out his intentions, with the 
result that his actions typically fail to benefit anyone. 
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Case 3: Claude takes himself to be motivated to promote well-being, and he 
has correct views about what well-being consists in and how best to 
promote it. However, Claude’s bumbling and clumsy nature ensures that he 
rarely succeeds in actually benefiting anyone. 
 
When first asked to come up with examples of morally virtuous agents, it is perhaps 
unlikely that most people would think of cases such as George, Nick and Claude. For 
that reason, it is important to ask whether or not the motivations model is forced to 
accept that these agents truly are virtuously kind, and whether or not that judgement is 
acceptable. And the first thing to say is that the motivations model can certainly allow 
that we would be justified in being suspicious in each of these cases. It may be that the 
true cause of each agent’s failing is a lack of depth in their motivation. For example, if 
Nick has good reason to suppose that his chosen methods will not be successful, and if 
there are competing motivations that point him in the direction of the methods that he 
ultimately chooses, then we will have good reason to suppose that his motivation to 
promote well-being is insufficiently persistent, strong or robust. And a similar failing in 
motivation might be the cause of Claude’s failure to overcome his clumsiness or 
George’s failure to realise that he is seriously mistaken about the nature of well -being. Of 
course, each agent might genuinely believe that they are deeply motivated to promote 
well-being. However, if their respective failings are actually explained by a failure in the 
persistence, strength or robustness of their motivation to promote well-being, then the 
motivations model will not have to accept that these agents possess virtuous kindness.  
 
With this in mind, let us now stipulate that the agents in these three cases really do 
possess a deep motivation. Will the motivations model now have to say that these agents 
(who all consistently fail to be successful) possess a genuine moral virtue, and will that 
be an intuitively acceptable judgement? Consider first the case of Claude. We are now 
imagining that Claude has a legitimately deep motivation to promote well-being, but that 
he continues to be thwarted by his own clumsy nature. Given that Claude’s deep 
motivation will have prompted him to try to overcome this aspect of his nature, we must 
assume that there is some serious obstacle to his becoming more adroit. Perhaps this will 
be something like a physical defect that prevents Claude from moving quickly enough, 





such a case, it does not seem at all implausible that Claude should be judged as a 
possessor of genuine moral virtue, even if we would not consider him to be either 
physically or intellectually ideal. Indeed, Claude appears to be a victim of luck to the 
same extent as Ted in the case of Demon. Just as Ted was faced with unsurmountable bad 
luck which impacted upon the external consequences of his actions, Claude is faced with 
bad luck in the sense that he has some internal obstacle that he cannot overcome. And 
just as Ted’s bad luck should not be taken to rule him out as a possessor of moral virtue, 
neither should Claude’s. It should not be considered problematic that the motivations 
model accepts the possibility of virtue possession in examples like Case 3.  
 
Consider next the case of Nick. We are now imagining that Nick has a genuinely deep 
motivation to promote well-being, but is consistently mistaken regarding the best means 
of attaining that end. One possibility here is that Nick faces a similar problem to Claude. 
Perhaps Nick suffers from some internal obstacle in the sense that he lacks the 
intellectual abilities required to work out the best means of attaining his end. Another 
possibility is that Nick simply does not have access to the reasons that tell against his 
own chosen method. This might be true in cases where the required evidence in support 
of those reasons is not generally available (such as when those reasons are not yet 
recognised in an agent’s society or when the evidence is concealed by an evil demon).33 
In either case, if Nick’s mistakes stem solely from his inability to work out how best to 
achieve his virtuous ends, then we ought to accept him as a possessor of genuine 
kindness. To borrow a quote from David Hume: 
 
these errors are so far from being the source of all immorality, that they are 
commonly very innocent, and draw no manner of guilt upon the person 
who is so unfortunate as to fail into them. They extend not beyond a 
mistake of fact, which moralists have not generally supposed criminal, as 
being perfectly involuntary. I am more to be lamented than blamed, if I am 
mistaken with regard to the influence of objects in producing pain or 
pleasure, or if I know not the proper means of satisfying my desires. No one 
can ever regard such errors as a defect in my moral character. 34 
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However we interpret Hume’s actual intentions in this passage, one important point that 
can be taken from it is the following: when an agent fails, despite their best efforts, to 
work out how best to proceed or how best to achieve some goal, this failing should not 
necessarily be taken to reveal a defect in their moral character. And if we think that an 
agent’s moral character is determined by their possession of moral virtues (and vices), 
then these failings also ought not to tell against their possession of moral virtues. 35 Once 
we have stipulated that Nick truly does possess a deep motivation towards the 
promotion of well-being, his inability to work out how best to achieve this ought not to 
count as a moral deficiency (even if it might count as an intellectual failing). 36 It should 
not be considered problematic if the motivations model accepts the possibility of virtue 
possession in examples like Case 2. 
 
What, then, can we say about our final example, the case of George? Unlike the cases of 
Claude and Nick, it is less obvious that the motivations model ought to judge George as 
a possessor of virtuous kindness. Even if we accept that George possesses a deep 
motivation, it is less clear that what he is motivated towards actually is well-being. If an 
agent is motivated towards something that is very different from what well -being actually 
consists of (whatever that may be) then there may come a point where we ought to judge 
that they are not really motivated towards well-being. In extreme cases this will be 
obvious. If an agent takes “well-being” to mean what we would usually mean by the 
term “tables” then they are simply too misguided to count as having well-being as the 
end of their deep motivation. And the same will be true if by “well-being” they mean 
“crippling agony”. In less extreme cases it will be correspondingly less clear, and it may 
often be difficult to determine whether or not an agent’s deep motivation truly is 
sufficiently directed towards the end of well-being. This means that it will often be 
difficult to determine who does and who does not possess genuinely virtuous kindness. 
It is important to point out that this ought not to be considered a failing of an account 
of the moral virtues. Indeed, we ought to be suspicious of any account that guarantees to 
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make it easy for us to correctly identify virtuous or vicious agents in the real world. 
Examples like the case of George simply highlight one way in which a difficulty can 
arise. In order to get clearer on the case, we would need to seek more information about 
what exactly George is targeting, and how closely that end matches an accurate 
conception of well-being (whatever that may be). Methods for attaining this additional 
information may include observing George in various situations and noting what 
features of a situation reliably lead him to act, and in what ways. This much has been 
suggested by Michael Slote when discussing cases where we are unsure whether an agent 
is truly motived by benevolence, or by conscientiousness. 37 What is important, however, 
is to recognise that there may be cases where it remains difficult to determine whether or 
not an agent possesses a moral virtue. It speaks well of the motivations model that it 
encourages us to be sensitive to this possibility in response to cases such as Case 1. 
 
My response to the objection from reliable success has had two parts. The first has been 
to point out that the motivations model can perfectly well explain why v irtuous agents 
can, in general, be expected to be more reliable in achieving their virtuous ends, and that, 
on any account, we should not be demanding perfect reliability. The second has been to 
consider specific cases where an agent with a deep motivation might consistently fail to 
achieve their virtuous ends, and to explain what the motivations model can say about 
such cases. Given the plausibility of this response, we ought to accept that the objection 
from reliable success fails to rule out the motivations model as a live option in this 
debate. 
 
2.2 ACTUAL VIRTUE AND NATURAL VIRTUE 
A second serious challenge to the acceptability of the motivations model is the claim that 
this model is unable to accommodate what is an intuitively appealing distinction within 
virtue theory. This is the distinction between “actual virtues” and “natural virtues”. In 
this section I will explain how the distinction is typically understood and why it looks to 
be a problem for the motivations model. Having first considered why we might want to 
maintain a distinction of this type, I will then propose an alternative understanding of 
                                                                 
37 Slote (2001) Chapter 2 (Slote also discusses how we ought to judge those with a “perverse” 





the distinction between actual and natural virtues which is compatible with the 
motivations model. 
 
The distinction between natural virtues and actual v irtues (or virtues “in the strict 
sense”) goes back at least as far as Aristotle. In The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explains 
that natural virtues are those that someone might have “from the very moment of birth” 
while “we seek something else as that which is good in the strict sense”.38 The idea that 
emerges is of natural virtues as something simple – such as the basic friendly feeling that 
children might demonstrate when sharing their toys – while the actual virtues require 
something more refined. Aristotle elaborates on this point by explaining that the actual 
virtues are those which are complimented by the possession of practical wisdom 
(phronesis). He tells us that: 
 
as in the part of us that forms opinions there are two types, cleverness and 
practical wisdom, so too in the moral part there are two types, natural virtue 
and virtue in the strict sense, and of these the latter involves practical 
wisdom… It is clear, then, from what has been said, that it is not possible to 
be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom.39 
 
In this passage, Aristotle distinguishes actual virtues and natural virtues by pointing out 
that possessors of natural virtue lack practical wisdom, while the actual virtues require 
practical wisdom. Contemporary virtue theorists also accept that actual and natural 
virtues differ as a result of the association between actual virtue and practical wisdom. 
For example, Daniel Russell explains that “phronesis is a part of every virtue in the strict 
sense (as opposed to, say, Aristotle’s so-called ‘natural’ virtues).”40 And Julia Annas also 
accepts this point, such as when asking whether or not virtues can be possessed 
independently of each other and saying that “This is possible with the natural virtues, 
but not the proper or real virtues. For to have even one of these you need practical 
intelligence, but when you have this you have all of the virtues.”41 If we agree with these 
theorists and accept that actual and natural virtues can be distinguished by appeal to the 
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notion of practical wisdom, then this will be problematic for the motivations model of 
the moral virtues.42 The motivations model does not include a requirement for practical 
wisdom in its account of (actual) moral virtues and so will be unable to distinguish actual 
and natural virtues in this way. If the distinction is deemed to be appealing, then this may 
count as a significant failing on the part of the motivations model.  
 
The motivations model does not include practical wisdom as a requirement for virtue, 
and this means that it is unable to distinguish actual and natural virtues with reference to 
practical wisdom. To make matters worse, it looks as if the rival composite model is able 
to accommodate the distinction in the standard Aristotelian way. We saw in the previous 
chapter that many theorists accept the idea that practical wisdom can be understood as a 
suite or collection of practical cognitive skills and abilities, such as “comprehension”, 
“sense”, and “nous”. Indeed, Russell claims that “there is now general consensus tha t 
right reason is a reasoning capacity that a phronimos has, rather than a set of principles 
that a phronimos knows… This view is further supported by Aristotle’s treating phronesis 
and right reason as interchangeable.”43 Russell then lists Sarah Broadie, Rosalind 
Hursthouse, and J. O. Urmson as noted Aristotelian scholars who now accept this 
view.44 If it is right that practical wisdom can be understood in terms of the possession 
of certain cognitive skills or abilities, then the composite model will be able  to 
accommodate the distinction between actual and natural virtues in the standard way. 
Natural virtues can be understood as positive motivations lacking the required practical 
wisdom, while actual virtues will involve both positive motivation and practical wisdom 
(understood as a component of skill(s) or know-how). But even if this is incorrect, and 
the rival composite model cannot appropriately accommodate the distinction in the 
standard way, it will still be a problem for the motivations model if it fails in this regard 
as well. We therefore have good reason to ask how a supporter of the motivations model 
should respond to this issue. 
 
                                                                 
42 It is worth noting that there will be a problem here even if the addition of practical wisdom is only 
one of the differences between the actual and natural virtues. For the suggestion that there could be 
other differences, see Russell (2009) p. 21 (especially footnote 36). 






A quick response here would be to simply deny that there is anything to be gained from 
making a distinction between what we can call “natural” and “actual” virtues. This is not 
the response that I want to consider here. Instead, it will be useful to think about why 
we might want such a distinction in the first place, before then asking whether or not the 
distinction can be made in a way that is compatible with the motivations model.  
 
The standard Aristotelian way of distinguishing actual and natural virtues allows us to do 
three things. Firstly, it allows us to ensure that possessors of (actual) moral virtues will be 
reliably successful when acting. When distinguishing natural and actual virtues, Aristotle 
says of the natural virtues that: 
 
one may be led astray by them, as a strong body which moves without sight 
may stumble badly because of its lack of sight, still, if a man once acquires 
reason, that makes a difference in his action; and his state, while still like 
what it was, will then be virtue in the strict sense. 45 
 
This idea is repeated by Russell, who says that natural virtues “are just as likely to go 
wrong as right”,46 and by Annas, who points out that “a natural tendency to bravery can 
stumble unseeingly into ethical disaster”.47 If we want it to be the case that truly virtuous 
agents are reliably successful when acting then it makes sense to distinguish actual 
virtues from the less reliable natural virtues. And making this distinction with reference 
to practical wisdom makes perfect sense, because the possession of practical wisdom is 
clearly something that we can expect to make an agent more reliably successful when 
acting. Therefore, one thing that the Aristotelian version of the distinction between 
actual and natural virtues allows us to do is to maintain the idea that truly virtuous agents 
will be more reliable when acting. 
 
A second benefit of the standard distinction is that it helps to make sense of the 
intuition that children and non-human animals would not be expected to possess actual 
moral virtues. For those who have this intuition, the idea that actual virtue (as opposed 
to natural virtue) requires practical wisdom will make perfect sense. We cannot expect 
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children and non-human animals to possess the cognitive capacities involved in practical 
wisdom and so this explains the intuition that children and non-human animals cannot 
be expected to possess actual moral virtues.48 If we agree with this intuition then we will 
have a further reason to accept the standard distinction. 
 
A third, and final, benefit of having a distinction between actual and natural virtues is 
that it allows us to make sense of the intuition that the possession of (actual) moral 
virtue will usually require a significant period of development. The idea that genuine 
virtue will need to be developed over time has been discussed in detail by Zagzebski, as 
well as being a major theme in the work of Annas.49 The basic idea here is that we would 
not expect someone to become truly virtuous overnight, or that genuine virtue could be 
present “from the very moment of birth”. Distinguishing actual from natural virtues 
allows us to make sense of this fact, and the Aristotelian version of the distinction makes 
particular sense given that we would also expect the possession of practical wisdom to 
be something that is developed over time. Distinguishing between actual and natural 
virtues therefore allows us to: (i) ensure that truly virtuous agents will be reliably 
successful when acting; (ii) explain the intuition that children and non-human animals 
cannot be expected to possess actual virtues; and (iii) explain the fact that actual virtue 
will usually need to be developed over time. Rather than denying the need for any such 
distinction, it would be better if we could come up with a way of understanding the 
distinction that is compatible with the motivations model.  
 
The motivations model says that possessing a moral virtue is to possess a deep 
motivation towards some characteristic end. The virtue of kindness might consist of a 
deep motivation towards the protection and promotion of well-being, while the virtue of 
justice might consist of a deep motivation to ensure fair outcomes. I explained above 
that a deep motivation is one that is sufficiently persistent, strongly felt, and robust. I 
now want to suggest that we can refer to motivations which fail to be sufficiently 
persistent, strongly felt, or robust as being shallow motivations. There is, then, three ways 
in which a motivation may come to be classed as shallow. The first is when the 
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motivation is problematically fleeting or sporadic. An agent’s motivation to ensure fair 
outcomes will be shallow if it only lasts for a few hours, or if it comes and goes 
according to their mood. The second way is when the motivation is problematically 
weak. An agent’s motivation to ensure fair outcomes will be shallow if it is so weakly felt 
that it never actually prompts them into action. And the third way is when the 
motivation is easily overridden or defeated by competing considerations. An agent’s 
motivation to ensure fair outcomes will be shallow if it is always defeated by their 
competing motivation to make as much money as possible. If an agent’s motivation is 
insufficient in (at least) one of these three ways then it ought to be classed as being a 
shallow motivation. 
 
I propose that an alternative way of understanding the distinction between actual and 
natural moral virtues is by reference to the depth of an agent’s motivation. Actual moral 
virtues will be those motivations (towards virtuous ends) which are sufficiently deep, 
while natural virtues will be those motivations (towards virtuous ends) which are 
problematically shallow.50 While this way of understanding the distinction is markedly 
different from the standard Aristotelian approach, I will now show that it is compatible 
with the reasons that were highlighted above for why we might want to maintain a 
distinction between actual and natural virtues. 
 
The first appealing feature of this distinction was that it allows us to maintain that 
possessors of actual moral virtues will be reliably successful when acting, whereas 
possessors of mere natural virtues may not be. If we make the distinction with reference 
to the depth of an agent’s motivation then we will still be able to explain this fact. I have 
already spent a considerable amount of time in this chapter arguing that a deep 
motivation can, in general, be expected to make an agent reliably successful in pursuing 
their ends, and so I will not repeat those points here. It seems equally clear that the 
possessor of a shallow motivation cannot be expected to be reliable in achieving their 
virtuous ends. If an agent’s motivation to ensure fair outcomes is fleeting or sporadic, if 
it is only weakly felt, or if it is easily overridden by competing interests, then we cannot 
expect them to do the things that will be required in order to actually ensure fair 
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outcomes on a regular basis. Those with a deep motivation can be expected to be more 
reliable in this way, while those with a shallow motivation cannot. Therefore, if we want 
our distinction between actual and natural moral virtues to explain the greater reliability 
of those with actual virtues, then my proposed version of the distinction will be able to 
satisfy this requirement. 
 
The second appealing feature of the actual/natural virtue distinction is that it helps to 
explain the intuition that children and non-human animals are not expected to possess 
actual moral virtues. And this intuition can be equally well explained by focusing on the 
depth of motivation that is required for moral virtue on the motivations model. It is 
plausible to suggest that children and non-human animals will tend to be incapable of 
motivations that are deep enough to count as being moral virtues. It would be unusual, 
for example, for a child to possess a sufficiently persistent and robust motivation 
towards a plausibly virtuous end. We suspect, rather, that a child will be easily distracted 
when trying to help others, or that they will be more easily influenced to give up and 
pursue some other motivation instead. Of course, it will not be impossible for a child to 
possess a sufficiently deep motivation. There may well be children who possess a deep 
motivation to protect and promote well-being, for example. If so, then they ought to be 
credited with the actual virtue, and even defenders of an Aristotelian approach accept 
that this can be the correct result in some cases.51 The intuition is simply that children 
(and non-human animals) are unlikely to be capable of anything more than natural 
virtue, and the proposed version of the distinction is able to agree with this.  
 
The third, and final, appealing feature of the standard actual/natural virtue distinction is 
that it allows us to explain why the possession of actual virtues will tend to require a 
significant period of development. We certainly would not expect it to be possible for 
someone to suddenly find themselves in possession of a moral virtue, or that someone 
might have a virtue “from the very moment of birth”. And the proposed understanding 
of the distinction can accommodate this fact. It is perhaps possible for someone to 
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simply find themselves with a motivation towards a plausibly virtuous end. We can 
imagine an agent waking up one morning in a good mood and being motivated to do 
something to make the world a fairer or better place, such as in the following example 
from Arpaly: 
 
Whim: [I]magine the person who acts benevolently on a whim. It is Sunday 
morning and she is awakened by a call from a charity asking for a donation. 
Our agent thinks, “Why not do something right?” and is moved to do 
something right so long as her credit card happens to be close enough to the 
bed.52 
 
Examples such as Whim suggest that it is possible for an agent to suddenly possess a 
shallow motivation towards a plausibly virtuous end, such as the protection and 
promotion of well-being or the ensuring of fair outcomes. However, this is less likely in 
the case of deep motivations. When confronted with the suffering of another, an agent 
may simply find themselves with a strong motivation to alleviate that suffering. 
However, in order to have a tendency to alleviate suffering that is sufficiently persistent, 
strong and robust (that is, in order to have the moral virtue of compassion) agents will 
typically need to have been habituated in much the same way as the more typical 
proponents of the actual/natural distinction have in mind. An agent might spend time 
thinking about role models who have worked tirelessly to alleviate suffering, or 
rehearsing arguments against egoism and in favour of compassion, or they might 
regularly bring to mind instances of hardship that provoke and make resolute their 
disposition to help. In these ways and others, an agent may be able to deepen their 
motivation to alleviate suffering to a point that is sufficient for virtue, but such a process 
is unlikely to occur overnight. The proposed version of the actual/natural virtue 
distinction is therefore capable of explaining the intuition that actual virtue will require 
time to develop. This means that the approach of distinguishing actual and natural 
virtues by focusing on the depth of an agent’s motivation is able to maintain all three 
appealing features of the standard distinction. 
 
                                                                 





The aim of this section has been to discuss the distinction between actual and natural 
moral virtues and to show that it is possible to make that distinction in a way that is 
compatible with the motivations model. By focusing on the depth of an agent’s 
motivation, it is possible to distinguish actual and natural moral virtues in a way that 
retains appealing features of the standard Aristotelian approach to this issue. Of course, 
it may be that the approach that I have proposed ought not to adopt the terminology of 
“actual” and “natural” virtues. Those terms may be wedded to the specific Aristotelian 
approach which necessarily involves an appeal to practical wisdom. An alternative 
suggestion would be to instead refer to shallow motivations towards virtuous ends as 
being “proto-virtues” in the sense that these will require improvement in order to count 
as actual moral virtues. Regardless of the terms that we choose to use, the arguments in 
this section have shown that the motivations model is able to explain those same 
features of moral virtue that we would want a distinction between actual and natural 
virtues to pick up on. Therefore, considerations involving this distinction do not provide 
good reason to reject the motivations model of the moral virtues.  
 
2.3 VIRTUE AND THE CELEBRATION OF IRRATIONALITY 
The final objection to the motivations model that will be discussed in this chapter stems 
from considerations in Russell’s Practical Intelligence and the Virtues. In Chapter 11 of this 
work, Russell discusses an account of virtue that he calls “the trajectories view”. 53 In this 
section I want to set out one of the objections that Russell raises for the trajectories 
view, explain why we might think that a similar objection can be directed towards the 
motivations model, and then defend the motivations model against that possible 
objection. 
 
According to Russell, the trajectories view of the moral virtues understands the virtues as 
issuing in fixed outcomes, such as the reliable performance or avoidance of particular 
actions. Russell says: 
 
the trajectories view defines a virtue as a disposition to manifest a certain 
range of behaviour; for instance, such a view understands the virtue of 
                                                                 





generosity as the disposition to give one’s time and belongings to others, 
either much of the time or on a wide range of occasions.54 
 
For another example, the trajectories view would understand the virtue of honesty as the 
brute disposition to avoid the act of lying or the breaking of promises. The stronger the 
disposition to perform the relevant act (such as giving away one’s possessions or 
avoiding lying), the more impressive is the agent’s corresponding virtue. 55 Russell is 
strongly opposed to such an account, and one of the arguments given against it accuses 
the view of the celebration of irrationality. If virtues are simply dispositions to perform 
certain actions then the strongest form of a virtue will be akin to a “psychological 
compulsion”. This worry is explained in the following way: 
 
Consider the difference between acting for a reason and, say, acting from 
compulsion, such as flipping a light switch three times when entering a dark 
room. It is clear that there is no arguing a person out of a compulsion, not 
simply because the person will not be persuaded by our argument, but 
because the person cannot be so persuaded on this point… Presumably, no 
such tendency [to perform acts relevant to generosity] would be stronger 
than a psychological compulsion to give whenever one perceived another’s 
good.56 
 
An agent’s disposition to perform actions of a particular sort will be stronger if they 
could not be convinced to do otherwise, and this will be true when they act out of a 
psychological compulsion rather than in response to actual reasons (which could perhaps 
be defeated or forgotten). Therefore, if virtue is simply a tendency to perform actions of 
a particular sort, then agents will be more virtuous the closer they are to acting from 
compulsion and the further they are from acting for reasons. As Russell says, “an 
implication of such a view is that one should be the more generous, the less rational 
one’s motivation for giving to others; and surely that cannot be right.”57 So, we ought to 
reject the trajectories view on the grounds that it would celebrate and promote 
irrationality in the place of perfect moral virtue. 
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I agree with Russell that we ought to reject the trajectories view, understood as 
explaining virtues in terms of a tendency to perform particular actions. I have no 
interest, then, in attempting to defend such a view. However, we might worry that the 
objection raised by Russell for the trajectories view could be equally well directed 
towards the motivations model. The motivations model tells us that the moral virtues are 
persistent, strongly felt, and robust motivations towards particular ends. Might it be the 
case that the most persistent, strong, and robust motivation that an agent could possess 
would be something like a psychological compulsion to achieve the particular end? For 
example, might an agent’s motivation to alleviate suffering be more persistent and robust 
if they are utterly invulnerable to competing reasons in the same way that a person with a 
psychological compulsion is expected to be? And if so, should the motivations model 
then be rejected on the grounds that it would celebrate and promote irrationality in the 
place of moral virtue? 
 
A first response to this worry is to cast doubt on the likely stability of such irrational 
compulsions. Imagine having the opportunity to take part in a potentially beneficial 
collaborative project with another person, where that project entails a level of risk for 
both parties. When deciding whether or not to get involved, we would be reassured to 
hear the reasons that ground the other person’s motivation to complete the project. On 
hearing these reasons and learning about what the other person takes to be at stake in 
the project, we may become convinced that they will not abandon us before the project 
has been completed. On the other hand, if we find out that the other person is 
motivated by a mere psychological compulsion, we will be wary that their motivation to 
complete the project could simply vanish without warning. If the motivation is not 
grounded by any reason then we will be concerned that it may also vanish without any 
reason, and so we will be less inclined to participate. Similarly, when we hear that an 
agent’s motivation to, for example, alleviate suffering is not grounded by any reasons 
and is instead a mere irrational compulsion, we will rightly worry that this motivation 
could be lost at a moment’s notice.  That we would have such worries tells us that we do 
not trust the reliability or stability of mere compulsions and that such compulsions 





demands. It is unlikely, therefore, that the motivations model would find itself praising 
as virtuous the possession of irrational compulsions. 
 
However, these considerations do nothing to show that it would be impossible for a 
compulsive motivation towards some end to meet the required levels of persistence (or 
of strength or robustness). It is important, therefore, to do more to defend the 
motivations model against the charge of celebrating irrationality. And an important 
element of that defence is to point out that the motivations model would not encourage 
irrationality to the same extent as the trajectories view. On that view, a moral virtue 
could consist of a tendency to perform certain actions, and the irrational compulsion to 
perform those actions would then be sufficient for virtue. For example, the compulsive 
tendency to give away money could be classed as virtuous generosity. This tendency 
could involve no reasoning at all on the part of the agent. In contrast, the kind of trait 
classed as a virtue by the motivations model will actively encourage the agent to reason in 
various ways. The agent is not driven towards basic or narrow ends (such as giving away 
money or flipping a light switch) but rather towards open or broad ends which are 
compatible with a great many different ways of proceeding. The agent with a deep 
motivation towards the protection and promotion of well-being, for example, will be 
driven to engage in reasoning about what well-being might consist in for different 
beings, how it is generally possible to promote such well-being, and what skills they 
should try to develop in order to help them in their efforts. The open nature of the end 
in question leads the virtuous agent to take on the task of then evaluating different 
reasons and considerations, and responding to these when performing particular actions. 
This is far from the unthinking, reasons-invulnerable flipping of a switch or giving away 
of possessions that could be praised as a moral virtue on the trajectories view. By 
presenting an account of virtue that encourages an agent to engage in subsequent 
reasoning when performing particular actions, the motivations model does enough to 
protect itself from the charge of celebrating irrationality. 
 
There is one form of irrationality which it is possible may be compatible with moral 
virtue according to the motivations model. Such irrationality would occur at the more 





looks to be compatible with the motivations model that an agent could possess the 
virtue of kindness (for example) even if their commitment to protect and promote well -
being was irrational in the sense that they could not be persuaded through rational 
argument to stop thinking of this as a valuable end. Even if the commitment is 
invulnerable to reason (although compatible with encouraging the agent to reason when 
determining how best to proceed), the motivations model may accept that the agent 
possesses the virtue of kindness (assuming that the sufficient levels of persistence, 
strength, and robustness are also met). We ought to be happy to accept this conclusion, 
and it would be uncharitable to read this as the motivations model championing 
irrationality over rationality. Given that compulsive motivations are unlikely to meet the 
persistence requirement for virtue, that the virtuous agent will be driven to engage in 
reasoning when deciding how to proceed, and that there is no suggestion that a 
motivation based on compulsion will be preferable to one grounded in reasons, the 
motivations model should not be thought of as vulnerable to the objection that Russell 
raises for the trajectories view. 
 
I have now considered three of the most serious objections that have been raised for 
accounts of moral virtue such as the motivations model. Demonstrating that responses 
to these objections are available actually strengthens the position of the motivations 
model in two ways. Most obviously, the defence of the motivations model shows that 
this model is less vulnerable than may have been assumed, and that it ought to be 
accepted as a serious contender in the virtue theory debate. In addition to this, a 
successful defence of the motivations model also increases pressure on the rival 
composite model of the moral virtues. We saw in the previous chapter that the 
composite model will be vulnerable to the charge of elitism unless it can provide some 
justification for requiring an intellectually demanding component of cognitive skill(s) or 
know-how. And that justification becomes more difficult to provide once we have 
shown that there is a plausible alternative account of virtue which does not demand a 
component of cognitive skill(s) or know-how. The arguments put forward in defence of 
the motivations model are therefore doubly important in helping us to decide between 





this chapter by considering some of the positive implications of accepting the 
motivations model. 
 
3. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MOTIVATIONS MODEL 
The motivations model of the moral virtues has not been popular in recent times. Most 
virtue theorists have endorsed a neo-Aristotelian position whereby moral virtue requires 
practical wisdom, and, as we saw in Chapter One, a significant amount of work has also 
focused on the connection between virtues and cognitive skills. Indeed, the sufficiency 
of a model of virtue that omits a necessary component of wisdom or cognitive skill is 
likely to be viewed as an extremely surprising (or even implausible) result by most of 
those currently working in virtue theory and virtue ethics. For this reason, the most 
important task for a supporter of the motivations model is a defensive one. The largest 
section of this chapter has focused on responding to serious objections to this approach 
(and a further possible objection will be discussed in Chapter Four). However, it is also 
important to carry out the more positive task of highlighting possible implications of 
accepting the motivations model. That is the aim of this section.  
 
This chapter has already identified several ways in which the motivations model implies 
or is compatible with intuitive truths about the moral virtues that would be accepted by 
most virtue theorists. Some examples of these truths are the following:  
 
(i) Possessors of a moral virtue are more likely to be reliably successful in 
achieving their virtuous ends. 
(ii) Moral virtues are firm and relatively unchanging aspects of an agent’s 
character. 
(iii) The development of a moral virtue will usually require a period of time 
and habituation. 
(iv) Possession of genuine moral virtue is unlikely in (at least very young) 
children and non-human animals. 
(v) There exist traits which can be referred to as “natural” or “proto-
virtues”, and these can sometimes be developed into genuine moral virtues.  
 
The motivations model is also in-keeping with Aristotle’s claim that moral virtue 





might include the protection and promotion of well-being (for the virtue of kindness) 
and the ensuring of fair outcomes (for the virtue of justice). 58 And, of course, the 
motivations model is compatible with the main finding from Chapter One that virtue 
possession must involve a significant element of motivation in order to rule out the 
possibility of virtuous agents who are non-instrumentally motivated in non-virtuous 
ways. The virtue of compassion is not compatible with the non-instrumental motivation 
to cause suffering, for example. In all of these ways, the motivations model is compatible 
with intuitively correct and widely-held beliefs regarding the moral virtues. 
 
One important claim that is compatible with the motivations model (and which was 
highlighted in Section 2.1, above) is less likely to be widely accepted by rival virtue 
theorists. When discussing the possibility of an agent who fails to be reliably successful 
due to their inability to work out the proper means for achieving their goals, I 
approvingly quoted Hume as saying that: 
 
I am more to be lamented than blamed, if I am mistaken with regard to the 
influence of objects in producing pain or pleasure, or if I know not the 
proper means of satisfying my desires. No one can ever regard such errors 
as a defect in my moral character.59 
 
It is an important benefit of the motivations model that it is able to accommodate the 
idea that a lack of ability in working out how best to proceed should not necessarily be 
taken to reveal a defect in an agent’s moral character. Suppose that an agent’s moral 
character is praiseworthy to the extent that they possess moral virtues and defective to 
the extent that they lack those virtues. If possessing a moral virtue requires that an agent 
possess cognitive skills or know-how (such as knowing how best to achieve some end or 
being skilled in predicting the likely consequences of available actions) then those who 
fail in this regard will necessarily be lacking in moral virtue. And if the possession of 
moral virtue determines an agent’s moral character, then we will have to say that those 
who lack these skills will to that extent be defective in their moral character. In other 
words, we will be unable to accept the important point just mentioned. The motivations 
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model, by denying the necessity of a component of cognitive skill(s) or know-how, 
allows us to avoid this problem. It allows us, therefore, to accept the Humean idea that 
failures in reasoning ability or know-how should not necessarily be taken to reveal a 
defect in an agent’s moral character. 
 
I want to conclude this section by highlighting two further implications of accepting the 
motivations model, as well as some directions for future research that are suggested by 
these implications. The first of these final two points is to note the relative inclusivity of 
the motivations model. When setting out the elitism worry for the composite model in 
Chapter Two, I listed individuals who would be ruled out as potential possessors of 
moral virtue on that account. In addition to children and non-human animals, the 
composite model also rules out those with cognitive disabilities or mental illnesses. And 
many other adult human beings can also be expected to fail to possess the required levels 
of cognitive skill or know-how. In contrast to this, many who could not even potentially 
possess any moral virtues on competing accounts might be classed as morally virtuous on 
the motivations model. All that is required to be a potential possessor of moral virtue is 
the ability to have motivations that are sufficiently persistent, strongly felt and robust. If 
you are capable of deep motivations then you just need to make sure that you have those 
deep motivations that are directed towards morally virtuous ends. It seems likely that the 
set of individuals who can possess motivations of this type will be larger than the set of 
individuals who possess the levels of cognitive skill and know-how required by 
competing approaches. The set may therefore include individuals from within those 
groups that were previously excluded from the realm of virtue, such as children or those 
will cognitive disabilities. Our idea of moral exemplars may then have to be altered in 
order to include such individuals alongside the more standardly accepted Socratic 
figures. This ought to encourage future work on the moral virtues to consider what 
might be learned from such individuals, and to acknowledge their moral value in a more 
complete way than is currently evidenced in the work of many contemporary virtue 
theorists. 
 
The second of the final two implications that I want to briefly highlight concerns 





possibility and the desirability of educating for good character, and this should 
encourage us to think about the corresponding possibility and desirability of educating 
for moral (and intellectual) virtues.60 The motivations model tells us that educating for 
moral virtue will involve educating for the possession of deep motivations. This means 
that those interested in the possibility of character education will be required to focus on 
how individuals might be led to possess deep motivations towards virtuous ends. For 
example, educating for the virtue of kindness will necessarily involve educating people in 
a way that leads them to develop a deep motivation to protect and promote well -being. 
It seems likely that this will involve something more than simply providing individuals 
with information about what well-being consists in and how best to perform actions that 
generally promote it. Character education must involve making people want to work out 
the answers to certain relevant questions, rather than simply providing those answers. 
This might turn out to be a more difficult task, and the level of difficulty (as well as the 
processes involved) will impact upon the desirability of trying to educate for good 
character.61 The answers to these questions are not obvious and will require input from 
educational theorists as well as virtue theorists. I do not intend to address these 
questions here, although the issue is one that I hope to investigate in future work. In the 
meantime, it is simply worth highlighting the fact that claims regarding character 
education will be rendered more or less plausible depending on the conception of moral 
virtue that we have in mind. This is therefore one further area where we will need to be 
aware of the choices that we are making at the level of virtue theory.  
 
This section has set out some of the implications that stem from accepting the 
motivations model, as well as some of the areas for future research that are suggested by 
such acceptance. The motivations model gains further plausibility by being compatible 
with many widely accepted beliefs regarding the nature of moral virtue. 
                                                                 
60 For example, see the papers included in recent special issues of the Journal of Philosophy of Education, 
Vol. 27, Issue 2, (2013), edited by Ben Kotzee, and of Theory and Research in Education, Vol. 12, No. 3, 
(2014), edited by Randall Curren and Ben Kotzee. For more evidence of this growing trend towards 
character education, see the resources provided by the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues 
based at the University of Birmingham (www.jubillecentre.ac.uk) as well as comments made by 
political figures, such as Shadow Education Secretary Tristram Hunt (reported by the BBC at 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-26140607 and accessed 20/02/2014). 
61 I have an engaged with one potentially worrying aspect of a non-traditional approach to character 







I have now evaluated three different accounts of the nature of the moral virtues. In 
Chapter One I argued against the skills model of the moral virtues, and suggested that 
the problems faced by that approach could be solved by demanding a significant 
motivational component for moral virtue. Chapter Two examined the composite model 
of the moral virtues, and argued that considerations stemming from the virtues of 
ignorance and the worry of elitism provide us with good reason to consider an 
alternative approach. In particular, we had good reason to consider the merits of an 
approach which does not demand a necessary component of cognitive skill(s) or know-
how. In this chapter I have set out the motivations model of the moral virtues, on which 
a moral virtue consists of a deep motivation towards some characteristic end. I have 
defended this account against three serious objections, as well as highlighting some 
positive implications of accepting the account. The points made in this chapter ought to 
be enough to demonstrate that the motivations model is a legitimate contender in this 
debate, and a live option for those working within virtue theory. I now want to build on 
this suggestion by doing some work in order to demonstrate in more detail what a 
version of the motivations model might look like. This will involve asking which deep 
motivations ought to be accepted as being actual moral virtues. However, before doing 
this, it will be necessary to first discuss a particularly problematic candidate moral virtue.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE PROBLEM OF COURAGE 
 
0. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I want to consider one further possible objection to the motivations 
model of the moral virtues. The motivations model states that the possession of a moral 
virtue consists in the possession of a deep motivation towards some characteristic end. 
For example, the candidate moral virtue of kindness can be understood as the deep 
motivation to protect and promote well-being. Such an account is incompatible with the 
existence of moral virtues which are not directed towards any characteristic end or 
target. For that reason, it is important to consider the trait of courage. As will be 
explained below, the trait of courage does not appear to be directed towards any 
characteristic end. And yet, the virtue status of courage has been widely accepted. 
Courage, therefore, serves as a possible counter-example to the motivations model. I will 
explain the problem faced by the motivations model in more detail as well as suggesting 
that the trait of courage may also be problematic for other accounts. Importantly, my 
response to this problem will then involve proposing and defending an alternative 
account of the trait of courage on which courage is not a moral virtue. Courage ought 
instead to be understood as an enabler for the moral virtues. Having defended the 
plausibility of this approach, I will then explain how it might be applied to other 
potentially problematic traits. 
 
1. COURAGE AS A MORAL VIRTUE 
The trait of courage would not provide a significant challenge to the motivations model 
if there was not a widespread acceptance of the fact that courage is indeed a moral 
virtue. That there is such a widespread acceptance can be shown by surveying just a 
handful of those theorists who have discussed the trait. Of course, courage is listed 
among the cardinal virtues by Plato, and is discussed at some length by Aristotle under 
the description of a moral virtue.1 Contemporary virtue theorists have been equally 
accommodating of the trait, with Linda Zagzebski claiming that “To think of virtue is 
almost immediately to think of particular traits such as courage”2 and Robert Roberts 
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asserting that “whatever else courage may be, it is a virtue”. 3 Wayne Riggs sums up the 
general assumption in favour of courage when saying that “no one would be willing to 
accept a theory that failed to count courage as a moral virtue”. 4 
 
The widespread agreement in favour of the virtue status of courage suggests that any 
failure to accommodate courage as a moral virtue will be a serious matter. At the very 
least, a proposed account of the nature of the virtues will not be able to respond to this 
issue by simply dismissing the idea that courage is a moral virtue. Instead, any theorist 
who wants to deny the virtue status of courage will need to provide a plausible account 
of courage as a non-virtue, and this account will need to explain the widespread 
acceptance of the moral value of courage. However, it has not yet been fully  explained 
why the trait of courage can be expected to cause problems for the motivations model. I 
will now set out the problem in more detail before then considering how best to 
respond. 
 
2. THE PROBLEM OF COURAGE FOR THE MOTIVATIONS MODEL 
The motivations model states that all moral virtues consist of a deep motivation towards 
some characteristic end. On this account, the candidate virtue of kindness might consist 
of a deep motivation to protect and promote well-being, and the candidate virtue of 
justice might consist of a deep motivation to ensure fair outcomes. In this way, every 
moral virtue can be expected to be directed towards a characteristic end. However, this 
claim sits uneasily alongside the acceptance of courage as a moral virtue. While it is 
possible to come up with a characteristic end for other candidate moral virtues, the trait 
of courage does not appear to be directed towards any characteristic end or target. An 
agent can exhibit genuine courage in the pursuit of any number of different and 
unrelated ends. This suggests that the motivations model will struggle to accommodate 
courage as a moral virtue.  We can refer to this issue as the motivational problem of courage. 
 
The problematic nature of the motivational structure of courage has been highlighted by 
other theorists. For example, Robert Adams has pointed out that courage differs from 
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other moral virtues because of the fact that it is not defined “by particular motives or by 
one’s main aims”.5 Bernard Williams makes a similar point when saying that “there is no 
X” such that all courageous agents “choose their acts for X reasons”. 6 And Roberts and 
Wood argue that “Although courageous acts must be motivated, no one type of 
motivation is characteristic of courage.”7 While kind agents must plausibly be motivated 
by considerations of well-being and just agents must plausibly be motivated by 
considerations of fairness, a courageous agent can demonstrate their courage in the 
pursuit of a wide variety of ends. If there is no characteristic end that is specific to the 
trait of courage then the motivations model will be unable to accept the virtue status of 
this widely accepted candidate virtue. The motivational problem of courage poses a 
significant challenge to the motivations model. 
 
I want to suggest that the motivations model can respond to the problematic nature of 
courage by maintaining that courage is not a moral virtue. This response will be set out 
in detail below. However, it is important to point out that other responses to this 
problem are available. Of course, a first possible response to the motivational problem is 
simply to abandon the motivations model. Virtue theorists will always have the option of 
endorsing a pluralist account of the virtues, on which not all moral virtues share the same 
nature. This is the approach taken by Adams in direct response to the problematic 
nature of courage. Adams posits that there are two different types of moral virtue – the 
“motivational virtues” (such as benevolence) which are directed towards a good 
characteristic end, and the “structural virtues” (such as courage) which are not defined in 
terms of any characteristic end.8 Similarly, Roberts and Wood suggest that we ought to 
reject the idea that all of the virtues can be accommodated within a “one-size-fits-all” or 
“monolithic” account of the nature of virtue.9 There is evidence, therefore, that some 
contemporary theorists have been led to endorse a pluralist understanding of the nature 
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8 Adams (2006) p. 33 (A similar point is made by those who hold that courage belongs to a separate 
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of the virtues.10 By accepting this approach, it would be possible to avoid the 
motivational problem of courage. 
 
I will not be arguing directly against pluralist approaches in this work. At most, it seems 
as if a direct challenge to pluralism would consist of accusing pluralist approaches of 
being unsatisfyingly ad hoc. If we change our account of the nature of the virtues 
whenever we want to accommodate some additional trait then the underlying account 
itself will lack any explanatory power. This objection may be what Zagzebski has in mind 
when arguing that pluralist accounts of the virtues “should only be taken as a last 
resort”.11 A further direct objection to pluralism would be that it makes it difficult to rule 
out any character trait as a potential moral virtue. Once we accept that specific moral 
virtues can differ in significant ways, it becomes possible to accommodate any 
problematic trait as being simply a different type of virtue. Such a possibility ought to at 
least make us suspicious of the pluralist approach. However, direct objections to 
pluralism will not be my main focus here. Instead, the work carried out in this chapter 
(and in the previous chapter) challenges pluralism indirectly. The switch to a pluralist 
account will be unnecessary if we can demonstrate the acceptability of a uniform 
understanding of the moral virtues. By defending the motivations model against serious 
objections, I aim to demonstrate the acceptability of this account. If the defence is 
successful then we will have no reason to abandon the uniform motivations model in 
favour of a pluralist approach. In this way, the defence of the motivations model 
provides an indirect response to pluralism. Of course, if that defence proves to be 
unconvincing then pluralism regarding the nature of the virtues may be the only 
remaining option. 
 
                                                                 
10 It may be worth noting that the “pluralism” being discussed here appears to be different from that 
present in the account offered by Christine Swanton in Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (2003). 
Swanton does propose a one-size-fits-all account of the virtues in the sense that every virtue “is a 
disposition to respond well to the ‘demands of the world’” (p. 21) or “more specifically a disposition 
to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good enough way.” 
(p. 19). Swanton’s account is pluralistic in two different ways. Firstly, a given virtue may have a 
plurality of items within its field. Secondly, there may be a plurality of appropriate responses to these 
items, including (for example) maximising the thing in question, as well as honouring or respecting 
the thing in question. These features make an account pluralistic in ways that are different from the 
pluralism endorsed by Adams or Roberts and Wood. 





We ought not to switch to a pluralist understanding of the nature of the moral virtues 
unless we accept that uniform approaches, such as the motivations model, are 
unsuccessful. How else, then, might a defender of the motivations model respond to the 
motivational problem of courage? One option will be to deny that courage differs from 
other candidate moral virtues. Someone might claim that courage does indeed have a 
characteristic end towards which the virtuously courageous agent will necessarily be 
motivated. This is the position held by Zagzebski. However, while Zagzebski does 
attempt to discuss the motivational component of courage, she is only able to say that it 
will involve “emotions characteristic of the virtue of courage” and admits that it is 
difficult to be any more specific.12 In the absence of a positive proposal, it is difficult to 
imagine the end towards which a courageous agent will necessarily be motivated. 
Williams is surely correct in ruling out “being courageous” as the end towards which a 
courageous agent must be motivated.13 Even if it will sometimes be possible for the 
courageous agent to have this end in mind, this will only be so in certain special cases, 
such as when the agent is purposely facing down a challenge so as to improve or to 
display their courage.14 In general, an agent can perfectly well possess courage without 
happening to be motivated to “be courageous”. For example, a parent protecting their 
child from a wild animal can perfectly well possess courage even if the motivation to “be 
courageous” is not one that they possess. We therefore have reason to reject this 
suggestion for the characteristic end of the trait of courage. It is plausible that the 
difficulty (shared and acknowledged by Zagzebski) in explaining the characteristic end of 
courage stems from the fact that there is no such characteristic motivational end. If so, 
then this response to the motivational problem of courage will not be successful.  
 
Of course, any survey of possible characteristic ends for the trait of courage will struggle 
to be exhaustive. It will always be possible to propose some other characteristic end for 
courage, and the motivations model will only face a significant challenge here if all such 
proposals prove to be unconvincing. This is an important point in favour of my overall 
project of defending the motivations model. However, for now I want to accept the 
charge that the trait of courage has no characteristic end and so cannot easily be 
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accommodated by the motivations model. Having done so, it becomes important to 
consider the option of denying the virtue status of courage. Before considering this 
response, however, I want to first point out that the motivations model is not the only 
account that has reason to consider denying the virtue status of this widely accepted 
candidate virtue. 
 
3. A SHARED PROBLEM 
The motivations model of the moral virtues is not alone in facing a challenge from the 
trait of courage. If we accept the claim that there is no end that is characteristic to the 
trait of courage then this will pose a problem for any account of the moral virtues which 
includes reference to some characteristic motivational end. This includes the rival 
composite model of the moral virtues that was the focus of Chapter Two. The apparent 
difference in the motivational structure of courage when compared to other candidate 
moral virtues therefore poses a general problem for accounts of the virtues that require a 
necessary motivational component. I now want to highlight one further difference 
between courage and other candidate moral virtues, and to suggest that this provides us 
with further reason to consider the option of denying the virtue status of courage.  
 
A second problematic feature of the trait of courage is suggested in the work of Philippa 
Foot. Foot highlights the possibility of cases where an agent possesses genuine courage 
but where there appears to be nothing morally valuable about that possession. We are 
asked to “Suppose for instance that a sordid murder were in question, say a murder done 
for gain or to get an inconvenient person out of the way, but that this murder had to be 
done in alarming circumstances or in the face of real danger.”15 It appears that carrying 
out such a murder will require the possession of courage, but the nature of the act in 
question may leave us uneasy regarding the moral value of the agent’s character. To 
Foot’s example of the apparently courageous murderer we can add the possibility of a 
courageous burglar, terrorist, or super-villain. If such cases are accepted as being 
conceptually possible then this supports the idea that the possession of courage can 
sometimes be lacking in moral worth. And yet, the possibility of virtue possession being 
without moral worth appears less likely for other candidate moral virtues such as 
                                                                 





kindness or compassion. We can refer to this as the value problem of courage. The value 
problem highlights a further possible difference between courage and other candidate 
virtues, in addition to the difference previously identified by the motivational problem. I 
will consider two possible responses to the value problem before then going on to 
endorse the idea that we should deny the virtue status of the trait of courage.  
 
The value problem suggests that the trait of courage is more prone to problematic 
examples than are other candidate moral virtues. Even if a kind agent’s attempts to 
promote well-being can sometimes go awry (as in the Hitchhiker example in the previous 
chapter), there still appears to be something morally valuable about the agent’s kindness. 
In contrast with this, the courage of a murderer or a terrorist does not appear to provide 
us with good reason to judge such agents as morally worthy. A first possible response to 
this issue is to deny that such problematic cases provide us with examples of genuine 
courage. That is, we can deny that it is possible for a murderer or terrorist (or super-
villain) to possess genuine courage. If we do this then we will be able to deny the main 
claim of the value problem to the effect that courage is more prone to problematic 
examples than are other candidate moral virtues. 
 
It is not clear that this response to the value problem will be intuitively appealing. 
Indeed, examples such as courageous terrorists and courageous burglars have proven to 
be controversial in recent years.16 However, support for the idea that these agents 
cannot possess genuine courage can be found in the work of contemporary virtue 
theorists. If we accept a demanding account of the nature of courage then it will be 
possible to rule out such problematic cases. Julia Annas claims that “the truly brave 
person has a better and more intelligent grasp on what things are worth risk and daring 
and what are not.”17 Similarly, Paul Bloomfield has suggested that genuine courage 
requires “both an ability to discern real from apparent danger and knowledge of what is 
of value in life”.18 If we agree with this then we will be able to deny the possibility of 
problematic examples of courage. It is plausible that neither the murderer nor the 
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terrorist are exhibiting “knowledge of what is of value in life” and so neither will be 
classed as genuinely virtuous according to Annas and Bloomfield. Furthermore, this 
general approach will be appealing to those who already endorse an account of the 
virtues such as the skills or composite models. These approaches already demand an 
element of cognitive skill on the part of the virtuous agent, and so demanding that the 
agent be able to work out “what things are worth risk and daring and what are not” will 
be perfectly acceptable on such accounts. If we agree, then it will be possible to avoid 
the value problem of courage. 
 
However, there is a problem with this response to the value problem. Claiming that 
genuinely courageous agents will always be responsive to what is of (actual) va lue in life 
does not appear to be in-keeping with how we would decide who is or is not courageous 
in any given case. Suppose, for example, that we are asked to judge which soldiers on a 
particular battlefield are genuinely courageous. This task will not be made easier once we 
are told that one side is furthering a just cause (and so pursuing an actually valuable 
outcome) and the other is furthering an unjust cause (and so pursuing an outcome that 
is not valuable). Indeed, it is not clear that this information will be of any use at all. The 
soldiers on the unjust side are not thereby less able to be courageous, even if this is what 
would be suggested by the claim that true courage requires that an agent be in pursuit of 
actually valuable ends. Whether or not an individual soldier can possess courage should 
not be entirely determined by which side of the battlefield they happen to be on. If we 
think that soldiers in unjust wars will be furthering ends that aren’t valuable, and if we 
accept that genuine courage is not possible in the pursuit of non-valuable ends, then we 
would need to deny this intuitive claim. This would be a significant downside of 
accepting the current response to the value problem. 
 
A defender of the view suggested by the quotes from Annas and Bloomfield may well 
agree with the idea that whether or not an agent is courageous should not be determined 
by which side of the battlefield they happen to be on. They can argue that the ends of 
the individual soldier may not match the unjust ends of their commanding officers or 
government. Instead, individual soldiers will be directed towards their own individual 





genuine value, then we will need to know the ends of each individual solider (as well as 
whether or not those ends are truly valuable) before we can make a judgement regarding 
that soldier’s courage. 
 
Even with this clarification in mind, the view suggested by Annas and Bloomfield is not 
intuitively appealing. When asked to judge which soldiers on a particular battlefield are 
genuinely courageous, we will now have to keep in mind that different soldiers may be 
directed towards different ends. It will be necessary to work out which end each solider 
is directed towards, and whether or not that end is valuable, before we can make a 
judgement regarding that soldier’s courage. Consider the following possible ends that an 
individual soldier might be directed towards: defending the security of the soldier’s 
nation; defending the oppressed citizens of the opposing state; encouraging the spread 
of freedom of speech; encouraging the spread of democracy; encouraging the spread of 
a particular religion; expressing loyalty to their commanding officer; fulfilling contractual 
obligations; fulfilling obligations so that they can return home to their families; fulfilling 
obligations so that they can return home to finish off some jigsaw puzzle; and so on. On 
the view being suggested, it will be necessary for us to know which specific goal (or 
combination of specific goals) the soldier actually has in mind, and whether or not that 
goal can rightly be considered valuable. This does not look to be a plausible claim, either 
about how we would act if asked to identify courageous soldiers on the battlefield or 
about who can or cannot be genuinely courageous.19 We therefore have reason to doubt 
the suggestion that an agent cannot be courageous unless they are directed towards and 
appreciative of ends that are of actual value. Denying that our problematic cases provide 
examples of genuine courage is not an intuitively appealing response to the value 
problem. 
 
The value problem provides a prima facie challenge to accounts of the virtues because it 
suggests that the trait of courage differs significantly from other candidate moral virtues. 
I have suggested that we ought not to respond to this problem by denying that the 
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problematic examples provide us with cases of genuine courage. A second possible 
response to this problem is to deny that the examples are problematic. That is, it is 
possible to claim that courage is morally valuable even in cases such as the courageous 
murderer or the courageous terrorist. This is the response favoured by Zagzebski, who 
uses the courage of a Nazi soldier as an example.20 Zagzebski argues that the ideally 
virtuous agent will possess courage and so any agent who happens to possess courage 
will thereby be closer to the moral ideal than they would be without it. Without courage 
“a person would have more moral work to do to attain a high level of moral worth” and 
so we ought to consider any possession of courage morally valuable. 21 If we agree with 
Zagzebski then we can deny that courage is especially prone to examples where its 
possession is lacking in moral worth, and so we will be able to avoid the value problem. 
 
This second response to the value problem is also problematic. The main issue here is 
that Zagzebski’s response fails to be sensitive to the different ways in which (and 
different extents to which) different people might possess genuine courage. As Daniel 
Russell has pointed out, there is no “denying the overwhelming evidence that no 
courageous person (say) is courageous across all areas of his or her life, and it is 
pointless to stipulate that such a person therefore could not be ‘really’ courageous in any 
area at all.”22 What these considerations (and everyday experience) highlight is that there 
are different ways in which an agent might be courageous. That an agent is courageous 
in one way (say, in a particular context or in response to a particular obstacle) does not 
guarantee that they will also be courageous in some other way. For example, an agent 
can be courageous on the battlefield and yet display a lack of courage when asked to 
speak in front of a large audience. That an agent is courageous when standing up for 
justice in their community tells us nothing about whether they will have the courage to 
be honest in their personal relationships. In response to this we could say that different 
agents can be expected to possess different forms of courage – some will be courageous 
regarding certain ends or contexts and others will be courageous regarding different 
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ends or contexts.23 These considerations are important in telling against Zagzebski’s 
response to the value problem. 
 
Once we realise that it is possible to be courageous in different ways, or that it is 
possible to possess different forms of courage, the response from Zagzebski becomes 
less appealing. Even if we were to think that courage does in general make an agent 
closer to the moral ideal, it is far from obvious that this is true of the forms of courage 
that are possessed in Foot’s example of the courageous murderer or in Zagzebski’s 
example of the courageous Nazi. It does not appear to be the case that a virtuous agent 
needs to possess courage in the ways in which it is possessed in these examples. 
Consider the agent who is able to be courageous when avoiding prosecution for 
criminal acts, the agent who is courageous in furthering their own self-interest, or the 
agent who can courageously carry out acts of genocide. We have no reason to accept 
that an ideally virtuous agent would need to be courageous in these ways, or that the 
possession of such forms of courage would make an agent closer to some moral ideal. 
An agent who possesses only problematic forms of courage may even improve their 
moral character by losing such courage. Given this, we ought to maintain that it is 
possible to possess courage in a way that is morally problematic. We ought, therefore, to 
reject this possible response to the value problem. 
 
To re-cap: the motivations model of the moral virtues faces a serious problem if we 
accept that the trait of courage (unlike other candidate virtues) is not directed towards 
any characteristic end or target. This is the motivational problem of courage, and is my 
main focus in this chapter. However, I have now suggested that the value problem of 
courage also challenges a variety of accounts of the moral virtues, and this will include 
the motivations model as well. It would be possible to avoid both of these problems by 
denying that the trait of courage is a moral virtue. However, the widespread acceptance 
of the virtue status of courage means that this approach will be controversial. It will be 
necessary to provide a plausible alternative account of the relationship between courage 
and the moral virtues, and this account will need to be capable of explaining the 
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intuitions in favour of the virtue status of courage. I will now propose such an account. 
If successful, this account will provide us with a response to the problem(s) of courage. 
 
4. COURAGE AS AN ENABLER 
As was noted above, it is possible to possess different forms of courage, and the 
possession of a given form provides no guarantee that an agent will possess any other 
form. That we have witnessed an individual acting courageously on the battlefield tells 
us nothing about whether they will be courageous when asked to speak in front of a 
large audience. If there are different forms of courage that an agent can possess then to 
be courageous overall will be to possess a sufficient combination or collection of the 
various specific forms. It will be useful, therefore, to consider what might be involved in 
possessing a specific form of courage – in possessing courage regarding a particular 
context or a particular end. Having done this, it will then be possible to explain the 
connection between courage and the moral virtues. A plausible account of the 
possession of specific forms of courage is the following: 
 
An agent is courageous regarding a particular context or end only when their 
motivations within that context or towards that end are not easily defeated 
by considerations of personal risk. 
 
An agent is courageous regarding the end of protecting their family only when their 
motivation to do so is not easily defeated by considerations of personal risk. An agent is 
courageous in the context of public speaking only when their motivations (whatever 
these may be) are not easily defeated by considerations of personal risk in such a 
context. An agent is courageous regarding the end of winning the affections of their 
beloved only when their motivation to do so is not easily defeated by considerations of 
personal risk. In these cases, the sense of “defeat” that  I have in mind should not be 
taken to imply that the motivation in question simply disappears. Instead, the 
motivation itself will remain, but the agent’s resolve in acting on the motivation (or in 
achieving the end of the motivation) will have been overridden by considerations of 
personal risk. With this in mind, we can say that an agent may be considered courageous 






It will be useful to clarify several aspects of this account before moving on to consider 
how it will allow us to explain the actual relationship between courage and the moral 
virtues. First of all, it is worth pointing out that the defeasibility of a given motivation is 
different from the felt strength of that motivation. It is possible to be very strongly 
motivated towards a particular end but for that motivation to be easily defeated by 
considerations of personal risk. This amounts to no more than highlighting the 
difference between apathy and cowardice. In cases of the former, an agent will not feel a 
sufficiently strong motivation, while in cases of the latter an agent may be very strongly 
motivated but this motivation is defeated by competing considerations. Furthermore, it 
is worth pointing out that the understanding of “personal risk” that is in play here is 
relatively broad. For example, it is not the case that the agent must be concerned for 
their physical well-being. Instead, the risk to the agent might be professional (the loss of 
a job or of status) or personal (the loss of a friend or partner) as well as physical. It is 
important that “personal risk” not be narrowly construed, and that it allow for 
consideration of the various different ways in which a person can be said to be harmed.  
 
A further question to be answered about this account is what it means for a motivation 
to be easily defeated by considerations of personal risk. Plausibly, this will be a matter of 
the agent’s motivation being defeated despite being confronted with a level of risk that 
is below some relevant threshold. There are two issues relating to this threshold on 
which different theorists may be inclined to disagree. The first involves the question of 
where to set the threshold of risk below which a motivation can be rightly thought of as 
having been defeated easily. The second involves the question of how we ought to 
determine the level of risk in a given situation. While I will aim to remain open on how 
best to resolve these particular issues, I do want to say something about the available 
options.  
 
Regarding the first issue, it is plausible that an agent should not be criticised in terms of 
their courage if the risk that they face is overwhelming. To borrow a vivid example from 
Julia Driver, we can imagine the motivation of an agent who had “resisted Nazi 





succumbed when driven to the edge of madness by the threat of being eaten by rats.”24 
As Driver is surely correct to claim, this agent can clearly be considered courageous 
even if their motivation (say, not to provide any information to their interrogators) has 
been ultimately defeated. On the other hand, some examples do encourage us to 
question the courage of those involved. If a parent’s motivation to buy vital supplies for 
their child is defeated by the slight risk of embarrassment were they to mispronounce 
the necessary product then we would rightly judge them to be lacking in courage. These 
two contrasting examples suggest the extremes between which the proper threshold 
ought to be set. Of course, competing theorists may wish to set the threshold at 
different levels within these extremes, or to set the threshold at different levels 
depending on the situation.25 I will not attempt to resolve this issue here, and will 
instead aim to focus on examples likely to gain widespread acceptance as being either 
clearly courageous or clearly non-courageous. 
 
In addition to the issue of what the appropriate threshold level of risk ought to be, there 
is also the issue of how we should measure the level of risk in a given situation. For 
example, it will make a significant difference whether we evaluate the defeasibility of a 
motivation by considering the actual level of risk or by considering the level of risk as 
perceived by the agent. The first approach would be to consider objective risk while the 
second would be to consider (purely) subjective risk. Of these two extremes, there 
would appear to be good reason to favour the subjective approach over the objective 
approach. This would allow us to explain why it can be courageous to take the crucial 
penalty in a football match even when the objective risk of failure has been greatly 
lowered (because the opposing goalkeeper has been bribed) or why the torture victim in 
Driver’s example would still be courageous even if the interrogators were unlikely to be 
able to carry out their threat (because they would have difficulty in procuring the 
necessary rats). To use a more outlandish example, it explains why the crew of Star Trek 
might be courageous while tackling a foe in the holodeck, even when the safety settings 
are operating within normal parameters. On the other hand, there are cases which 
encourage us to move away from the purely subjective approach – cases where the 
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agent’s risk assessment is especially foolish or irrational. This suggests that some middle -
ground between the extremes is required. Perhaps we should evaluate based on the level 
of risk that it would be rational for the agent to believe was present, or the level of risk 
that would be supported by the available evidence. The account as I present it here, and 
the subsequent explanation for the relationship between courage and moral virtue, is 
compatible with different answers to this question and so I will not further discuss these 
issues. The aim here has been to better explain what is being meant by “easily defeated” 
in the basic understanding of courage being proposed. This is a matter of there being 
some level of risk (however measured) below which it would be problematic for an 
agent’s motivation to be defeated. If the agent’s motivation remains (or would remain) 
undefeated at any level of risk up to that point, then we ought to say that their 
motivation is not easily defeated by considerations of personal risk and that, therefore, 
they may possess the relevant form of courage. 
 
With these clarifications in mind, we can now turn our attention back to the 
understanding of courage that is being suggested. The suggestion is that forms of 
courage (regarding a particular context or end) involve motivations that are not easily 
defeated by considerations of personal risk. This understanding is in-keeping with many 
commonly held intuitions regarding the nature of courage. For example, it is commonly 
remarked that the ways in which an agent can demonstrate courage are numerous and 
highly variable. When asked to imagine a case in which someone might act 
courageously, some will imagine a soldier on the battlefield, or perhaps an outlaw in the 
Wild West. Others will think of examples from history of those who took a stand in 
order to further some just cause – examples such as Rosa Parks. And, on reflection, 
most would surely accept that courage can be shown by a patient suffering through 
some chronic illness, or by a shy student who speaks up in class. While it is not 
immediately obvious what these examples have in common, a plausible understanding 
of courage will allow that courage can be expressed in (at least) these varying contexts 
and in these various ways.26  An account of courage as involving a non-defeasible 
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motivation is perfectly able to uphold this intuition. When we evaluate the soldier as 
being courageous, we do so on the grounds that their motivation to achieve their set 
goals or to serve their country is not being defeated by the very real danger that 
confronts them. When we judge that Rosa Parks was courageous, we do so because her 
motivation to support the cause of civil rights was not defeated by the risk of arrest, 
abuse or mistreatment which she knew to be a likely consequence of her actions. And 
when we judge the patient suffering through a chronic illness to be courageous, this is 
because their motivation to live as normal a life as possible, or to live life in a certain 
way (for example cheerfully, or with dignity), is not defeated by the increased difficulties 
and dangers that they face. The proposed account can explain why these agents clearly 
possess forms of courage. And in these cases the known levels of risk are so high that it 
makes sense for us to assume that such agents will in fact be exemplars of overall 
courage. Compatibility with these intuitions about courage provides us with reason to 
accept the understanding of courage that is being suggested.  
 
Having clarified certain aspects of the proposed account of courage, as well as providing 
prima facie reason for its acceptance, it is now possible to consider the relationship 
between courage and the moral virtues that it would suggest. According to the 
motivations model, moral virtues consist of a motivation towards some characteristic 
end. For example, a virtuously kind agent will be motivated towards the end of 
protecting and promoting well-being. However, as was explained in the previous 
chapter, not just any motivation towards the characteristic end will be sufficient. First of 
all, a virtuous motivation must be sufficiently persistent. We do not think of the virtuously 
kind agent as one whose motivation to promote well-being is fleeting or sporadic. 
Similarly, the motivation must not be so weak that, even if persistent, it would never be 
strong enough to actually prompt the agent into action. That is, the virtuous motivation 
must be sufficiently strongly felt. And finally, the motivation involved in a moral virtue 
must be sufficiently robust in the sense that it will not be easily overridden by competing 
considerations. For example, if an agent possesses a persistent and strongly felt 
motivation to promote well-being, but their motivation is always overridden by the 
competing aim of making as much money as possible, then we will not want to say that 
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the motivation for well-being is sufficient for virtue. It is only when sufficient levels of 
persistence, strength and robustness are achieved that we can say that an agent 
possesses the type of motivation necessary for a moral virtue. I have suggested that we 
can refer to a motivation that meets the sufficient levels of persistence, strength and 
robustness as a deep motivation. 
 
Moral virtues, then, involve a deep motivation towards some characteristic  end, and 
having a deep motivation involves (among other things) having a motivation that is 
robust in the face of competing considerations. One type of competing consideration 
for a morally virtuous motivation will be considerations of personal risk. For example, 
the virtuously kind agent will have a motivation to protect and promote well -being that 
is (among other things) not easily defeated by considerations of personal risk. The 
virtuously compassionate agent will have a motivation to alleviate suffering that is 
(among other things) not easily defeated by considerations of personal risk. If an agent’s 
otherwise virtuous motivation is easily defeated by considerations of personal risk then 
they do not possess the relevant moral virtue. And, of course, I have suggested that a 
motivation towards some end which is not easily defeated by considerations of personal 
risk is exactly what an agent who is courageous regarding that end will possess. 
Therefore, possession of a given moral virtue will involve possession of what is required 
for the form of courage relating to the characteristic end of that virtue. The virtuously 
kind agent will be courageous regarding the end of protecting and promoting well -being. 
The virtuously compassionate agent will be courageous regarding the end of alleviating 
suffering. In this way, we can begin to understand the proper relationship between 
courage and the moral virtues. 
 
Courage can be best understood as an enabler for moral virtue. More accurately, those 
forms of courage which relate to the end of a moral virtue can be best understood as 
being enablers for the corresponding virtue. An example may help to further explain 
this relationship. Consider again the example of a parent who feels strongly motivated 
to secure vital supplies for their young child but who fails to do so due to a fear of 
ridicule were they to mispronounce the necessary product. Clearly there is something 





problem is to interpret the case as one where the agent does possess kindness but is still 
morally lacking as the result of failing to possess the independent virtue of courage. 
However, we ought instead to recognise that the virtue of kindness is actually missing in 
this case – and for the very reason that the agent lacks the relevant form of courage. 
Their motivation to protect and promote well-being, despite being strongly felt, has 
been easily defeated by considerations of personal risk. This tells us that their 
motivation is not sufficiently robust and so is not sufficient for morally virtuous 
kindness. If we could transform the agent such that they did possess courage regarding 
the end of promoting well-being then we could improve their moral character – not 
because the added courage is an independent moral virtue but because by adding that 
form of courage we would make it possible for the agent to actually possess the virtue 
of kindness. This does mean that an agent cannot be morally virtuous without 
possessing (relevant forms of) courage, and this fact explains why many have assumed 
that courage itself must be a moral virtue. However, it is instead the case that the 
addition of (relevant forms of) courage makes the possession of actual moral virtues 
possible, and it is the addition of these virtues that makes for a morally virtuous agent.  
 
The understanding of courage as enabling the possession of moral virtue (as opposed to 
being an independent moral virtue) can explain some of the issues raised by the 
problems discussed above. For example, the value problem suggested that there can be 
cases were an individual possesses courage but where this possession is lacking in moral 
worth. We are now in a better position to understand why this is the case. We have seen 
that there are different forms of courage (regarding different contexts or ends) and that 
possessing one form is no guarantee of possessing any of the other forms. Some forms 
of courage will relate to an end which is also the end of a moral virtue. When this is the 
case, the agent who possesses that form of courage will possess something that is 
necessary for possession of the corresponding moral virtue – they will possess a 
motivation towards the virtuous end that is not easily defeated by considerations of 
personal risk. In this way, they will be closer to possessing the moral virtue than 





explains the moral worth of possessing these forms of courage. 27 However, the same is 
not true for someone who possesses a form of courage regarding an end that is 
unrelated to any moral virtue. In some cases that form of courage will be morally 
neutral, such as the form involving a non-defeasible motivation to secure a cup of tea. 
In other cases, the form of courage may actually be a moral hindrance – such as those 
cases where the related end runs contrary to a moral virtue. Cases such as the 
courageous murderer described by Foot (or the courageous terrorist or super-villain) 
will likely fit this description. In these cases, the courage that is possessed will be of no 
moral worth, and we might even think that the moral character of the agent would be 
improved if these forms of courage were not present. The understanding of courage as 
an enabler, as opposed to an independent moral virtue, provides us with a satisfying 
explanation for the respective levels of moral worth present in these examples.  
 
The understanding of courage as an enabler is therefore able to provide those 
explanations that are required if we choose to deny the virtue status of courage. It can 
explain the connection between courage and the moral virtues in a way that maintains 
the moral value of (certain forms of) courage. It can also explain the widespread 
assumption that courage is an independent moral virtue. On the enabler account it is 
correct to say that an agent entirely lacking in courage will also be lacking in moral 
virtue, and this explains the assumption that courage itself must be a moral virtue. 
However, the proper explanation for this is that the absence of (relevant forms of) 
courage will prevent an agent from possessing further traits, such as kindness and 
compassion, which are actually moral virtues. In addition, the enabler account is in-
keeping with many intuitions regarding courage, such as the belief that courage can be 
displayed in many different ways and in many different contexts, and the belief that the 
courage of a soldier ought not to be entirely determined by what side of the battlefield 
they happen to be on. The enabler account therefore provides an attractive 
understanding of courage, and of the relationship between courage and the moral 
virtues, for those who would deny that courage is a moral virtue.  
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The motivations model of the moral virtues faces a challenge in accommodating 
courage as a moral virtue. This is because we have reason to doubt that the motivational 
structure of courage is similar to that of other candidate virtues such as kindness or 
compassion. The value problem also suggests a difference in the mora l worth of 
courage when compared to other candidate moral virtues. By providing a plausible 
account of courage as a non-virtue, it has been possible to show that denying the virtue 
status of courage is a viable option when defending an account of the nature of the 
moral virtues. Before concluding this chapter, I want to briefly mention other traits 
which might be thought to pose a problem for the motivations model (and for other 
accounts of the virtues) and to explain the various options that are available when 
responding to these traits. 
 
5. OTHER PROBLEMATIC TRAITS 
In this chapter I have so far focused solely on the trait of courage. This trait is of 
particular interest due to the widespread acceptance of its virtue status, as well as the 
extent to which its problematic nature has already been touched upon in the literature. 
However, it is important to recognise that courage is not the only trait that can be used 
to challenge accounts of the moral virtues. When presented with an account of the 
nature of the virtues, one response to that account will always be to suggest some 
candidate virtue that the account is unable to accommodate. We saw in Chapter Two 
that Julia Driver has highlighted the trait of modesty (along with the other virtues of 
ignorance) in an attempt to undermine rival accounts of the virtues. 28 In response to 
such suggestions, the defender of a particular account will have the option of either 
claiming that the proposed candidate virtue actually can be accommodated by their 
account, or else arguing that the trait is not in fact a moral virtue. I am interested here in 
defending the motivations model of the moral virtues. With regards to courage, I have 
suggested that it will be acceptable for a defender of that account to select the option 
whereby they deny the virtue status of courage. And I have attempted to lessen any costs 
in embracing that option by providing an account of courage as a non-virtue which, I 
have argued, is independently plausible. I now want to briefly suggest that the strategy 
                                                                 





used in response to the trait of courage may also be useful in responding to other 
problematic traits. 
 
As mentioned above, one supporter of a pluralist understanding of the moral virtues is 
Robert Adams. Adams believes that different virtues can be of different types, and 
suggests that two different types of virtue are the motivational virtues and the structural 
virtues.29 Adams is not alone in suggesting such a distinction between types of virtue. 
For example, in ‘Will Power and the Virtues’, Robert Roberts proposes a distinction 
between “substantive” or “motivational” virtues on the one hand, and “virtues of will 
power” on the other.30 These theorists are in agreement that the trait of courage must be 
placed in a separate category from traits such as compassion or honesty or justice. 
However, courage is not the only trait that is to be so distinguished. One important 
example of another trait that is distinguished from candidate virtues such as compassion 
and honesty is the trait of temperance. Much like the trait of courage, the trait of 
temperance (or self-control) has been widely accepted as a moral virtue. And, also like 
the trait of courage, we might worry that it is difficult to identify a characteristic end that 
will be common to all instances of temperance. Given this, it will be interesting to 
consider whether or not the enabler account that was used in response to the trait of 
courage can also be used in response to the trait of temperance. 
 
The motivations model states that moral virtues consist in deep motivations towards 
characteristic ends, and a deep motivation is one that is sufficiently persistent, strongly 
felt, and robust. This requires (among other things) that the motivation not be easily 
overridden or defeated by competing considerations. One type of competing 
consideration will be considerations stemming from personal risk, and the possession of 
courage enables an agent to possess motivations that are not (easily) defeated by such 
considerations. But other types of consideration may also defeat an agent’s otherwise 
virtuous motivation. An agent’s strong motivation to promote well-being, for example, 
may be steadfast in the face of personal risk and yet be utterly defeated by a competing 
desire to make as much money as possible, or to experience the pleasures of alcohol or 
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idleness. An agent in possession of (the relevant forms of) temperance will not have 
their motivations overridden in this way.31 The role that courage plays when enabling 
virtue through the avoidance of motivational defeat by consideration of personal risk is 
played by temperance when enabling virtue through the avoidance of motivational 
defeat by other considerations, such as considerations of available pleasure. Indeed, I 
find it plausible to view temperance as a general term for when an agent’s motivations 
are invulnerable to competing considerations, while courage refers specifically to when 
motivations are invulnerable with regards to considerations of personal risk. But it is not 
necessary to accept this further claim about the relationship between courage and 
temperance. All that is required here is to note that the trait of temperance can be 
treated in the same way as the trait of courage. It is possible to come up with a plausible 
account of temperance as a non-virtue by accepting that temperance actually serves as 
an enabler for moral virtue. And the required explanations for why temperance has been 
thought to be a moral virtue, or for what the actual relationship is between temperance 
and moral virtue, will be just the same as for courage. The trait of temperance poses no 
additional problems for the motivations model. 
 
Of course, courage and temperance are only two examples of traits that might be taken 
to pose a problem for the motivations model. When distinguishing different types of 
virtue, both Adams and Roberts classify traits such as patience, perseverance, wisdom, 
and conscientiousness, alongside the traits of courage and temperance. This suggests that 
the motivations model will have to say something about these traits as well. However, 
the available options for responding to these traits ought to now be clear. On some 
occasions the correct response may be to argue that the relevant trait can be 
accommodated as a moral virtue by the motivations model, and this wi ll involve 
identifying the characteristic end of such traits. On other occasions the correct response 
may be to deny that the relevant trait is a moral virtue, and this could be done in a 
variety of ways. For some traits it may be appropriate to claim that they are virtues of 
some other type (for example, intellectual or aesthetic virtues), while for others it may be 
appropriate to argue that they are unconnected with virtue in any way. And on still other 
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occasions it may be appropriate to argue that the proposed trait is in fact an enabler for 
moral virtue, in the same way as I have argued in the cases of courage and temperance. It 
is not necessary to go through every potentially problematic trait in order to identify 
which of these possible responses would be most appropriate for that trait. It is instead 
sufficient to highlight the various options that are available when responding to 
objections of this sort. Given the availability of these options, the motivations model 
looks to be well-placed in terms of being able to respond to the suggestion of potentially 
problematic candidate virtues. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
All accounts of the nature of the moral virtues will face challenges in accommodating 
certain problematic candidate virtues. Courage is a prime example of such a problematic 
trait. In this chapter I have explained why courage may be taken to pose a problem for 
the motivations model (as well as for other accounts of the moral virtues). I have then 
proposed and defended an alternative account of courage as a non-virtue on which 
courage is instead understood to be an enabler for moral virtue. The arguments in this 
chapter show that the motivations model is capable of responding to challenges 
involving potentially problematic candidate virtues. In addition to providing a plausible 
account of a key candidate moral virtue, this discussion also provides further support for 





CHAPTER FIVE: IDENTIFYING THE MORAL VIRTUES 
 
0. INTRODUCTION 
My focus so far has been on evaluating three different accounts of the nature of the 
moral virtues. I have argued in defence of the motivations model, on which a moral 
virtue consists of a deep motivation towards some characteristic end. Of course, not all  
deep motivations will be plausible contenders for virtue status. The deep motivation to 
secure as much money as possible is not a plausible candidate moral virtue. Therefore, 
anyone who accepts the motivations model will have an interest in identifying which 
motivations actually are moral virtues. In fact, addressing this type of issue will be an 
obvious next step regardless of the model of the nature of moral virtues that one 
endorses. If we think that virtues are skills, or that virtues are composites, or even if we 
think that virtues can have any number of different natures, it will still be important to 
ask which sub-set of these ought to be accepted as moral virtues. Determining the identity 
of the moral virtues is therefore one of the more pressing tasks facing anyone working 
on virtue theory. My aim in this chapter is to evaluate different ways of carrying out this 
important task.   
 
The chapter will begin by considering an approach to identifying the moral virtues 
endorsed most clearly in the work of Michael Slote. Slote argues that attempts to explain 
virtue status in terms of some other concept or feature of the world are mistaken. 
Instead, the value and virtuousness of a given trait is a basic feature of that trait, and 
ought not to be explained with reference to other factors. As we shall see, this approach 
faces certain challenges. Given this, Sections 2 and 3 will move on to evaluate two of the 
most influential alternative approaches to identifying the moral virtues – Julia Driver’s 
consequentialist approach and Rosalind Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian approach. I will 
justify a re-assessment of the fundamental value approach by arguing that these rival 
approaches face serious problems.1 The chapter ends by re-considering the fundamental 
value approach and by suggesting a possible way forward on this issue.  
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1. SLOTE’S FUNDAMENTAL VALUE APPROACH 
Michael Slote is perhaps best known for endorsing a form of what he calls “agent -
based” virtue ethics.2 The particular form of agent-basing that Slote endorses tells us that 
the moral status of actions is entirely determined by whether or not they “exhibit or 
express” a positive (overall) motivation on the part of the agent. 3 This account has been 
extensively commented upon and criticised in the literature. 4 However, my interest here 
is not in Slote’s theory of morally right action. Instead, I want to point out a second 
important element of Slote’s agent-based approach to the virtues. The two elements of 
the general agent-based approach can be set out as follows: 
 
Agent-Priority: The moral status of actions is derivative from ethical facts 
about the “motives, dispositions, or inner life of moral individuals”.  
 
Fundamental Value: Ethical facts about the motives, dispositions, or inner life 
of moral individuals are fundamental.5 
 
With this definition of the agent-based approach in mind, Slote rules out Aristotle as a 
possible adherent of the view. The Aristotelian approach may count as “agent -prior” 
because right action is determined with reference to virtue concepts (and is thus a form 
of virtue ethics), but it does not understand ethical facts about motives to be 
fundamental, explaining these instead in terms of the further concept of eudaimonia (or a 
flourishing life).6 Similarly, David Hume is ruled out as a possible historical supporter of 
agent-basing. In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume asserts that “all virtuous actions 
derive their merit only from virtuous motives”, and Slote points out that this may mean 
that Hume accepts agent-priority.7 However, Hume also accepts that the virtuousness of 
motives is to some extent connected to their positive consequences, and so he fails to 
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endorse both of the necessary components of agent-basing.8 In fact, Slote admits that it 
is difficult to find any obvious prior adherents to the kind of agent-based approach that 
he proposes.9 
 
While accepting that it is most common to refer to Slote’s overall view as “agent-based”, 
I will here be referring to his “fundamental value” approach to the virtues. This move is 
necessary in order to avoid confusion about the focus of this chapter. I will not be 
considering Slote’s account of morally right action (the “agent-prior” component of 
agent-basing) and will only be interested in his claims regarding the fundamentality of 
ethical facts about inner traits (the “fundamental value” component of agent-basing).10 I 
ought, therefore, to say more about this aspect of Slote’s account.  
 
When faced with the task of identifying the moral virtues, it is understandable that we 
might want to do this with reference to some further concept. As we shall see, influential 
approaches include identifying the moral virtues with reference to the production of 
positive consequences, or with reference to the idea of the good life for human beings. 
However, not everyone agrees that such appeal to a further concept is required. Work 
on virtue theory often begins by providing a list of the kinds of traits that we have in 
mind when talking about virtues. Regular mention tends to be given to traits such as 
compassion, honesty, courage, justice, temperance, and so on, and the listing of these 
traits is fairly widespread and accepted by (most) virtue theorists. 11 Instead of looking for 
some further explanation that can tell us why these traits are moral virtues, we ought 
instead to notice just how widely accepted their virtue status is. Perhaps this tells us 
something about their value independently of any further considerations. Perhaps it 
suggests that we can simply see that these traits are valuable in a fundamental way. 
 
This is the approach to identifying the moral virtues that is taken by Slote. When 
assessing the value of particular traits, Slote denies that we need to consult other 
concepts or ideas. For example, when discussing the prospects of basing a moral theory 
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on either universal benevolence or a more partialistic form of caring, Slote defends these 
traits as plausible contenders by saying that “the moral goodness of (universal) 
benevolence or of caring about people is intuitively obvious and in need of no further 
moral grounding.”12 Similarly, when discussing the possible virtue of “inner strength”, 
Slote suggests that “there is something intuitively admirable about being strong inside, 
something requiring no appeal to or defence from other ideas”.13 Rather than coming up 
with some alternative method for answering our key question, we ought instead to 
simply reflect upon the nature of the traits themselves. We will then come to realise that 
some traits are fundamentally valuable and (therefore) virtuous. This idea is  also 
endorsed by Linda Zagzebski, as can be shown by the following lengthy quote:  
 
I believe it is possible that we can see the goodness of a person in this rather 
direct way. She may simply exude a “glow” of nobility or fineness of 
character… If we then attempt to find out what it is about such a person 
that makes him good, we may be able to identify that goodness as involving 
certain feelings or motivations such as feelings of compassion or of self-
respect or of respect for others, or motives of benevolence, sympathy, or 
love… In each case we would not determine that his love, compassion, or 
benevolence is good because of its relation to anything independently 
identified as good. We would simply see that these feelings or motivations 
are the states whose goodness we see in him.14 
 
The quotes from both Slote and Zagzebski show that influential virtue theorists have 
endorsed the idea that the virtuousness of traits ought not to be explained by reference 
to further, more fundamentally valuable, concepts. 15 Of course, this leaves open the 
possibility that a connection to, for example, positive consequences or a good life might 
provide evidence for the virtuousness of a given trait. But that evidence will be 
defeasible, and it would be a mistake to assume that the connection is what explains the 
value of the trait. Instead, certain traits are fundamentally valuable and these are the traits 
that are the virtues. 
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In terms of providing a method for identifying the moral virtues, the fundamental value 
approach suggests that this ought not to be done by relying on a necessary connection 
between virtuous character traits and some further concept, such as the good life. 
Instead, both Slote and Zagzebski discuss the possibility that we can simply “see” that 
certain traits are fundamentally valuable, or that the value of certain traits will be 
“intuitively obvious”. This suggests that, on the fundamental value approach, it will be 
necessary to identify the moral virtues via an appeal to our intuitions. I now want to 
explain why we might be uneasy about endorsing this approach. 
 
The most important, and perhaps the most obvious, point that needs to be made 
regarding any appeal to intuitions is the following: intuitions differ. Intuitions can differ 
between different people at the same time, different people at different times, and even 
the same person at different times. It may even be possible for an individual to 
experience conflicting intuitions at any one time. It is plausible that these differences will 
be influenced by societal factors and cultural backgrounds. Moral intuitions regarding 
duties of care to those in need can be expected to differ between those struggling in 
poverty-stricken countries and those who live in relatively secure and affluent 
surroundings. The intuitions of a philosopher in Ancient Greece can be expected to be 
different from those of a philosopher today.16 Such disagreement leaves us with a 
problem when identifying the moral virtues by appeal to their fundamental value. If the 
value of virtuous traits is meant to be “intuitively obvious” then how can we explain 
instances of disagreement, and how are we supposed to uncover which intuitions are the 
correct ones? Of course, we could say that all intuitions are correct for the person who 
experiences them. This would lead to an extremely relativistic account whereby any trait 
(including cruelty, prejudice, or arrogance) could end up being classed as a moral virtue, 
as long as its possessor has the necessary corresponding intuitions. It would also be 
possible for traits to frequently lose and then re-acquire their virtue status whenever an 
individual’s intuitions fluctuated. Assuming that we would prefer to avoid such 
conclusions, the fundamental value approach appears to put us in the position of having 
to come up with some way of resolving disagreements. We need to be able to determine 
which intuitions regarding the virtue status of traits are the correct ones.  
                                                                 







This issue cannot be resolved by relying on intuitions about which intuitions we ought to 
accept. That approach would be likely to lead to something of a vicious regress. Second-
order intuitions (intuitions about which intuitions are correct) are just as likely to differ 
as are first-order intuitions. If someone finds it intuitive that faith and piety are key 
moral virtues, then we should not expect them to simply discard this belief upon being 
told that others disagree. Instead, they are likely to have the further, second-order 
intuition that their opponent’s first-order intuitions are incorrect. And this problem of 
disagreement will not be solved by appeal to a third, fourth, or any higher level of 
intuition. Furthermore, giving priority to our own intuitions makes it likely that our list 
of moral virtues will simply reflect our own cultural background. Therefore, it looks as if 
we need to appeal to some further concept in order to adjudicate in those instances 
where we disagree over the virtuousness of a given trait. This is an objection to Slote 
that has been raised by Daniel Russell, who argues that:  
 
To avoid parochialism, one must look somewhere to explain why one trait is 
virtuous or admirable while another is not, but of course to give any other 
explanation is to concede that aretaic concepts are not fundamental. 17 
 
The challenge facing the fundamental value approach to identifying the moral virtues 
ought to now be clear. If we do not explain the virtuousness of traits by reference to 
some further concept then it looks as if we will have no way of adjudicating disputes 
regarding which traits actually are virtues. We will instead be left with only our intuitions 
to help us in deciding which traits to accept, and these intuitions can be expected to have 
been shaped by our upbringing and environment in ways that may render our list of 
virtues problematically parochial. 
 
These worries provide a challenge for the fundamental value approach, and they ought 
to encourage us to consider alternative methods which do look elsewhere for an 
explanation of why one trait is virtuous while another is not. I want to now consider two 
of the most influential approaches of this type – Driver’s consequentialist approach and 
Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian approach. However, I will be returning to the 
                                                                 





fundamental value approach later in this chapter. A re-assessment of that approach can 
be justified by first arguing that the methods proposed by Driver and Hursthouse face 
serious problems of their own. 
 
2. DRIVER’S CONSEQUENTIALIST APPROACH 
Following the revival of interest in the virtues over the past few decades, most work 
within the field has drawn its primary inspiration from the ideas of Aristotle. That is, 
most virtue theorists have produced accounts of the virtues (and of virtuous action) that 
are influenced by and in-keeping with Aristotelian conceptions of the virtuous life.18 Julia 
Driver provides a radical departure from this general tendency by instead presenting an 
account of the virtues that is consequentialist in nature. Instead of appeals to concepts 
such as eudaimonia or phronesis, we are encouraged to think about the role of virtues in the 
production of positive outcomes. I will set out Driver’s method for identifying the moral 
virtues before highlighting some problems that arise for the consequentialist approach. I 
will argue that these problems provide sufficient reason for us to instead consider an 
alternative approach. 
 
2.1 EXPLAINING DRIVER’S CONSEQUENTIALIST APPROACH 
Driver presents her consequentialist account of the virtues in Chapter 4 of Uneasy 
Virtue.19 The general idea is set out in the following way: 
 
Specifically, the account that I want to propose is an objective consequentialist 
account of the virtues, which would define moral virtues as character traits 
that systematically produce more actual good than not. 20 
 
On such a view, traits like generosity, kindness, justice, and courage will count as moral 
virtues if and because they systematically produce more actual good than not. The use of 
systematically in this account is important in order to avoid certain unintuitive conclusions. 
Consider the case of a super-villain who cruelly mocks the seemingly defeated hero. If 
the cruel taunts ultimately spur the hero on to re-double her efforts and save the day, 
then the villain’s trait of cruelty, in this instance, will have resulted in a positive outcome. 
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A simple consequentialist account would then be forced to accept that the trait of cruelty 
was a moral virtue in this instance. Driver is well aware of such dangers, and uses the 
idea of the systematic consequences of a trait in order to avoid them. On Driver’s view, we 
will not have to include cruelty as a moral virtue unless it “normally”, “by and large”, or 
“generally” leads to the production of good.21 Furthermore, it is not the case that we are 
to consider the systematic effects of a trait as held by a particular individual. Even if the 
cruel villain was utterly inept such that their cruel intentions always resulted in 
unintended positive outcomes, this would not mean that cruelty systematically produces 
good in the sense that is meant by Driver. As well as not focusing on specific instances 
of a trait in action, we are also to avoid focusing on the impact at the level of particular 
agents. Instead, we ought to evaluate traits by considering their general impact within the 
society as a whole. As Driver explains: 
 
The account that I’m pushing for in this book focuses on the production of 
good within a population, and not simply with respect to an individual. This 
seems intuitively plausible to me.22 
 
We need not accept that the inept villain’s cruelty is a moral v irtue because cruelty will 
not lead systematically to the production of good within the population more generally. 
A trait can be a virtue even if its possession by a particular individual never leads to the 
production of any good consequences, and even if it actually leads to bad consequences 
in certain unlucky cases. So long as the trait does systematically lead to good outcomes in 
the general population then we can class it as being a genuine virtue. Driver provides a 
useful analogy in order to make this point clear: 
 
Consider an analogy with an artefact that we feel to be good. A sprinkler 
system in a building may well be good and useful even if – because that 
building may never catch fire – it never gets turned on. It’s a good thing to 
have because if there were a fire, it would save the contents of the building. 
And sprinkler systems in general are good and useful, though on occasion 
they can lead to disasters, for example, where the system is used in a 
building storing chemicals that explode on contact with water.23 
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These quotes and examples from Driver ought to be enough to make clear the general 
consequentialist approach to identifying virtues. But there is one final clarification that is 
required. In the (first) above quote from Driver, moral virtues are linked to the 
systematic production of good in general. However, in a subsequent paper, Driver 
suggests that we need to understand “good” in a particular way if we are seeking to 
distinguish the moral virtues. Traits that are moral virtues are to be distinguished by the 
production of a particular type of good (and by who the good is produced for):  
 
Moral virtues produce benefits to others – in particular, they promote the 
well-being of others – while the intellectual virtues produce epistemic good 
for the agent.24 
 
With this further clarification in mind, we ought to now have a clear understanding of 
Driver’s consequentialist approach to identifying moral virtues. A trait can be classed as 
a moral virtue when it systematically leads to the production of more good (understood 
in terms of the well-being of others) than bad in the general population. I will now 
highlight some problems for this account. 
 
2.2 PROBLEMS FOR THE CONSEQUENTIALIST APPROACH 
I will now argue that the consequentialist approach to identifying moral virtues faces 
serious challenges. The underlying problem here will be that the virtuousness of a trait, 
on the consequentialist approach, is independent of the actual features or nature of the 
trait itself. Instead, virtuousness is determined by external consequences. This underlying 
aspect of the consequentialist approach leads to two general worries. Firstly, we ought to 
be concerned by the potential for the production of an unintuitive list of moral virtues 
(either through the endorsement of traits that are intuitively unappealing or through the 
endorsement of traits that are intuitively banal). Secondly, the approach appears to allow 
for a problematic degree of relativism when determining virtue status. I will now explain 
these two worries. 
 
One way in which Driver’s approach leads to strongly unintuitive conclusions is through 
the endorsement of intuitively unappealing traits as being moral virtues. And one 
                                                                 





example of this is actually provided by Driver. Driver asks us to imagine a society that 
has developed differently from normal human society and is populated by a race of 
“Mutors”. The example is fleshed out in the following way:  
 
It happens to be the case that for them, beating one’s child severely when it 
is exactly 5.57 years old actually increases the life expectancy of the child by 
50 percent. The child is upset by the beating, but this feeling goes away in 
time… So some Mutors have a special trait – they intensely desire to beat 
children who are exactly 5.57 years old. That it is good for the child is 
irrelevant to them.25 
 
Using the consequentialist method, a Mutor’s intense desire to beat children will be 
classed as a moral virtue because being beaten happens to (systematically) lead to a 
longer life for the child. This result is generated even though the benefit to the child 
plays no role in explaining why the Mutor wants to carry out the beating. In fact, the 
same result would be generated even if the beating did not benefit the child, so long as it 
did (systematically) benefit some third-party to a greater extent than it harmed the child. 
If this is the case, the intense desire to beat children will be classed as a moral virtue – as 
an “excellence of character” – on Driver’s consequentialist approach.26 
 
This example may be enough on its own to lead us to question the consequentialist 
approach. Commentators, including Slote and John Skorupski, have focused on this case 
(and cases like it) as providing ample reason to consider alternatives.27 And Driver, when 
discussing the results generated by the Mutor example, admits that “I myself am not 
comfortable at all with this case”.28 However, perhaps the Mutor example alone is not 
sufficient to demonstrate that the consequentialist approach is problematic. There are 
aspects of the case which weaken its force as a counter-example. Driver has pointed out 
that the Mutor example is one of pure science-fiction, involving “alien beings” that are 
“wired differently and have evolved in different settings”. 29 Therefore, we ought not to 
fully trust our intuitions about this case, or about the similarly science-fictional “Satan 
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and Planet X” example provided by Skorupski.30 It will be important to add to the Mutor 
example in order to demonstrate that it is just one symptom of an underlying problem.  
 
A further example of an intuitively unappealing trait that may be classed as a moral 
virtue on the consequentialist approach has been provided by Amartya Sen. 31 Sen 
appeals to the possibility that the wealth of a nation will be positively affected by the 
presence of citizens who are robustly focused on maximising their own profits. In order 
to become wealthy themselves, such individuals will need to employ other people. And, 
if they are successful, this will have the effect of increasing the money that a government 
receives through taxes. On the plausible assumption that those living in wealthier nations 
will experience higher living standards, the overall impact of those who are focused on 
increasing their own profits may actually be a positive one. Considerations of this nature 
support Sen’s claim that “the motivation of merciless profit maximization” might, on the 
whole, produce a positive “utility sum”.32 If so, the motivation to produce profit (or to 
maximise one’s own profits) will be classed as a moral virtue on the consequentialist 
approach – regardless of the fact that the benefits that are produced play no role in 
actually motivating the agent. The motivation for profit maximisation is unlikely to be 
viewed by many as a strong candidate moral virtue. The failure to rule out this intuitively 
unappealing trait as being a moral virtue tells against the consequentialist approach.  
 
The consequentialist approach also gets things wrong regarding the character trait 
possessed by those to whom it is vitally important that others be impressed with them. I 
have in mind here the character trait that is possessed by, for example, the administrator 
in an organisation who needs everyone else to see just how important they are in running 
things efficiently, or by the parent whose desire to be viewed as superior leads them to 
volunteer at every event taking place at their child’s school. It is not clear what name is 
appropriate for this trait. Such an individual will not necessarily believe that they are 
important or superior (although they might), and so “self-importance” is not the correct 
term. The agent is instead deeply motivated, or has a deep need, to have others view 
them as impressive. Perhaps “need for validation” or “desire for esteem” is the correct 
term for this trait. But, whatever term we assign to the character trait, it is clear that the 
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deep need to be well regarded can be expected to have good overall consequences. The 
individual with this trait will take on extra responsibilities and tasks which will be helpful 
to other people. This can be expected to promote the well-being of others, even if that 
well-being is not truly what is motivating those who possess the trait. The “desire for 
esteem” will therefore be classed as a moral virtue by the consequentialist approach. And 
yet, this character trait is not an intuitively appealing trait for someone to possess. The 
consequentialist approach provides the wrong verdict in this case.  
 
We now have three examples of intuitively unappealing traits that could be classed as 
moral virtues on the consequentialist approach: the intense desire to beat children, the 
motivation of merciless profit maximisation, and the desire for esteem. In general, the 
strategy of identifying intuitively unappealing traits that will be classed as moral virtues is 
an effective and understandable way of attempting to discredit the consequentialist 
approach.33  However, it is important to highlight an equally effective strategy. We 
should also note that intuitively banal traits will be classed as virtues by this account. 
Consider the deep motivation to ensure that you blink at least eight times per minute. It 
seems unlikely that this deeply held trait will lead to any negative consequences. And 
such a motivation may be expected to systematically lead to some positive outcomes. A 
reduced rate of blinking when reading for an extended period can cause eyes to become 
dry, and this can lead to a distracting feeling of fatigue for the reader. The motivation to 
ensure that their rate of blinking stays at a consistently high level will systematically allow 
an agent to avoid this outcome and so will lead to some good (a reduction in feelings of 
fatigue) without systematically leading to anything bad. The deep motivation to ensure a 
high rate of blinking would therefore be classed as a virtue by Driver’s method, even if 
the good that is produced plays no role in the explanation of why the agent has the 
motivation in the first place. Consider also the deep motivation to wave at passing trains. 
This trait may systematically lead to some good (the slight pleasure of passing 
passengers) without also leading to anything bad. If so, the deep motivation to wave at 
passing trains will be classed as a moral virtue on the current proposal, even if the slight 
pleasure of the passengers plays no role in the explanation of why the agent has the trait. 
And similar arguments could be provided for other seemingly banal traits such as the 
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deep motivation to ensure that every meal features several different colours, or the deep 
motivation to re-use teabags. Such traits will be classed as virtues even when the good 
that is systematically produced (the health or environmental benefits) are of no actual 
concern to the agent. These examples may even be more damaging than the Mutor 
example mentioned above. The traits involved in the banal examples are closer to real 
life, and so we have less reason to doubt the intuition that the wrong verdict is being 
generated. The consequentialist approach can therefore be criticised on the grounds that 
it would lead to a highly unintuitive list of the moral virtues.  
 
It will not be possible to respond to these problematic examples by appealing to the fact 
that Driver’s account requires traits to systematically lead to good outcomes. In the 
examples that have been provided, there is a systematic connection between the trait and 
the consequences that are produced. The profit-hungry agents in Sen’s example do not 
care about the well-being that is produced, and may even resent it. However, their 
motivation for profit does systematically lead to that well-being. They are driven to 
perform actions (employing people, amassing profit and subsequently paying taxes) that 
reliably promote the well-being of others. Indeed, by focusing on the general or overall 
impact of character traits within a society or population, Driver’s account allows for 
these traits to be virtues even when they are possessed by those who do not actually 
promote well-being. So long as the motivation for profit, or to be esteemed by others, 
does, on the whole, lead to the promotion of well-being, those who possess such 
motivations will be classed as virtuous – even if their own desire for profit or for esteem 
never actually helps anyone. 
 
Furthermore, the demand for a systematic connection between traits and the production 
of well-being offers no defence against the examples involving intuitively banal character 
traits. There does appear to be a systematic connection between (for example) being 
motivated to ensure that every meal includes a variety of colours of food and the 
positive outcome of the corresponding health benefits. Similarly, there will be a 
systematic connection between the motivation to wave at passing trains and the slight 
increase in pleasure (or the reduction in boredom) that is experienced by the passing 
passengers. And these motivations are unlikely to also lead systematically to any negative 





systematically leading to good outcomes on the account of “systematically” that is in 
play. It remains the case that Driver’s account produces an unintuitive list of moral 
virtues. 
 
The production of an unintuitive list of moral virtues is a serious problem for Driver’s 
account. However, a second worry also results from the failure to connect virtue status 
to features that are internal to character traits. This worry concerns the degree of 
relativity that the approach would allow. We saw above that the consequentialist 
approach tells us that virtue status depends on the effects of a trait in the wider 
population (as opposed to in the individual’s own case). 34 This is also explained as 
encouraging us to focus on the “context” in which the agent is located. 35 However, by 
tying virtue status to context, we make it possible for an agent to switch from being 
virtuous to being vicious (and vice versa) simply by changing context. If an agent moves 
from a society where the effects of their trait are generally negative, to a society where 
the effects are generally positive, then they can suddenly be classed as highly virtuous. 
And when the Mutors relocate to the United Kingdom, this may be enough to make 
vicious agents out of virtuous ones. An agent’s moral status can be switched along with 
their postcode. Driver suggests that her account is not “a form of pernicious relativism, 
since the criterion for virtue is universally the same.”36 However, the extent of the 
relativism that is present in an approach that makes an agent’s moral status dependent 
on their location does seem to be problematic. The combination of these worries ought 
to encourage us to consider alternatives to the consequentialist approach.  
 
It is important to stress the general feature of Driver’s account which leads to the two 
problems that have been identified here. On Driver’s account, the virtue status of a 
given trait will be independent of any of the actual internal features of that trait. That is, 
it is possible for any trait to be classed as a moral virtue, regardless of the actual 
motivation that the trait involves. All that is required is for the world to be (or to 
become) such that the trait systematically leads to the production of good outcomes. As 
Driver says, “It is not the motive that makes the trait a given type of virtue” but rather 
                                                                 







the systematic effects of the trait.37 This means that it is impossible to rule out the 
possibility that traits which involve motivations that are intuitively unappealing or banal 
will be classed as moral virtues. If the external situation is right, then any motivation can 
be a moral virtue on this approach, including the motivation to beat children or the 
motivation to wave at passing trains. This feature of the account also means that an 
agent’s moral status can change even when no internal change takes place.  Because 
virtue status is determined by external consequences, an agent can cease to be virtuous 
simply as a result of a change in their external circumstances. The problems that have 
been identified here provide good reason to consider an alternative approach. In 
particular, we have good reason to consider an approach that is less susceptible to these 
objections. 
 
3. HURSTHOUSE’S NEO-ARISTOTELIAN APPROACH 
I am attempting to justify a re-assessment of the fundamental value approach to 
identifying the moral virtues by highlighting problems for two influential rival accounts. 
I have shown that the consequentialist approach suffers as a result of failing to connect 
virtue status to features that are internal to the trait itself. An Aristotelian approach to 
the virtues, however, will demand that the virtues involve certain motivations and 
emotions.38 I will now explain Rosalind Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian approach to this 
issue, and argue that this approach faces serious problems. These problems will provide 
us with good reason to abandon Hursthouse’s approach.  
 
3.1 EXPLAINING HURSTHOUSE’S NEO-ARISTOTELIAN APPROACH 
In The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle tells us that the good life for human beings consists 
in a life of eudaimonia, and that this can be achieved by those who well fulfil the function 
that is common to all (rational) human beings.39 To fulfil our function well is to be a 
good example of a human being, in the same way that a knife that fulfils the function of 
cutting is a good example of a knife. In order to fulfil our function, and so to achieve a 
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eudaimon life, it is important that we live a life in accordance with virtue. 40 In On Virtue 
Ethics, Hursthouse builds upon this Aristotelian insight regarding the connection 
between living well and living a good human life, as well as upon ideas taken from Plato 
and from Philippa Foot.41 In particular, Hursthouse is interested in the idea that the 
possession of moral virtues is what makes an agent good qua human being (or a good 
example of a human being) and that, therefore, we can come to identify the moral 
virtues by reflecting upon what it means to be good qua human being. In order to clearly 
explain this approach, it will be useful to set out three central features:  
 
Plato’s Requirement: The virtues make their possessor good qua human being.42 
 
Good as Attributive: ‘Good’ is an attributive adjective in the sense that the 
criteria for goodness in a given case depends on the nature of what is being 
evaluated, and what it is being evaluated as.43 
 
Footian Naturalism: The way ‘good’ is used when assessing human beings 
ought not to be wholly distinct from how it is used when assessing plants or 
non-human animals in the natural world.44 
 
These are the main components of Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism, 
with the latter two ideas being attributed to Philippa Foot. 45 For Hursthouse, the moral 
virtues are those that make their possessor good qua human being, and how we 
understand being good qua human being ought not to be wholly distinct from how we 
understand other evaluations in the natural world. If we want to understand what it 
would mean to be a good human being (and so to then work out which traits are the 
moral virtues) then we should first consider how we would assess a particular plant as 
being a good plant, or how we would assess a particular tiger as being a good tiger.  
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Good as Attributive tells us that the very same object can be correctly evaluated as a ‘good 
X’ while at the same time failing to be a ‘good Y’. The relevant standards will be 
determined by what the thing is being evaluated as. A particular guitar may be classed as 
a good piece of memorabilia (because it has been signed by a famous rock star) while at 
the same time being classed as a bad musical instrument (because it is out-of-tune and 
missing several strings). If we want to know what makes for a good plant or a good tiger 
then we need to know how evaluation works in these cases. According to Hursthouse, 
biologists will evaluate a plant by looking at its various aspects (in a sense to be explained 
shortly) and assessing how these aspects enable the plant to meet certain ends, in a way 
that is characteristic of its particular species.46 The aspects in question include the plant’s 
parts (petals, roots, leaves, and so on) and the plant’s operations or reactions (turning towards 
sunlight, producing seeds, and so on). These aspects are evaluated as good or bad 
depending on how well-fitted they make the plant for meeting the ends of individual 
survival and continuance of the species. If the aspects of a plant enable it to attain these ends 
(in ways characteristic of the species) then we can evaluate the plant as being good qua 
plant. 
 
Footian Naturalism requires that our approach to evaluation ought not to be considerably 
different once we come to be interested in evaluating individuals as being good qua 
human being. Of course, we will expect things to be more complicated in the case of 
animals than in the case of plants. According to Hursthouse, as we “ascend the ladder of 
nature” we need to add to our list of aspects and ends in order to accommodate this 
added complexity.47 Ultimately, in the case of the higher social animals (such as human 
beings), the account that Hursthouse settles upon is the following:  
 
So, summing up, a good social animal (of one of the more sophisticated 
species) is one that is well fitted or endowed with respect to (i) its parts, (ii) 
its operations, (iii) its actions, and (iv) its desires and emotions; whether it is 
thus well fitted or endowed is determined by whether these four aspects well 
serve (1) its individual survival, (2) the continuance of its species, (3) its 
characteristic freedom from pain and characteristic enjoyment, and (4) the 
                                                                 






good functioning of its social group – in the ways characteristic of the 
species.48 
 
A good human being, therefore, will be one whose relevant aspects (listed above) 
combine to make them well-fitted for attaining the relevant ends (listed above). 
However, one further clarification is required here. Hursthouse believes that evaluation 
in the case of human beings is slightly more complicated in the sense that we ought to 
distinguish moral evaluation from evaluation with a more medical focus. Regarding the 
relevant aspects, we ought to leave evaluation of an agent’s parts (body parts) and 
operations (bodily functions) to the realm of medicine, and focus only on their other 
aspects when attempting to make a moral evaluation. 49 Such a move is necessary if we 
are to avoid the conclusion that an agent can be considered morally defective as a resul t 
of damaged or malfunctioning body parts or bodily systems. Having removed these 
aspects from the equation, the account we are left with is the following:  
 
human beings are ethically good in so far as their ethically relevant aspects 
foster the four ends appropriate to a social animal, in the way characteristic 
of the species.50 
 
The virtues, therefore, are the character traits that are involved in making a human being 
good in this way. As Christopher Gowans has explained, the form of ethical naturalism 
proposed by Hursthouse makes the following claim regarding the identity of the virtues:  
 
A character trait C is a virtue only if (a) C promotes in a substantial way at 
least one of the four ends, and (b) C does not significantly inhibit the four 
ends.51 
 
And Hursthouse argues that this approach will produce an intuitively acceptable list of 
the moral virtues. She does this by considering traits widely accepted as being moral 
virtues and by showing that they do indeed make an individual well-fitted for attaining 
the ends highlighted by her naturalist approach. For example, she suggests that:  
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Human beings who are good in so far as they are courageous defend 
themselves, and their young, and each other, and risk life and limb to defend 
and preserve worthwhile things in and about their group, thereby fostering 
their individual survival, the continuance of the species, their own and 
other’s enjoyment of various good things, and the good functioning of the 
social group.52 
 
For this reason, the widely accepted candidate virtue of courage would be accepted by 
Hursthouse’s approach. Similar defences are provided for the traits of justice, honesty, 
and charity, as shown by the following two quotes: “it has long been commonplace that 
justice and fidelity to promises enable us to function as a social, co-operating group” and 
“Charity directed to the young and helpless particularly serves the continuance of the 
species; directed more widely it serves the good functioning of the social group”. 53 If 
these claims are correct, then Hursthouse’s approach will have provided a list of moral 
virtues that includes charity, justice, honesty and courage. Such results ought to be 
accepted as being in line with widely held intuitions. Indeed, these results prompt 
Hursthouse to suggest that: 
 
if this naturalistic project were to be pursued, there is no reason at the 
moment to suppose that it would yield a bizarre characterisation of a good 
human being54 
 
If Hursthouse is correct then the approach will also yield an acceptable list of the moral 
virtues. I will now argue that we have less reason to be optimistic in this regard than 
Hursthouse supposes. 
 
3.2 PROBLEMS FOR HURSTHOUSE’S APPROACH 
Hursthouse’s brand of neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism has been much commented 
upon in the literature, with many different objections to the approach being proposed. 
David Copp and David Sobel argue that Hursthouse’s approach is arbitrary, in the sense 
that she provides no justification for focusing on the evaluation of plants and animals 
from the perspectives of biology and ethology as opposed to from the perspective of 
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other scientific disciplines (such as evolutionary biology or veterinary science) which may 
produce different results.55 They also argue that the focus on species membership (rather 
than focusing on individuals as bearers of a particular genotype, or as members of a local 
population, or of a particular genus) is also unexplained and unjustified by Hursthouse. 56 
And Gowans has argued that Hursthouse’s approach suffers from indeterminacy due to 
its failure to fully explain key terms, such as “social group”, when setting out the account 
of a good human being.57 By choosing not to focus on these concerns, I do not mean to 
suggest that they are unproblematic for Hursthouse. It may be that any one of these 
worries would require a significant defence and, ultimately, the amendment or rejection 
of the naturalist approach. However, the most relevant objection to Hursthouse’s 
approach for my purposes will be to show that it would lead us to accept the virtue 
status of character traits that are intuitively unvirtuous. This is the line of criticism that I 
will look to pursue. 
 
Hursthouse’s approach allows for a character trait to be a virtue if it promotes in a 
substantial way one or more of the four relevant ends without at the same time 
significantly inhibiting any of those ends.58 Hursthouse suggests that this supports the 
virtue status of charity because helping the young promotes the continuance of the 
species, and she suggests that it supports the virtue status of justice because this helps 
the good functioning of any social group. However, there is a problem here. The four 
ends included in this approach make no mention of the well-being or interests of those 
who are outside of the individual’s own social group. Being charitable towards our 
children or towards our fellow group members may well promote the stated ends, but 
charity with a wider scope does not appear to be required. Similarly, acting justly towards 
those in our social group will help to promote the good functioning of that group, but 
this will not require us to be just in our dealings with those outside of our own group. 
Hursthouse’s approach, therefore, appears to classify as virtuous , forms of (for example) 
charity and justice that are exclusionary in the sense that they extend concern only up to 
the boundaries of the individual’s own social group. Furthermore, character traits that 
are more actively exclusionary (such as the trait of being prejudiced against or suspicious 
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towards outsiders) look to be compatible with being perfectly virtuous on this account. 59 
Such a characterisation of the virtues (and of a good human being) is not intuitively 
acceptable.60 
 
A related objection to Hursthouse is discussed by Gowans. Gowans believes that any 
ethical theory ought to provide support for the claim that each human being is deserving 
of serious moral consideration, a thesis he terms “Moral Universalism”. 61 He then argues 
that what he calls Hursthouse’s “Teleological Framework” will be unable to explain why 
the virtuous agent would accept such a position, rather than instead extending concern 
only to members of their own social group.62 This objection (plus the further objection 
that Hursthouse’s approach suggests that virtuous agents must be inclined to reproduce 
so as to further the continuance of the species in a characteristic way), leads to the claim 
that: 
 
A straightforward application of the Teleological Criterion would suggest 
that virtuous human beings would have character traits that (among other 
things) lead them to reproduce, raise children, and promote the interests of 
their own social group. If we think (as many, including Foot and 
Hursthouse, do) that virtuous persons need not conceive and raise children, 
and should be concerned about human beings well beyond their social 
group, then we are relying on considerations that have no basis in the 
Teleological Framework.63 
 
The main point for our purposes is that the account of virtues supported by 
Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism is not intuitive. It allows for the virtue 
status of traits which involve a concern only for group members, and which are 
compatible with acting cruelly or unjustly towards non-group members. 
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There is a further worry for Hursthouse’s approach. We saw above that a  good human 
being will be well-fitted so as to promote “the good functioning of its social group”. If 
we are to understand this as referring to the particular social group to which the 
individual belongs then this will lead to a worrying form of relativism. The character 
traits that help an individual to promote and maintain the functioning of their social 
group will be different for different social groups. Traits such as faith or piety or respect 
for traditions may be vital for the good functioning of a highly theistic society, and yet 
be of significantly less benefit in an atheist or secular society. For a more extreme 
example, consider societies based on a rigid caste system, or where minority groups are 
systematically exploited in some way. In these social groups, traits such as a general 
resignation to one’s fate, timidity in the face of injustice, or (misguided) elitism may all 
play an important role in allowing the society to continue to function. If so, those 
character traits would be classed as virtues for those living in such a society. If we are to 
evaluate an individual depending on their being well-fitted to promote the functioning of 
their own particular social group, then the ethical naturalist approach will lead to further 
unintuitive consequences. 
 
A final objection to this approach focuses on another of the key ends listed by 
Hursthouse. It is worth highlighting the strangeness of including “individual survival” as 
a relevant end for ethical evaluation. Admittedly, many of the possible unintuitive 
consequences of including this as a key end are tempered by the inclusion of the other 
ends that are listed. Many of the traits that could best further individual survival will be 
inimical to these other ends. For example, absolute selfishness or extreme paranoia may 
further individual survival, but they do not look to be compatible with the good 
functioning of a social group. However, other unappealing traits do seem to be 
compatible with that further end. Consider the individual who is disposed to let others 
perform any laborious or dangerous task, and who will only step in if no one else will do 
so. Such an agent will possess a character trait that furthers individual survival (as they 
are less likely to perform dangerous tasks) while not harming the functioning of the 
social group (as necessary tasks are still performed). And yet their trait does not look to 
be a plausible moral virtue. The same result is generated by the trait of effective false 
modesty. This trait promotes individual survival (as the individual will be well-liked) 





effective). But again, this does not look to be a plausible candidate virtue. Unease at 
accepting these traits may stem from the intuition that a greater ability to secure one’s 
own survival ought not to necessarily correspond to a greater level of moral worth. But 
regardless of the explanation for this unease, the objections considered here ought to be 
sufficient to cast doubt on the intuitive acceptability of Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian 
ethical naturalism. If these objections cannot be refuted then we will have good reason 
to reject that approach. 
 
3.3 CONSIDERING (AND REJECTING) A POSSIBLE RESPONSE 
Applying Hursthouse’s approach in an attempt to identify the moral virtues leads to 
certain unintuitive conclusions. These conclusions will only be avoided if we can change 
the way in which we apply the approach when attempting to evaluating human beings. 
And a possible rationale for such a change can be found if we focus on an element of 
Hursthouse’s account that has so far gone unexplained. According to Hursthouse, a 
good example of a human being is one whose various aspects make it well -fitted to 
attain the various ends in ways characteristic of the species. For other animals, this notion is a 
statistical one. King penguins tend to guard their mate’s egg and so one who fails to do 
so is not acting in a way characteristic of their species. 64 Lionesses tend to suckle their 
cubs and so one who does not do this is failing to act in a way characteristic of their 
species.65 After setting out the general approach, Hursthouse goes on to suggest that 
“characteristic of the species” should be understood differently in the case of human 
beings. It is to be understood as follows: 
 
Our characteristic way of going on, which distinguishes us from all the other 
species of animals, is a rational way. A ‘rational way’ is any way that we can 
rightly see as good, as something we in fact have reason to do… [T]o 
maintain, as I am recklessly doing, that ‘our characteristic way of going on’ is 
to do what we can rightly see we have reason to do, is to give up with a 
vengeance any idea that most human beings do what it is ‘characteristic’ of 
human beings to do.66 
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Of course, we may be surprised that a naturalist approach would have the result that the 
way of life “characteristic” of a species could be one which no member of that species 
has ever exemplified, and this worry has been expressed elsewhere. 67 However, if we can 
switch the meaning of “characteristic of the species” from a statistical one to a 
normative one, then this will help to rule out the kinds of unintuitive conclusions that I 
highlighted earlier. 
 
When applying the naturalist approach to humans in a straightforward way, intuitively 
problematic traits will be identified as virtues. This is because some problematic traits 
look likely to further at least one of the four stated ends, without at the same time 
inhibiting any of the other ends. However, it is less clear that these traits will further 
those ends “in ways characteristic of the species” if this latter term is read as “in ways 
that can be rightly seen as good”. Extending charity only to your own social group may 
well be characteristic of human beings in the sense that it is fairly common, but it is less 
clear that it counts as acting in a way that can be rightly seen as good. And the same goes 
for the other problematic traits that I identified in the previous section. Modifying the 
way the approach works when applying it to human beings will therefore help 
Hursthouse to avoid being committed to the problematic conclusions that I have 
identified. 
 
However, the problem now is that the overall approach appears somewhat empty. 
Previously, it was possible to determine whether or not a given trait was a moral virtue 
by asking whether or not the possession of that trait would make an individual well -
fitted for attaining any of the four ends (without also inhibiting any of those ends). Now 
that we are to understand the account differently, being virtuous will involve acting in 
ways which can rightly be thought of as good, or on reasons that are actual reasons. And 
we are then offered no account of which reasons are actual or of which ways of acting 
are rightly seen as good. Without this there is no way of working out whether or not a 
given trait counts as a virtue, because we have no way of knowing whether it involves 
acting in a way in which we can rightly see ourselves as having reason to act. The 
approach avoids the worry of endorsing an implausible list of the moral virtues only by 
                                                                 





being rendered incapable of producing any set list of the virtues at all. And this inability 
provides us with good reason to reject the amended version of Hursthouse’s approach.  
 
It is worth mentioning one final problem with this proposed response. The response 
requires us to treat the evaluation of human beings differently from the evaluation of 
plants or other animals, by changing the way in which we interpret the phrase 
“characteristic of the species”. And we need to ask what can justify this change. Given 
what has come before, Hursthouse’s explanation of why we can do things differently in 
the case of human beings (when compared to the case of other animals) is puzzling:  
 
Nature determines how they should be, but the idea that nature could be 
normative with respect to us, that it could determine how we should be, is 
one we will no longer accept.68 
 
It is not clear that such a position is available to a committed supporter of ethical 
naturalism. The possible inconsistency in Hursthouse’s thinking has been highlighted by 
Copp and Sobel:  
 
The dilemma is, in short, that she must either reject Footian naturalism or 
accept that nature can be normative with respect to us. If she rejects the idea 
that nature can be normative with respect to us, as she does, and if she 
concedes that, for humans, the normatively appropriate way of going on is 
to act in ways that we can rightly see ourselves as having reason to act, as 
she does, she must give up the Footian naturalism.69 
 
This dilemma is particularly troubling given the points that have been made here. If 
Hursthouse chooses to ultimately reject Footian Naturalism then she will not have 
provided an account that is capable of identifying a set list of the moral virtues. If she 
instead chooses to endorse Footian Naturalism, and to treat the evaluation of human 
beings in the same way as the evaluation of other animals, then her account will have 
seriously unintuitive consequences. Either way, we will have good reason to reject 
Hursthouse’s approach. 
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I have now considered two of the most influential alternatives to the fundamental value 
approach to identifying the moral virtues. Serious objections have been raised for both 
the consequentialist approach and the neo-Aristotelian approach. We therefore have 
good reason to re-consider the fundamental value approach in order to assess whether 
or not the objections to that approach can be overcome, and whether or not that 
approach might lead to a plausible overall picture of the moral virtues. 
 
4. RE-ASSESSING THE FUNDAMENTAL VALUE APPROACH 
The fundamental value approach to identifying the moral virtues says that the value of 
virtuous traits ought not to be explained by reference to some other concept or idea. 
Instead, the virtues are taken to be fundamentally valuable. It was pointed out above that 
this approach faces the challenge of explaining how we can identify such fundamentally 
valuable traits. Daniel Russell has argued that if we rely solely on intuitions then it will be 
difficult to resolve disputes regarding which traits are fundamentally valuable (and 
therefore virtuous), and that the intuitions themselves may be problematically influenced 
by societal factors. There are two important points that ought to be made at this stage. 
The first highlights the fact that the fundamental value approach is not alone in facing a 
challenge in ensuring that we are able to satisfactorily resolve disputes regarding which 
traits are the moral virtues. The second highlights the fact that the fundamental value 
approach is able to provide guidance on how to proceed in cases where we are unsure of 
the accuracy of our intuitions. 
 
The fundamental value approach claims that certain character traits are fundamentally 
valuable and that this value ought not to be explained by reference to other concepts. 
This leads to the problem of how we can be sure that intuitions regarding the 
virtuousness of traits aren’t being problematically influenced by societal or other factors, 
as well as the problem of how to resolve disagreements regarding the correct list of the 
virtues. Suppose that we take the list of fundamentally valuable virtuous traits to include 
only Plato’s cardinal virtues of courage, wisdom, moderation and justice. When an 
opponent disagrees with this list, claiming that the fundamentally valuable virtuous traits 
are instead kindness, faith and piety, it is difficult to see how we might determine who is 





have been discussed in this chapter. In cases of disagreement, these rival approaches 
would direct us to consider whether or not the traits that have been identified 
systematically promote the well-being of others, or whether they would make an agent 
well-fitted to achieve the four ends listed by Hursthouse. This would help to reveal 
whether or not a proposed list of the moral virtues is accurate, or whether that list ought 
instead to be amended. Either way, the rival approaches discussed in this chapter appear 
to offer a resolution to the stalemate in a way that the fundamental value approach does 
not. 
 
However, while this may look like a step in the right direction, it actually only pushes the 
original problem back a stage.   Previously an opponent could simply refuse to accept a 
list of fundamentally valuable traits. Now the opponent can refuse to accept the 
proposed underlying explanation for the virtuousness of those traits. That is, an 
opponent can refuse to accept that the moral virtues must systematically promote the 
well-being of others, or that the moral virtues must make us well-fitted for achieving the 
four ends identified by Hursthouse. Such a refusal could take any number of forms. For 
example, an opponent might argue that the moral virtues ought instead to be identified 
by their role in bringing agents closer to God.70 At this stage the discussion will once 
again reach an impasse. And it is not clear that this impasse is any less problematic than 
that faced by the fundamental value approach. Whatever ultimate basis we provide in 
our explanation for the value of virtuous traits, it will be possible for an opponent to 
disagree with that basis. Therefore, being unable to avoid the possibility of such 
disagreement ought not to be considered a fatal flaw for any theory of the virtues. The 
fundamental value approach ought not to be rejected in response to such considerations. 
 
It is also important to point out that the fundamental value approach can provide some 
guidance on how we ought to adjudicate between competing lists of the moral virtues. In 
Morals from Motives, Slote considers two broad forms of the fundamental value approach: 
one on which (only) “inner strength” is taken to be fundamentally valuable and one on 
which (only) benevolence is taken to be fundamentally valuable.71 Ultimately, he favours 
the latter type of approach, preferring a view which “bases all morality on the aretaic 
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value, the moral admirability, of benevolence”.72 In attempting to decide between the 
two options, Slote suggests a general method for evaluating different versions of the 
fundamental value approach. When presented with a list of traits that are taken to be 
fundamentally valuable (and therefore virtuous) we ought to consider the overall picture 
of virtuous character that this would suggest. If we are virtue ethicists (like Slote) then 
we can also plug the proposed list of moral virtues into our preferred account of right 
action, and see what results would be generated. As Copp and Sobel have explained, 
Slote’s method tells us to move back and forth between the list of fundamental virtues 
and the overall picture of the moral life that they imply, amending either the traits listed 
on the former, or our intuitions regarding the latter, until we reach some form of 
“reflective equilibrium”.73 In other words: 
 
claims about the admirability of traits of character can be tested for 
plausibility in the familiar way by assessing the intuitive plausibility of the 
other ethical judgements that they support as well as the plausibility of the 
overall ethical view that would result from taking them as fundamental to all 
ethical judgement.74 
 
It is this method that leads Slote to reject the account that lists inner strength as the only 
fundamental moral virtue. Slote believes that this implies a view of virtuous character 
that is implausible: 
 
The problem, in a nutshell, is that morality as strength treats sentiments or 
motives like benevolence, compassion, kindness, and the like as only 
derivatively admirable and morally good. And this seems highly implausible to 
the modern moral consciousness… it seems to distort the aretaic value we 
place on compassion, benevolence, kindness, and caring for others to regard 
them as needing justification in terms of the (cool) ideal of inner strength or 
indeed any other different value.75 
 
The list of fundamental moral virtues that includes only “inner strength” leads to an 
overall view of virtuous character that appears implausible. This encourages Slote to 
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instead favour a list of fundamental virtues that includes only forms of benevolence or 
caring.76 While Slote believes that other traits, such as moderation or strength of 
purpose, may class as “rational” virtues, the account that he wants to evaluate is one on 
which the moral virtues are all forms of benevolence or caring.77 And Morals from Motives 
sets out to defend the claim that the overall picture of virtuous character (and the related 
account of right action) that stems from such a list of virtues is a plausible one. I do not 
want to question Slote’s claim that something like benevolence or caring ought to be 
included as a fundamentally valuable trait and, therefore, a moral virtue. However, the 
view that this is the only fundamentally valuable trait is problematic. This can be shown 
by considering worries that have been raised for accounts that take morality to be 
(exclusively) concerned with benevolence. These worries point towards the need to also 
recognise the independent (fundamental) value of the trait of justice.  
 
Driver considers various ways of distinguishing the moral virtues on the way to 
developing her own account (discussed above) whereby the moral virtues are those 
which produce well-being for others and the intellectual virtues are those which produce 
epistemic good for the individual.78 One alternative that is considered and rejected is the 
idea that all of the moral virtues can be taken to involve a motivation of benevolence. 
The explanation for the rejection of this account is brief but instructive:  
 
There are… reasons for doubting that moral virtues have benevolence as a 
characteristic motivation: it is unclear that this needs to be the case for 
virtues like justice and honesty, for example. Then there is Hume’s point 
that we do think persons can have a variety of moral virtues that are 
distinctive, and this becomes difficult to spell out if all of them are 
understood simply in terms of being motivated by benevolence. 79 
 
The main point here is that there are traits which ought intuitively to be included as 
moral virtues and yet cannot be plausibly understood as simply being forms of 
benevolence. And justice (understood as a personal character trait as opposed to a 
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positive feature of institutions or nation states) looks to be a prime example. 80 Just as the 
failure to give a plausible account of the virtue of benevolence causes Slote to reject the 
“inner strength” form of the fundamental value approach, so too does the failure to 
account for the virtue of justice provide us with reason to reject the benevolence or care-
based form of that approach. Instead, we ought to evaluate the plausibility of a view on 
which both (something like) benevolence and justice are viewed as being fundamentally 
virtuous traits. 
 
Slote dismisses without explanation the possibility that there might be more than one 
fundamentally virtuous trait, preferring instead to focus on setting out his preferred care -
based form of virtue ethics.81 Had he considered possible additions to his list of 
fundamental virtues, it is likely that the trait of justice would have been taken to be a 
plausible candidate. This is because Slote is aware that other care-based approaches to 
ethics have been thought of as incomplete because of their failure to focus on concepts 
such as justice. He acknowledges that previous forms of care ethics (such as those 
present in the work of Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings) look as if they need to be 
“supplemented by justice ethics in order to represent a complete normative conception 
of morality”.82 In order to demonstrate why his own theory is invulnerable to these 
worries, Slote attempts to explain how justice actually can be understood purely in terms 
of caring. Highlighting the unsatisfactory nature of this attempt will provide further 
support for the claim that a plausible version of the fundamental value approach would 
acknowledge the fundamental value of both (something like) benevolence and justice.  
 
Slote has elaborated his account of “justice as benevolence” in several places, and the 
central idea has remained constant.83 Slote believes that the justice or injustice of laws and 
institutions can be determined by whether or not the creators of those laws and 
institutions were suitably motivated by benevolence: “A law, for example, will be just (at 
the time it is promulgated) when it doesn’t reflect selfishness, malice, or some other 
deficiency in universal benevolence on the part of (enough of) those responsible for its 
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existence”.84 According to Slote, we ought to consider a law or institution (or society) as 
being just, as long as enough of its members or creators have kind (rather than 
malevolent) motivations, and regardless of any other factors. This is how Slote argues 
that his care-based ethical theory is able to suitably accommodate ideas of justice, 
without the need for supplementation from any additional justice-based component. 
 
This approach provides an implausible account of the justice of laws and institutions. It 
is possible for a law to be unjust even when those involved in implementing the law have 
the best of benevolent intentions. Imagine a society where (enough of) the lawmakers 
genuinely but wrongly believe some sub-group of their members to be inferior and in 
need of protection. The benevolence of the lawmakers may then lead them to pass 
paternalistic laws that limit the freedom of members of that sub-group. Of course (as 
Slote points out in response to a similar objection), we will often have good reason to 
doubt the benevolence of such lawmakers, thinking them to instead be motivated by 
self-interest or a desire for power.85 But, in some cases, the lawmakers may truly be 
motivated by misguided benevolence, and in these cases Slote will be forced to accept 
that the laws they pass are not only benevolent but are also just. Furthermore, Slote 
accepts that his view implies that it could be just to convict and punish someone for a 
crime they did not commit.86 This appears to be particularly problematic if we consider 
the famous thought experiment of the sheriff who must decide whether or not to 
convict and punish an innocent man in order to prevent the destructive rampage of an 
angry mob.87 If the sheriff’s decision to convict the innocent man is motivated by 
benevolent concern for the community as a whole, then Slote will be forced to accept 
that the conviction is not only benevolent (and, therefore, morally right), but also that it 
is just. Slote’s account of just institutions, laws, and societies is not intuitively acceptable.  
 
Furthermore, Slote’s approach fails to address justice understood as a virtue held by 
individuals. Justice, understood as involving something like a deep motivation to ensure 
fair outcomes, appears to be clearly distinct from considerations of benevolence or 
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caring.88 And justice also appears to be intuitively (morally) valuable as a character trait. 
By failing to address this issue, Slote does not do enough to defend his own care-based 
version of the fundamental value approach from the charge that it fails to provide an 
adequate picture of an overall virtuous character. 
 
We therefore have good reason to amend Slote’s care-based version of the fundamental 
value approach. The resulting picture of overall virtuous character that is suggested by 
Slote’s account, as well as the results that it generates in particular cases, should 
encourage us to consider an amendment. And the obvious amendment at this point 
would be to consider an account that accepts Slote’s claim about the fundamental value 
of something like “benevolence, kindness, and caring” but then also accepts the 
fundamental value of justice. Setting out the structure and implications of an account 




The purpose of this chapter has been to evaluate different methods for identifying which 
traits ought to be accepted as moral virtues. Support for the fundamental value approach 
has been provided by arguing against two influential rival approaches to this issue: Julia 
Driver’s consequentialist approach and Rosalind Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian 
approach. I then explained why Michael Slote’s own care-based version of the 
fundamental value approach is insufficient by highlighting the need to account for the 
virtuousness of the trait of justice. We have good reason to consider a view on which 
both the trait of benevolence (or kindness) and the trait of justice are fundamentally 
virtuous traits. However, it is not yet clear what such a view would look like, or whether 
that view would result in a plausible overall picture of the moral life. In the final chapter 
of this work I will set out an account of the moral virtues which lists kindness and justice 
as being fundamentally virtuous traits, as well as considering some of the implications of 
accepting this account. 
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CHAPTER SIX: A CARDINAL STRUCTURE FOR THE MORAL VIRTUES 
 
0. INTRODUCTION 
The main focus of this thesis so far has been to defend the view that the possession of a 
deep motivation (towards a virtuous end) is sufficient for the possession of a moral 
virtue. This has involved arguing against other, more popular approaches (such as the 
skills and composite models) as well as responding to objections directly targeted at the 
motivations model. In the previous chapter I moved on to evaluate ways of identifying 
which deep motivations ought to be accepted as moral virtues. I first provided support 
for the fundamental value approach by arguing against influential rival approaches. I 
then argued that Michael Slote’s care-based version of the fundamental value approach 
is insufficient due to its failure to properly accommodate the trait of justice (understood 
as a personal character trait rather than as a feature of societies or institutions). There is 
good reason to consider the merits of an account on which both kindness and justice are 
viewed as fundamentally virtuous traits. 
 
In this chapter I will develop and support the suggestion that kindness and justice are 
fundamentally virtuous traits. I will first provide more detail for this suggestion by 
proposing a cardinal understanding of the moral virtues. This task will be made easier by 
first explaining Linda Zagzebski’s influential account of the intellectual virtues. I will 
aim to move beyond Zagzebski in two significant ways: firstly, by explaining how her 
account of the intellectual virtues lends itself to a cardinal understanding of those traits, 
and, secondly, by arguing that this cardinal picture can also be successfully applied to the 
moral virtues. I will defend my proposed cardinal understanding of the moral virtues by 
arguing that it is able to provide convincing accounts of specific candidate virtues, as 
well as by demonstrating how the cardinal structure can help to resolve certain problems 
currently faced by all virtue theorists. These considerations will provide strong support 
for the acceptance of the cardinal understanding that I propose in this chapter. 
However, before setting out this account, it may be worth briefly highlighting the radical 
nature of the suggestion that I will be defending. 
 
Contemporary virtue theorists have been fairly unrestrained when listing virtuous traits. 





less familiar suggestions such as the virtue of “diachronic consistency”1 and the virtue of 
“reflexive critical openness”.2 Theorists have also proposed situation-specific virtues, 
such as Hursthouse’s virtues of good parenting and of environmental concern, 3 as well 
as the many virtues that have been suggested as relevant for different professions.4 It is 
some indication of the range of virtues that are taken to exist that the index to Robert 
Adams’ A Theory of Virtue contains reference to over sixty virtue terms.5 And the 
tendency to assume a large number of different virtues should not be mistaken as a 
modern phenomenon. David Hume is noted to have mentioned more than thirty 
different virtues in a single passage.6  It is against this background that we need to assess 
the suggestion that kindness and justice are the moral virtues. At first glance such a list 
of virtues appears suspiciously lightweight, and we may be concerned that it cannot 
account for the true richness of moral life.  Indeed, it looks as if accepting the 
suggestion that only kindness and justice are moral virtues has the potential to make a 
falsehood of Daniel Russell’s claim that “no contemporary virtue theorist seems to be in 
danger of making the virtues too few.”7 Therefore, if this suggestion is to have more to 
recommend it than sheer novelty, it will be necessary to offer some sort of defence. In 
particular, it will be necessary to both further explain the suggestion, and to provide 
reasons in support of accepting the suggestion. It will be useful to begin this task by first 
considering Zagzebski’s account of the intellectual virtues.  
 
1. ZAGZEBSKI’S ACCOUNT OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES 
Linda Zagzebski’s Virtues of the Mind is widely accepted as a key text within virtue 
epistemology, as well as being an important and influential work within virtue theory 
more generally. Zagzebski sets out an account of the nature of the virtues that has 
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4 A selection of professions-based virtues can be found in the contributions to Walker and Ivanhoe 
(eds.) (2007). 
5 Adams (2006) 
6 See Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Section 6, Part 1, (as printed 2011). Hume’s 
list is also noted in Zagzebski (1996) p. 85. 





already been discussed in earlier chapters of this thesis. According to Zagzebski, a virtue 
consists of two components: 
 
A virtue therefore has two main elements: a motivational element and an 
element of reliable success in bringing about the end (internal or external) of 
the motivational element.8 
 
In this chapter I want to focus on the motivational element that Zagzebski mentions 
and, in particular, to look at the motivational component that is suggested for the 
intellectual virtues. Zagzebski’s position is that a motivation is “a persistent tendency to 
be moved by a motive of a certain kind”,9 while a motive “is an emotion or feeling that 
initiates and directs action towards an end”.10 On Zagzebski’s view, therefore, the 
motivational element of a virtue consists in the agent being directed towards some 
characteristic end. For example, Zagzebski suggests that the virtue of benevolence 
involves being directed towards the well-being of others.11 This is the general 
understanding of the motivational component of virtue that is proposed by Zagzebski. 
 
When moving on to discuss the intellectual virtues, Zagzebski introduces an important 
complication into this picture. Intellectual virtues are widely taken to include traits such 
as intellectual rigour, open-mindedness, inquisitiveness, intellectual fairness, and so on. 
According to Zagzebski, all of these intellectual virtues will share the same underlying 
motivation: the motivation for “cognitive contact with reality” (where this is taken to 
include the motivation for knowledge and the motivation for understanding). 12 While all 
of the intellectual virtues share this one underlying motivation, specific intellectual 
virtues also involve specific proximal motivations. For example, the intellectual virtue of 
inquisitiveness might involve the specific proximal motivation to ask questions, where 
this proximal motivation is grounded in a more fundamental motivation to achieve 
knowledge (or “cognitive contact with reality”). Zagzebski provides her own examples 
of the specific proximal motivations for some candidate intellectual virtues:  
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We have seen that all intellectual virtues arise out of the motivation for 
knowledge and include an internal aim to operate cognitively in a way that is 
believed to be knowledge conducive, a way that is unique to each virtue. So 
the aim of open-mindedness is to be receptive to new ideas and arguments 
even when they conflict with one’s own in order to ultimately get 
knowledge. The aim of intellectual thoroughness is to exhaustively 
investigate the evidence pertaining to a particular belief or a set of questions 
in order to ultimately get knowledge. The aim of intellectual courage is to 
defend one’s belief or a line of inquiry when one has good reason to be 
confident that it is on the right track, and to fearlessly answer objections 
from others in order to ultimately get knowledge.13 
 
Every intellectual virtue involves its own proximal motivation, as well as sharing in the 
general underlying motivation for knowledge or for cognitive contact with reality. This 
aspect of Zagzebski’s account has been highlighted by other theorists. Jason Baehr 
explains that “for Zagzebski, to possess a particular intellectual virtue V is to be 
motivated to bring about a certain end characteristic of V out of a deeper or more 
ultimate motivation to achieve knowledge or ‘cognitive contact with reality.’”. 14 And 
Miranda Fricker borrows Zagzebski’s general understanding of the virtues when setting 
out her own influential account of the virtue of “testimonial justice”, saying that: “In the 
case of intellectual virtues there will always be a motivation to achieve truth in one or 
another guise, but usually there will also be a more proximal aim to achieve something 
that is conducive to truth – notably here, the aim of neutralizing the impact of prejudice 
in one’s credibility judgements.”15 This ought to be enough to make clear Zagzebski’s 
understanding of the motivational component of the intellectual virtues. Such virtues 
include both an underlying motivation for cognitive contact with reality as well as a 
specific proximal motivation that is unique to the particular virtue.  
 
My suggestion at the end of the previous chapter was that we can view the candidate 
moral virtues of kindness and justice as being fundamentally virtuous. I now want to 
further explain that suggestion (and the resulting picture of the moral virtues) with 
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reference to Zagzebski’s account of the intellectual virtues. Importantly, I will move 
beyond Zagzebski in two significant ways. Firstly, I will suggest that Zagzebski’s 
account of the intellectual virtues fits well within a cardinal understanding of intellectual 
virtue. Secondly, I will argue that Zagzebski is mistaken when asserting that a similar 
picture cannot be proposed in relation to the moral virtues. 
 
2. PROPOSING A CARDINAL STRUCTURE FOR THE MORAL VIRTUES 
A cardinal understanding of virtue separates the virtues into two classes: a fundamental (or 
cardinal) class and a subordinate class. Such understandings of virtue have not been 
widely endorsed in recent times, to the extent that Daniel Russell marks the rejection of 
the cardinal structure as a defining feature of contemporary debates. 16 Russell suggests 
that this feature of current debates involving the virtues can be explained by the 
dominance of Aristotelian approaches, and by the fact that Aristotle himself does not 
appear to have accepted a cardinal understanding of the virtues. 17  And yet, the idea that 
there are some moral virtues which are deserving of special consideration is one that has 
a strong tradition.18 Perhaps most famously, in The Republic Plato identifies the cardinal 
virtues of wisdom, courage, moderation and justice. 19 Russell explains that the idea of 
these traits as being special ‘cardinal’ virtues was accepted by the Stoics and, later, by 
Aquinas.20 It will be important to be clear on the difference between the fundamental 
(or cardinal) virtues and the subordinate virtues. 
 
A virtue can be considered as being subordinate when it is possible to understand it as 
being simply one form of a more fundamental virtue. As Aquinas puts the point, the 
subordinate virtues are specific forms of more general (or cardinal) virtues, such that the 
subordinate virtues can be understood as being “contained” within the fundamental 
ones.21 Russell explains this further when saying that: 
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19 Plato (trans. Lee) (1987) pp. 158–160 [Book IV, 441c–442d] 
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On a theory like Plato’s, the Stoics’, or Aquinas’, the cardinal virtues are 
primitive (in fact, the Stoics call them the ‘primary virtues’), while the 
subordinate virtues – what Aquinas calls the ‘secondary’ or ‘derived’ virtues, 
and the ‘exercises’ – are such that their exercise is not a different kind of 
thing from the exercise of some primitive (i.e. cardinal) virtue or virtues. On 
the other hand, without cardinality – as in Aristotle’s and all modern theories 
– all the virtues are primitive, that is, the exercise of any virtue is different 
from the exercise of any other22 
 
An example may help to explain this general idea (in addition to the more detailed 
discussion of examples in the next section). Russell sets out Aristotle’s candidate virtue 
of magnificence, where this is understood to be possessed by wealthy individuals who 
make grand (and tasteful) contributions to their polity. 23 Examples of the exercise of 
magnificence might be found in the organising of important political or cultural events 
for the public good, such as dramas or public feasts. An important question for the 
virtue theorist is whether or not magnificence ought to be regarded as a fundamental 
virtue in its own right, or whether it might best be understood as the mere exercise of 
some other virtue.24 Russell argues for the latter view, suggesting that magnificence is a 
form of the more fundamental virtue of generosity. Both magnificence and generosity 
are concerned with the application of the same sort of things (one’s own resources) but, 
more importantly, the magnificent and the generous agent are also moved by the same 
considerations (the benefit of others).25 An agent is not virtuously magnificent if their main 
aim when organising some public feast is self-aggrandisement or political gain. Instead, 
the virtuously magnificent agent is moved to use their wealth in order to further the 
public good, and in this sense their aims are shared by the more general virtue of 
generosity. Magnificence is simply a form of generosity, exercised in the circumstances 
of having great wealth, and through the method of (for example) organising great public 
events. 
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A virtue ought to be considered as subordinate when it can be viewed as being simply a 
form of one of the more fundamental virtues, exercised in a specific way or in a specific 
context.26 To accept such a distinction between types of virtue is to endorse a cardinal 
understanding of the virtues. In Virtues of the Mind, Zagzebski does not discuss the 
possibility of a cardinal structure and in that sense can be included on the list offered by 
Russell of contemporary theorists who reject the idea of cardinality. 27 And yet, I want to 
now suggest that Zagzebski’s account of the intellectual virtues fits nicely within an 
overall cardinal understanding of the virtues. 
 
According to Zagzebski, all of the intellectual virtues share in the underlying motivation 
for cognitive contact with reality, but can be distinguished by their differing proximal 
motivations. The proximal motivation of an intellectual virtue will lead an agent to try to 
achieve the end of the underlying motivation in a particular way or a particular context. 
For example, the intellectual virtue of intellectual thoroughness will move an agent to 
achieve cognitive contact with reality through the exhaustive investigation of evidence. 
Zagzebski (following Aristotle) provides a picture of the intellectual virtues that is not 
cardinal. All of the intellectual virtues are on the same level and importantly involve a 
proximal motivation. 
 
However, the structure suggested by Zagzebski does lend itself to a cardinal 
understanding. Consider the possibility that an agent could be motivated to achieve 
cognitive contact with reality in a direct way. Rather than being motivated to achieve 
this merely through the exhaustive investigation of evidence, or through the asking of 
questions, an agent might be motivated to achieve cognitive contact with reality in 
general. That is, an agent might be motivated to achieve this in various ways and in 
various contexts. The agent who possesses a general (and deep) motivation to achieve 
cognitive contact with reality could then be thought of as possessing a fundamental 
intellectual virtue. It is not obvious what we should call this fundamental  trait, although 
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perhaps “love of knowledge” would be a suitable description. 28 The specific intellectual 
virtues discussed by Zagzebski would then be understood as subordinate to this more 
fundamental virtue. They are specific forms or specific exercises of the fundamental 
virtue. For example, intellectual thoroughness will simply be a form of the more 
fundamental love of knowledge, exercised through the exhaustive investigation of 
evidence. Inquisitiveness will also be a form of the love of knowledge, exercised through 
the asking of questions. And so on for all of the other subordinate intellectual virtues. It 
is important to be clear that my claim here is not that Zagzebski ought to be interpreted 
as proposing anything of this sort. Instead, my claim is that an account on which virtues 
share an underlying motivation lends itself to a cardinal understanding. It becomes 
possible to view the fundamental virtue(s) as involving a general motivation towards the 
underlying end(s), while the subordinate virtues involve being motivated towards the 
end(s) only in a particular way, or in a particular context.  
 
Consider again the starting suggestion that kindness and justice are fundamentally 
virtuous traits. My aim is to support this suggestion by proposing an overall picture of 
the moral virtues that is able to accommodate it, before then demonstrating that this 
picture has much to recommend it. A first worry for the suggestion is that it cannot 
account for the true richness of moral life. If we acknowledge only these two moral 
virtues then we will be missing out on an array of other morally valuable traits, including 
widely accepted candidate virtues such as honesty and compassion. This worry would be 
lessened if we were to endorse a cardinal understanding of the moral virtues. In this way 
it would be possible to maintain that kindness and justice are the only (fundamental) 
moral virtues, while also acknowledging the richness of moral life through the addition 
of a range of subordinate moral virtues. I have now set out Zagzebski’s account of the 
intellectual virtues and explained why the idea that virtues share an underlying 
motivation lends itself to a cardinal understanding of virtue. By proposing an account of 
the moral virtues which mirrors the amended version of Zagzebski’s account of the 
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intellectual virtues, it may be possible to support the fundamental virtue status of 
kindness and justice while also being responsive to the true richness of moral life.  
 
An account whereby the virtues (within some domain) all share in some underlying 
motivation lends itself to a cardinal understanding of the virtues (within that domain). In 
the case of the intellectual virtues, Zagzebski’s suggestion was that these traits all share in 
the underlying motivation for cognitive contact with reality. If we want to consider the 
possibility of a cardinal understanding of the moral virtues then it would be useful to 
come up with a shared underlying motivation for this domain. However, Zagzebski 
provides us with no reason for optimism in this regard. The discussion here is somewhat 
complicated by the fact that Zagzebski believes the intellectual virtues to constitute a 
sub-set of the moral virtues.29 However, she does maintain that we can distinguish this 
sub-set by the differing motivational structure of the virtues that are involved: 
 
Since all of the intellectual virtues have the same foundational motivation 
and since all of the other moral virtues have different foundational 
motivations, this means that a distinction between an intellectual and a 
moral virtue can be made on the basis of the motivational component of the 
virtue.30 
 
The (other) moral virtues, according to Zagzebski, cannot be unified by appeal to an 
underlying motivation in the same way that the intellectual virtues can be. If true, this 
would be damaging to the prospects of a cardinal understanding of the moral virtues. 
However, we ought not to accept Zagzebski’s claims here. I now want to suggest that it 
is possible to come up with shared underlying motivations for virtues within the moral 
domain, and that these motivations are the ones associated with the fundamentally 
virtuous traits of kindness and justice. 
 
The fundamentally virtuous trait of kindness can be understood as consisting in the 
deep motivation to protect and promote well-being. The fundamentally virtuous trait of 
justice can be understood as consisting in the deep motivation to ensure fair outcomes. 
The suggestion that these traits are fundamentally virtuous can now be understood as 
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the claim that these traits are fundamental within a cardinal structure of the moral 
virtues. If true, this claim would imply that any subordinate moral virtues must involve 
one of the two motivations involved in the fundamental virtues of kindness and justice. 
Just as intellectual virtues, such as inquisitiveness or intellectual thoroughness, 
necessarily involve the underlying motivation for cognitive contact with reality, so too 
will any moral virtues necessarily involve either the motivation to protect and promote 
well-being or the motivation to ensure fair outcomes. Subordinate moral virtues can 
then be understood as being particular forms or exercises of the more fundamental 
moral virtues of kindness and justice. 
 
The aim of this section has been to further explain the suggestion that kindness and 
justice are fundamentally virtuous traits. The suggestion can now be understood as 
claiming that kindness and justice are fundamental virtues within a cardinal structure of 
the moral virtues. This suggestion implies that any other moral virtues are subordinate 
in the sense that they are merely particular forms or exercises of either kindness or 
justice. I have not yet provided any reason to accept this suggestion. In order to do so, it 
will be important to show that the suggestion is in-keeping with plausible accounts of 
other candidate moral virtues. Just as ‘love of knowledge’ gains plausibility as a 
fundamental intellectual virtue through the recognition that other intellectual virtues 
share in the motivation for cognitive contact with reality, so too will the suggestion that 
kindness and justice are fundamental moral virtues gain plausibility through the 
recognition that other moral virtues share in the motivations either for well-being or for 
fair outcomes. In the next section, I will demonstrate how candidate moral virtues such 
as honesty and compassion can indeed be plausibly understood as sharing in the 
fundamental motivations involved in either kindness or justice. This will provide 
support for the suggestion that kindness and justice are fundamental moral virtues. 
 
3. ACCOUNTING FOR SPECIFIC SUBORDINATE VIRTUES 
In order to defend the claim that kindness (understood as a deep motivation to protect 
and promote well-being) and justice (understood as a deep motivation to ensure fair 
outcomes) are the fundamental moral virtues, it is important to demonstrate that other 





section I will focus on three candidate moral virtues in order to fully demonstrate this 
idea, before then also briefly mentioning some additional traits. The first three traits to 
be considered are honesty, modesty and compassion. 
 
Consider first the trait of honesty. Possession of this trait is widely accepted as being of 
moral worth, and so it would be a mark against any proposed account of the virtues if 
honesty were to be excluded from the list. In order to see how honesty can be included 
as a form of either kindness or justice, it is important to think about what honesty might 
actually consist in. For example, it is not sufficient for the trait of honesty that an agent 
just happens to never say anything false. We can imagine a Robinson Crusoe figure 
whose utter isolation means that he never speaks and so never says anything false. Such 
a figure would not necessarily possess the trait of honesty. 31 Similarly, it is not sufficient 
for honesty that someone regularly (and exclusively) utters truths. We can imagine an 
agent who wanders around reading aloud every piece of text that they come across and 
who never happens to stumble upon a falsehood. Such an agent would not thereby 
possess honesty as a character trait. Instead, honesty requires the possession of some 
intention or motivation on the part of the agent. An honest agent is one who is deeply 
motivated to avoid deception. However, it is important to note that this motivation may 
be grounded in any number of different underlying motivations.  
 
It is possible for an honest agent’s motivation to avoid deception to be grounded in a 
number of different ways. If an agent believes that any deception is likely to be 
uncovered and severely punished then their motivation to avoid deception may be 
grounded in an underlying motivation to avoid punishment. Alternatively, if an agent 
believes that those who speak the truth are more likely to be respected and to receive 
privileges then their motivation to avoid deception may be grounded in the underlying 
motivation to gain respect. One interesting possibility for the purposes of this chapter is 
that an agent’s motivation to avoid deception could be grounded in an underlying 
motivation to protect and promote well-being. Such an agent will be particularly 
motivated to avoid deception in cases where the deception would be cruel, or where it 
would not be in the best interests of some other agent. If an agent’s honesty is grounded 
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in this way then we can view their trait as being a form of the more general trait of 
kindness. They are motivated to protect and promote well-being in a particular way 
(through the avoidance of deception), just as the magnificent agent was motivated to be 
generous in a particular way (through the use of their great wealth to organise grand 
public events). We can refer to such an honest agent as possessing honesty-as-kindness, or 
honesty as a specific form of kindness. It is also interesting to consider the possibility 
that an agent’s motivation to avoid deception could be grounded in an underlying 
motivation to ensure fair outcomes. Such an agent will be particularly motivated to 
avoid deception in cases where it would be unfair to withhold information from 
another, or where they believe themselves to ‘owe it’ to another to tell them the truth. 
The agent can be understood as possessing a specific form of the trait of justice in the 
sense that they are motivated to ensure fair outcomes in a particular way (through the 
avoidance of deception). We can refer to such an agent as possessing honesty-as-justice. 
These two examples of the trait of honesty (honesty-as-kindness and honesty-as-justice) 
are particularly relevant given the claim that kindness and justice are fundamental moral 
virtues. 
 
If we accept that kindness and justice are fundamental virtues within a cardinal structure 
of the moral virtues then any other moral virtues must be understood as specific forms 
or exercises of these fundamental traits. It is clear now that this picture of the moral 
virtues will be able to include certain forms of honesty on the list of subordinate virtues. 
Both honesty-as-kindness and honesty-as-justice share in the underlying motivation of a 
fundamental moral virtue and so can be understood as being specific forms of those 
fundamental traits. Honesty-as-kindness and honesty-as-justice are therefore included as 
subordinate moral virtues on this approach. However, other forms of honesty will not 
be included in this way. It is important to show how the approach to honesty that I am 
proposing actually helps to produce intuitively acceptable results regarding when (and 
why) honesty is a moral virtue. 
 
There are cases where an agent should not be praised for possessing the trait of honesty. 
Imagine an agent who delights in the revealing of cruel and hurtful truths and who 





such truths. Traditional accounts on which honesty is straightforwardly (and always) a 
moral virtue will be forced to either deny that the agent in this example is honest or else 
they will be forced to accept that the agent possesses a character trait that i s 
praiseworthy. However, on the cardinal understanding that I am proposing in this 
chapter, a different and more plausible response becomes available. Only those forms of 
honesty that share in the underlying motivation of a fundamental moral virtue should be 
accepted as being (subordinate) moral virtues. The agent whose avoidance of deception 
is motivated by an underlying desire to reveal hurtful truths can indeed be classed as 
honest, but they need not be classed as possessing a moral virtue. Forms of honesty that 
are grounded in negative (or indifferent) underlying motivations ought not to be 
counted as moral virtues, even if we have no reason to deny that the possessors of those 
traits are indeed honest individuals. The proposal that only honesty-as-kindness and 
honesty-as-justice ought to be included as (subordinate) moral virtues provides a way of 
endorsing this intuitively appealing conclusion. 
 
Before moving on to a second specific candidate virtue, it will be worthwhile to 
consider one further interesting form of honesty. It may be possible for an agent to 
possess a form of honesty that is not grounded in any further underlying motivation. 
That is, an agent might possess a deep motivation to avoid deception for its own sake. 
Such an agent does not appear obviously non-virtuous in the same way as the agent 
whose honest motivation was grounded in the desire to reveal hurtful truths. Indeed, it 
is not immediately obvious how we ought to judge the moral status of this character 
trait. Once we accept the idea that all moral virtues involve either the motivation to 
protect and promote well-being or the motivation to ensure fair outcomes, an answer to 
this puzzle becomes available. 
 
An agent who is motivated to avoid deception just for the sake of avoiding deception 
ought not to be viewed as possessing a moral virtue. Of course, it may in fact be 
difficult to imagine such an agent. We need to imagine an agent who is honest ‘for its 
own sake’ in the sense that they don’t take themselves to have or to need any further 
reason to avoid deception. In such a case, the agent’s motivation to avoid deception will 





harm to another person, or where deception could harmlessly avert some grave 
injustice. This form of honesty would prompt an agent to reveal the location of a friend 
to the crazed axe murderer at the door, or to tell an unnecessarily hurtful and unhelpful 
truth to an elderly relative. This form of honesty would also prompt an agent to reveal 
unnecessary information in less extreme cases, but where there is simply no need to do 
so, such as when chatting to a cashier at the supermarket. Of course, we ought to accept 
that an agent who acts in this way out of a motivation to avoid deception does indeed 
possess a form of honesty. But it would be a stretch to suppose that the agent is thereby 
morally virtuous. The suggestion that morally virtuous forms of honesty will share in the 
underlying motivations involved in either kindness or justice results in plausible verdicts 
regarding when honesty is or is not a moral virtue. This provides us with reason to 
accept the suggestion that kindness and justice are fundamentally virtuous traits.  
 
A second example of a candidate moral virtue that we can consider is the trait of 
modesty. The discussion of this trait can be more brief than the discussion of honesty, 
both because modesty ought to be accommodated in just the same way as honesty and 
because modesty has already been discussed at some length in Chapter Two.32 I have 
argued that modesty plausibly involves being motivated to de-emphasise one’s attributes 
or accomplishments. However, it is possible for someone to possess this motivation as a 
result of any number of further, underlying motivations. An agent may be motivated to 
de-emphasise their own attributes out of an underlying motivation to be well -liked, or 
out of a desire to lull potential opponents into a false sense of security. When an agent’s 
modest motivation is grounded in this way then we ought not to say that they possess 
modesty as a moral virtue. 
 
However, in Chapter Two I highlighted the value of being motivated to de-emphasise 
one’s own accomplishments out of a further motivation to protect and promote well -
being. Modesty of this form can be referred to as modesty-as-kindness and ought to be 
viewed as a specific form of the fundamental virtue of kindness. The agent is motivated 
to protect and promote well-being in a particular way (through the de-emphasising of 
personal accomplishments or attributes). We can now see that this is not the complete 
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story regarding morally valuable forms of modesty. An agent’s motivation to de -
emphasise their own accomplishments might also be grounded in the underlying 
motivation to ensure fair outcomes. For example, a footballer might downplay the 
importance of their winning goal out of a concern that those in the media will fail to 
give due consideration to the contribution of their teammates. When an agent’s modesty 
is grounded in this way then we can say that they possess modesty-as-justice. Their modesty 
is simply a specific form of justice in the sense that they are motivated to ensure fair 
outcomes in a particular way (through the de-emphasising of personal accomplishments 
or attributes). Both modesty-as-kindness and modesty-as-justice can be understood as 
specific forms of fundamental virtues and so can be accepted as subordinate moral 
virtues on the proposed view. This looks to be an intuitively plausible result, and one 
that demonstrates how additional candidate virtues can be included on a list of virtues 
that takes only kindness and justice to be fundamental moral virtues.  
 
It has been useful to consider the traits of honesty and modesty in order to explain one 
way in which a candidate virtue might come to be classed as subordinate to one of the 
fundamental virtues of kindness and justice. This involves the candidate virtue having a 
characteristic proximal motivation that is grounded in a virtuous underlying motivation. 
For example, a motivation to avoid deception might be grounded in an underlying 
motivation to ensure fair outcomes. However, there is another way in which a trait can 
be taken to be a restricted form of a more fundamental virtue. In order to explain this it 
will be useful to return briefly to Zagzebski’s account of the intellectual virtues. 
Zagzebski’s account highlights the possibility that a trait may involve  a direct motivation 
towards just one aspect of the motivation involved in a fundamental virtue. It will be 
useful to first explain this possibility before then discussing the candidate moral virtue 
of compassion. 
 
According to Zagzebski, the underlying motivation for the intellectual virtues is the 
motivation to achieve cognitive contact with reality. It is clear that this concept i s less 
familiar that the concepts of knowledge or true belief, and Zagzebski explains the 





is usually expressed by saying that people desire truth”. 33 In particular, it includes being 
motivated towards truth, understanding, and knowledge, as well as towards that which 
will “enhance the quality of the knowing state”. 34 Examples of specific intellectual 
virtues which involve the underlying motivation for cognitive contact with reality have 
already been provided above. These traits involved a characteristic proximal motivation 
that was grounded in the fundamental motivation for cognitive contact with reality. 
However, we ought now to notice one further way in which a trait can count as 
involving a restricted form of the fundamental motivation. Zagzebski tells us that:  
 
Although all intellectual virtues have a motivational component that aims at 
cognitive contact with reality, some of them may aim more at understanding, 
or perhaps at other epistemic states that enhance the quality of the knowing 
state, such as certainty, than at the possession of truth per se. 35 
 
While Zagzebski does not explain her own view in terms of a cardinal structure, I have 
suggested that her account is compatible with the idea that the fundamental intellectual 
virtue involves a direct motivation towards cognitive contact with reality in general, 
while the subordinate intellectual virtues involve proximal motivations that are 
grounded in this fundamental motivation. The fundamental intellectual virtue can be 
referred to as the love of knowledge. However, we can now see that there is another 
way in which a trait can be classed as a subordinate intellectual virtue. A trait ought to 
be classed as a restricted form of a fundamental virtue when it involves a direct 
motivation towards just one aspect of the fundamental motivation. That is, if a trait 
involves a direct motivation towards just one aspect of cognitive contact with reality 
(such as understanding or certainty) then it can be classed as a restricted form of the 
love of knowledge. It is not restricted in the sense that the agent is motivated to achieve 
cognitive contact via some proximal motivation (such as the proximal motivation to 
exhaustively investigate evidence) but because it is directly targeted at only one aspect of 
cognitive contact (such as understanding). The availability of this second way of 
counting as a restricted form of a fundamental virtue provides us with further 
opportunity to extend our list of subordinate virtues. 
                                                                 








Returning to the moral domain, the fundamental motivations within this domain are the 
motivation to protect and promote well-being and the motivation to ensure fair 
outcomes. A further way in which some trait might be included as a restricted form of 
either kindness or justice will be for the trait to involve a direct motivation towards just 
one aspect of these fundamental motivations. One example of this is provided by the 
trait of compassion. The trait of compassion plausibly consists of a characteristic 
motivation to alleviate suffering. Given that the alleviation of suffering is simply one 
aspect of the protection and promotion of well-being, the trait of compassion can 
plausibly be listed as a restricted form of the fundamental virtue of kindness. It is 
directly targeted at one aspect of the fundamental motivation involved in kindness. In 
this way, the trait of compassion can be included on our list of the subordinate moral 
virtues.36 
 
Of course, the list of suggested or candidate moral virtues includes more than just 
honesty, modesty and compassion (in addition to kindness and justice). I mentioned 
above that Robert Adams’ A Theory of Virtue references over sixty virtue terms. While it 
won’t be necessary to go through all of these terms here, I do want to briefly consider a 
few more candidate virtues in order to further demonstrate the options that exist for 
accommodating these traits. Some of the available options were discussed in Chapter 
Four in relation to the traits of courage and temperance. These traits, I have argued, 
ought to be viewed as enablers for moral virtue. Possessing (a relevant form of) courage 
or temperance will be necessary in order to ensure that virtuous motivations are 
sufficiently robust and so will be necessary for the possession of moral virtues. 37 I will 
now list a few more candidate virtues and explain how the cardinal understanding of 
virtue provides a plausible way of thinking about these traits.  
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kindness. However, someone might possess a motivation to alleviate suffering that is proximal to an 
underlying motivation. If the underlying motivation is associated with a fundamental virtue, then that 
form of compassion will be included as a subordinate virtue in the same way as the forms of honesty 
and modesty that were discussed above. 






The trait of generosity plausibly involves being motivated to make your own time or 
possessions available for use in the service of others. If an agent has an underlying 
motivation such that they are motivated to use their time or possessions as a way of 
promoting the well-being of others, or as a way of ensuring that others receive a fair 
share, then their trait can be included as a subordinate virtue in the same way as 
honesty-as-kindness or honesty-as-justice. The agent will possess either generosity-as-
kindness or generosity-as-justice. However, if an agent is motivated to give their own 
time or possessions to others out of an underlying motivation to improve their public 
image or to gain from the benefits of a good reputation then they do not thereby 
possess a moral virtue. Similarly, if someone is mot ivated to pay for their grandchild’s 
education out of an underlying motivation to make the child’s parents feel inadequate 
then they do not thereby possess a moral virtue, even if there might be a sense in which 
their behaviour does count as generous. The plausibility of these results demonstrates 
that the trait of generosity can be adequately accommodated by the cardinal 
understanding that I have proposed. 
 
Consider next the trait of conscientiousness. As Slote tells us, “Conscientious concern 
to do what is right or to do one’s duty is, after all, a motive, and a morality of motives 
needs to say something about how that motive is to be assessed.”38 Slote points out that 
we have good reason to be suspicious of the moral worth of an agent who possesses the 
pure form of conscientiousness, or who possesses a motivation to do their duty just for 
the sake of doing their duty. This trait may appear morally harmless and may sometimes 
lead to positives outcomes. But it may also be possessed by moral monsters, such as the 
“Nazi prison camp guard who executes Jews and gypsies because he thinks that it is his 
duty to do so”.39 However, the cardinal understanding of moral virtue provides us with 
a method for working out when this trait is morally valuable. If an agent is motivated to 
do their duty because they think that this will, in general, be a good way of protecting 
and promoting well-being then we should class them as possessing a subordinate moral 
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virtue.40 Similarly, if an agent’s motivation to do their duty is motiva ted by the 
underlying thought that this is what they owe to other people then it will be possible to 
classify them as possessing a subordinate form of the virtue of justice. Once again, the 
cardinal understanding that I have proposed helps us to reach intuitively acceptable 
verdicts regarding the moral worth of a specific candidate moral virtue.  
 
There exist other character traits regarding which there is much confusion over both the 
nature of the trait and the moral status of the trait. The cardinal understanding of the 
virtues that I have proposed can help us to say consistent and plausible things in 
response to such examples. One trait which is the source of much disagreement in the 
literature is the trait of integrity. That integrity is valued in society  may be reflected in 
the fact that we typically wish for integrity in our elected officials and law-makers. The 
trait has also been accepted as a virtue by contemporary virtue theorists. Integrity, 
understood as “personal consistency” makes it on to Adams’  list of the virtues.41 But 
this position is far from universal. Bernard Williams has argued that integrity is not a 
virtue,42 while Greg Scherkoske has suggested that it be understood as an epistemic or 
intellectual virtue,43 and Denise Dudzinski discusses the view that integrity is the name 
that we apply to the state of possessing all of the virtues.44 In the face of such 
disagreement, it will be useful to consider the approach to integrity that is suggested by 
the cardinal understanding of the moral virtues. 
 
An agent who possesses integrity is one who is consistent in their commitment to 
various causes or ends. This is reflected in the fact that we would seriously doubt the 
integrity of a politician who switched their position on a particular issue, or who 
switched party allegiance, whenever it was politically convenient to do so. Someone who 
consistently supports or fights for some cause will demonstrate a level of integrity 
throughout their life that is not shared by someone who simply follows the latest fads. 
Ought we to consider such personal consistency in a life to be a moral virtue? The 
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approach to integrity that is suggested by the cardinal understanding is similar to the 
approach to courage that was outlined in Chapter Four. Certain forms of courage enable 
the possession of moral virtue by ensuring the robustness of an agent’s moral motivations. 
Integrity can be viewed as enabling moral virtue by ensuring the persistence of moral 
motivations. Integrity, then, will be morally valuable only when the agent’s motivations 
are morally virtuous. Integrity in the enactment of a racist ideology will be of no moral 
worth, whereas integrity in the pursuit of fair outcomes or in the promotion of well -
being will be of moral value. Integrity is not a moral virtue, but it will be possessed by 
those who are morally virtuous. This picture provides an explanation for the confusion 
over the status of integrity. While Williams was right in denying the virtue status of 
integrity, the intuition that integrity must be a (moral or epistemic) virtue can be 
explained by the fact that virtuous agents will demonstrate integrity when pursuing their 
virtuous ends. The ability to explain disagreement regarding integrity, in addition to 
providing a plausible account of that trait, provides further support for the cardinal 
understanding of the moral virtues that I have proposed. 
 
The discussion in this section has demonstrated the ways in which a cardinal 
understanding of the moral virtues will be able to incorporate various traits as being 
subordinate moral virtues. Traits such as honesty, modesty and compassion can be 
included on the list of moral virtues whenever these traits are understood as restricted 
forms of the more fundamental virtues. This possibility ought to lessen the concern that 
an account which lists only kindness and justice as moral virtues will struggle to 
acknowledge the true richness of moral life. And the account gains further credibility by 
providing an understanding of the subordinate virtues which explains when these traits 
ought to be accepted as morally virtuous. While cardinal understandings of the virtues 
have not been popular in recent times, the considerations raised in this chapter highlight 
some of the positive aspects of such an approach. I will now continue to argue in favour 
of a cardinal understanding that lists kindness and justice as fundamentally virtuous 
traits. The remainder of the chapter will introduce two problems currently facing virtue 







4. THE CONFLATION PROBLEM 
One problem that confronts all virtue theorists has been labelled by Julia Driver as the 
“conflation problem”.45 This problem arises when virtue theorists are unable to explain 
or accommodate intuitive distinctions between different kinds of virtue. For example, 
the conflation problem faces virtue theorists who cannot accommodate the distinction 
between the moral virtues on the one hand and the intellectual (or epistemic) virtues on 
the other.46 One way of responding to this problem will be to simply deny that we ought 
to distinguish between types of virtues in this way. 47 However, those who want to 
maintain the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues face the challenge of 
explaining how this distinction can be made in a way that is plausible. As Driver’s paper 
demonstrates, standard ways of making this distinction prove to be problematic.  
 
Given the influence of Aristotle on contemporary virtue theorists, it is worth setting out 
the suggested distinction between moral and intellectual virtues that he provides. 
Aristotle suggests that moral and intellectual virtues are distinguished by the fact that 
they are acquired in different ways. While it is possible for the intellectual virtues to be 
taught by some expert, the moral virtues must be developed through habit. As Aristotle 
says: 
 
intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching 
(for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes 
about as a result of habit48 
 
Unfortunately, it is not clear that this distinction will divide up candidate virtues in the 
correct way. For example, certain traits that ought to intuitively count as being 
intellectual virtues appear no easier to teach than are traits widely acknowledged as being 
moral virtues. It is not obvious that we could teach someone to be intellectually fair or 
open-minded or inquisitive any more than we could teach someone to be virtuously 
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honest or kind. Furthermore, it may be the case that the development of certain 
intellectual virtues will require a period of habituation. It will not be sufficient for us to 
be told how to be intellectually thorough, for example. Instead, it will be important for 
us to practice acting in a thorough way, and to get into the habit of regularly engaging in 
the exhaustive investigation of evidence. Such examples point to the deficiencies of 
Aristotle’s proposed method for distinguishing the moral and intellectual virtues, and 
this deficiency is acknowledged by both Zagzebski and Driver.49 
 
In ‘The Conflation of Moral and Epistemic Virtue’, Driver discusses a variety of 
alternative approaches to this issue in an attempt to demonstrate the need for a new 
proposal. It is not my intention here to list all of the various alternatives discussed by 
Driver, or to evaluate the strength of the arguments that Driver provides for the 
rejection of those alternatives. I also do not intend to argue here against Driver’s own 
proposal for distinguishing the moral and intellectual virtues (although I did argue 
against Driver’s consequentialist approach to identifying the moral virtues in Chapter 
Five). Instead, my aim is to explain a method for distinguishing moral and intellectual 
virtues that becomes available once we accept the cardinal picture of the moral virtues 
that has been proposed in this chapter. The plausibility of this method provides further 
support for the acceptance of the cardinal understanding of moral virtue.  
 
Different types of virtue ought to be distinguished by appeal to their motivational 
aspects. Once we accept the cardinal structure of virtue that I have proposed, it 
becomes clear that all of the moral virtues will share in (some aspect of) an underlying 
virtuous motivation. If we also accept the amended version of Zagzebski’s account of 
the intellectual virtues then it will be possible to say the same for virtues within that 
domain. We could then identify traits as being either moral or intellectual virtues (or 
neither) depending on the fundamental motivation that they involve. Driver does 
consider this possibility and is keen to argue against such an approach. Two of the 
alternatives criticised by Driver are particularly relevant for the discussion in this 
chapter. 
 
                                                                 





One of the approaches criticised by Driver is the suggestion from Zagzebski that the 
intellectual virtues can be distinguished by their shared motivation for cognitive contact 
with reality. The reason given for dismissing this approach is that it:  
 
seems to be the case that some intellectual virtues may involve an at least 
limited failure to consider various aspects of reality – for example, focus and 
concentration may involve the capacity to exclude irrelevant (but true) 
facts.50 
 
However, this objection to Zagzebski’s treatment of the intellectual virtues is far from 
conclusive. One quick response to the objection would be to point out that attributes 
such as good concentration or the ability to focus are not obvious candidates for the 
status of intellectual virtue. They may be more akin to capacities like a reliable memory 
or good eyesight, and it remains controversial whether or not these should count as 
being intellectual virtues alongside traits such as open-mindedness, inquisitiveness or 
intellectual thoroughness. A second response to this objection involves looking again at 
the detail of Zagzebski’s account of cognitive contact with reality. As explained above, 
being motivated for cognitive contact with reality includes being motivated to achieve 
states such as true belief, knowledge and understanding, as well as being motivated 
towards what will “enhance the quality” of those states. Therefore, if someone is deeply 
motivated to focus or to concentrate on some particular aspect of reality in order to 
attain a better understanding of it, or in order to become more certain of some fact (and 
so to enhance the quality of their knowledge) then it will be possible to say that that 
person shares in the underlying motivation for cognitive contact with reality. This 
means that Zagzebski’s approach would be able to include those attributes that are 
highlighted as being potentially problematic by Driver. Driver’s objection to Zagzebski’s 
motivations-based approach to distinguishing the intellectual virtues is not successful.  
 
Driver also criticises a motivations-based approach to distinguishing the moral virtues. 
The approach that is considered suggests that all moral virtues share in an underlying 
benevolent motivation, understood as a concern for others. Driver explains that there 
are: 
                                                                 






reasons for doubting that moral virtues have benevolence as a characteristic 
motivation: it is unclear that this needs to be the case for virtues like justice 
and honesty, for example. Then there is Hume’s point that we do think 
persons can have a variety of moral virtues that are distinctive, and this 
becomes difficult to spell out if all of them are understood simply in terms 
of being motivated by benevolence.51 
 
I am in agreement with Driver here, and it will be important to explain how the 
motivations-based method for distinguishing the moral and intellectual virtues that I will 
now propose is sensitive to these concerns. 
 
If we accept the cardinal understanding of the virtues that I have proposed then a 
motivations-based method for distinguishing moral and intellectual virtues is 
immediately available. The intellectual virtues are those that share in an underlying 
motivation for cognitive contact with reality. The moral virtues are those that share in 
either the underlying motivation associated with kindness or the underlying motivation 
associated with justice. This approach is compatible with Driver’s assertion that traits 
like justice need not be fundamentally motivated by a concern for the overall welfare of 
others. It is important to note that this approach is also sensitive to the variety of virtues 
that different people might possess. I explained above how various traits (including 
honesty, modesty and compassion) can be included as subordinate moral virtues on the 
cardinal understanding that I have proposed. Different subordinate virtues will be 
distinct in the sense that they will involve distinct proximal motivations, or will involve 
being directly motivated towards different aspects of the underlying motivations. This 
means that it will be possible to include a wide variety of subordinate virtues and, 
therefore, it will be possible to be sensitive to the different ways in which people might 
be virtuous, at the same time as maintaining that all moral virtues share in one of two 
fundamental motivations. The motivations-based approach that I have proposed is not 
vulnerable to the objections that Driver raises for the approach that focuses solely on 
benevolence. And the motivations-based approach that results from accepting the 
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cardinal understanding of the virtues also leads to interesting and plausible conclusions 
with regards to specific candidate virtues. 
 
Consider again the trait of honesty, understood as involving a characteristic deep 
motivation to avoid deception. I demonstrated above how different forms of honesty 
will be grounded in different underlying motivations. Honesty-as-kindness and honesty-
as-justice will be classed as moral virtues as a result of being grounded in the 
motivations associated with either kindness or justice. However, we can now see that it 
may also be possible for honesty to be classed as an intellectual virtue. It will be possible 
for the motivation to avoid deception to be grounded in an underlying motivation for 
truth. When this is the case, we ought to view that form of honesty as sharing in the 
motivation for cognitive contact with reality. Different forms of honesty, therefore, 
ought to be awarded differing virtue status. Honesty-as-kindness and honesty-as-justice 
are moral virtues, honesty grounded in a desire for truth may be an intellectual virtue, 
and honesty grounded in a desire to be cruel is a non-virtue. That the trait of honesty 
divides up in this way explains the difficulty experienced by Driver when trying to 
accommodate that trait, with honesty leading Driver to suggest that “There is also the 
possibility that things just are fuzzy, and that is why some virtues are difficult to 
classify.”52 The motivations-based method which follows on from the cardinal 
understanding of the virtues can reveal to us the cause of this apparent fuzziness. If we 
focus only on honesty’s characteristic motivation to avoid deception then it is difficult 
to classify the trait as either a moral virtue or an intellectual virtue. This difficulty is 
explained once we focus on the underlying motivations involved in different forms of 
honesty. This focus reveals to us that different forms of honesty will differ in terms of 
their virtue status, and this is why it is difficult to classify honesty in general. By 
providing this explanation, as well as providing a plausible account of when honesty 
ought to be considered an intellectual or a moral virtue, the motivations-based method 
for distinguishing types of virtue recommends itself for acceptance.  
 
The proposed method also leads to plausible conclusions regarding specific candidate 
intellectual virtues. One widely accepted intellectual virtue is the trait of inquisitiveness, 
                                                                 





which can be understood as involving a characteristic motivation to engage in 
investigations and to ask questions. It is clear that this characteristic motivation will 
often be grounded in an underlying motivation for some aspect of cognitive contact 
with reality. In such a case, inquisitiveness will indeed be labelled as an intellectual virtue 
on the proposed method. However, it will also be possible for forms of inquisitiveness 
to share in the underlying motivations associated with either kindness or justice. An 
agent may be motivated to ask questions out of a fundamental motivation to ensure fair 
outcomes. We might hope that such a form of inquisitiveness will be possessed by 
judges or lawyers. Similarly, an agent may be motivated to ask questions out of a 
fundamental motivation to protect and promote well-being. We might hope that such a 
form of inquisitiveness will be possessed by medical practitioners or social workers. In 
these cases, the form of inquisitiveness that is possessed ought to be classed as a moral 
virtue. We can refer to the forms of inquisitiveness that are possessed in each of these 
cases as inquisitiveness-as-justice and inquisitiveness-as-kindness, respectively. Alternatively, an 
agent’s motivation to ask questions might be grounded in an underlying motivation to 
embarrass others or to make themselves look good. Forms of inquisitiveness that are 
grounded in this way ought not to be classed as either morally or intellectually virtuous. 
The motivations-based method for distinguishing types of virtue provides plausible 
results when dealing with cases of this type, as well as helping to explain the ways in 
which different forms of the same trait can differ in terms of their virtue status. 
 
The conflation problem is one that faces all virtue theorists. In particular, it is important 
that any virtue theorist is able to explain how we ought to distinguish moral and 
intellectual virtues.53 If we accept the cardinal understanding of the moral virtues that I 
have proposed in this chapter then it will be possible to endorse a motivations-based 
method for distinguishing different types of virtue. The moral virtues are those that 
share in the underlying motivation associated with either kindness or justice, while the 
intellectual virtues (if we agree with Zagzebski) are those that share in the underlying 
motivation for cognitive contact with reality. I have explained how this method allows 
us to make the distinction between types of virtue in a plausible way, as well as 
illuminating the intuitively appealing possibility that different forms of the same trait 
                                                                 





might differ in terms of their virtue status. The cardinal understanding of the virtues 
that I have proposed therefore leads to a method that would allow us to resolve the 
conflation problem. This provides us with good reason to accept that proposal.  
 
5. THE ENUMERATION PROBLEM 
A second issue facing virtue theorists has recently been identified by Daniel Russell and 
is referred to as “the enumeration problem”.54 It is perhaps easier to explain this 
problem with reference to virtue ethics, before then explaining why it is also problematic 
at the level of virtue theory.55 Russell argues that the enumeration problem arises out of 
the combination of two features of contemporary forms of virtue ethics, one necessary 
feature and one commonplace feature.56 The necessary feature is that all forms of virtue 
ethics must explain morally right action in terms of the moral virtues. It may be helpful 
to mention some specific (and highly influential) examples of approaches of this sort. 
Rosalind Hursthouse tells us that the right action is the one that the virtuous agent 
would characteristically perform, where the virtuous agent is taken to be the agent who 
possesses the moral virtues.57 Christine Swanton suggests that the right action is the one 
that is “overall virtuous” in the sense that it “hits the target of” the virtues to the extent 
that this is possible.58 On both of these influential versions of virtue ethics, right action 
is explained with reference to the moral virtues. In fact, this is a necessary feature of all 
forms of virtue ethics. 
 
According to Russell, the enumeration problem arises when this necessary feature of 
virtue ethics is combined with a commonplace one. The commonplace feature has 
already been alluded to in this chapter. Virtue ethicists have been extremely liberal when 
discussing the virtues and when assigning virtue status to different trai ts. Russell is 
concerned about the tendency to identify virtues in ways that lead to there being 
“innumerable virtues”.59 For example, if we think that there could be a corresponding 
virtue for all of the issues or areas in life in which it is possible to do well, then it seems 
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likely that we will be left with an uncountable number of virtues. Russell provides an 
example to help demonstrate this point: 
 
For instance, virtue ethicists often observe that people may be intemperate 
about food, say, but temperate about drink and sex, and conclude that the 
apparently single virtue of ‘temperance’ must in fact be a host of smaller-
scope virtues like temperance-about-sex, temperance-about-drink, etc. But 
of course people compartmentalize character traits in all sorts of ways, and 
the principle generalizes; so on this sort of approach, there seems no way to 
escape the virtues being infinitely many.60 
 
This will be a problem for virtue ethicists given the necessary feature of explaining right 
action in terms of the virtues. If a right action is one that is in accordance with all of the 
virtues, but the virtues are “infinitely many”, then it will not be possible for us to work 
out whether any particular action is in fact a right action. This is the enumeration 
problem as it applies to virtue ethics. 
 
The enumeration problem also applies at the level of virtue theory. While virtue ethicists 
need the virtues in order to explain morally right action, virtue theorists need the virtues 
in order to explain what it means to be an overall virtuous person. If a virtuous person 
is one who possesses the virtues, but the virtues are infinitely many, then it is not clear 
how we could come to understand what it means to be a virtuous person. Russell sums 
up the enumeration problem for both virtue ethics and virtue theory in the following 
way: 
 
If right action is action in accordance with the virtues, and a virtuous person 
a person who has the virtues, but virtue ethics tells us that the virtues are 
infinitely many, then virtue ethics cannot say what right action is action in 
accordance with, or what it would be to be a virtuous person. 61 
 
If there are infinitely many distinct virtues then it will be impossible to tell whether or 
not an action is in accordance with all of them, or whether or not an individual possesses 
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all of them. And this would mean that we are unable to work out whether or not the 
action is right, or the individual is overall virtuous. 
 
The cardinal understanding of the moral virtues that I have proposed is able to avoid 
this problem. Indeed, Russell himself argues that a possible response to his enumeration 
problem would be to revive the idea of cardinality that is found in the work of the Stoics 
and Aquinas.62 On the view that I favour, there are only two fundamental moral virtues: 
the virtues of kindness and of justice. This is a far cry from the unmanageably long or 
even infinite list of virtues that led to concerns about the possibility of working out who 
counts as a virtuous person. At the same time, however, it is not the case that the 
proposed account avoids the enumeration problem at the expense of ignoring the many 
different ways in which someone can be considered virtuous. I explained above how the 
cardinal approach allows us to incorporate other traits to our list of the virtues, not as 
entirely independent entities that need to be accounted for, but as differing aspects of 
the traits that we have already accepted. Traits such as honesty-as-kindness, honesty-as-
justice, modesty-as-kindness, and so on, allow us to paint a picture of the virtuous agent 
that is sufficiently rich and detailed, at the same time as allowing us to maintain that the 
moral virtues are in fact (extremely) countable. In this way, the cardinal understanding 
that is proposed in this chapter allows us to avoid the enumeration problem without 
leading to a problematically restricted conception of the ways in which someone might 
be considered a virtuous agent. 
 
Before concluding this section, it is important to consider a possible response to the 
claim that a cardinal understanding of the virtues will allow us to avoid the enumeration 
problem. The enumeration problem arises when the various components involved in 
being a virtuous person (the virtues) are so numerous as to make it impossible to work 
out whether or not any given individual actually is virtuous overall. However, we might 
now worry that a similar problem arises for the cardinal approach that I have proposed. 
On this approach, it appears as if the fundamental virtues of kindness and justice a re 
themselves comprised of a number of further components (the subordinate virtues). If 
being kind overall involves possessing all or a significant proportion of the virtues that 
                                                                 





are subordinate to kindness, and if the virtues subordinate to kindness are in fact infinite, 
then it will be difficult for us to tell whether or not any given individual is kind overall. 63 
The enumeration problem then re-appears. For standard, non-cardinal accounts of the 
virtues the enumeration problem highlights a difficulty in working out whether or not 
any given individual is virtuous overall. On the cardinal understanding of the virtues that 
I have proposed it appears as if the enumeration problem will highlight a difficulty in 
working out whether or not any individual actually possesses either of the fundamental 
virtues. If this is correct then the proposed understanding will not have allowed us to 
avoid the difficulties stemming from the enumeration problem. 
 
However, this worry is the result of a misunderstanding of the cardinal approach. On the 
standard, non-cardinal view, the virtues are not divided into different classes. All of the 
different virtues are equally fundamental. If we say that being virtuous overall means 
possessing all of these different fundamental virtues, then overall virtue will be a 
composite notion. Referring to someone as being ‘overall virtuous’ will be a shorthand 
way of saying that they possess a whole host of different and equally fundamental traits. 
The enumeration problem then arises when the number of those traits becomes 
unmanageably large. On the cardinal understanding of virtue, the fundamental virtues 
are not composite in this way. To possess the fundamental virtue of kindness is simply 
to possess one, easily understandable, motivation – a deep motivation to protect and 
promote well-being. Similarly, to possess the fundamental virtue of justice is simply to 
possess the one deep motivation to ensure fair outcomes. The enumeration problem 
does not arise here because possessing a fundamental virtue does not consist in 
possessing a whole host of different and independent components. Of course, reflecting 
on the subordinate virtues allows us to identify the complexity of moral life, and the 
different extents to which different people might possess the fundamental virtues. As 
Russell tells us, thinking about the subordinate virtues merely “enriches our 
understanding of the cardinal virtues; the virtues by which we understand ‘overall 
virtuous’ do not multiply thereby.”64 This is because possessing a subordinate virtue is 
not to possess something that is separate and distinct from a fundamental virtue. On the 
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cardinal understanding that I have proposed, possessing honesty-as-kindness is not a 
different thing from possessing kindness, in the way that possessing each individual 
virtue is a different thing from possessing overall virtue on the standard approach. 
Instead, possessing honesty-as-kindness is just one way of being kind. And being kind is 
a simple matter of possessing a sufficiently deep motivation to protect and promote 
well-being. There is no composite notion here, and no “rampantly expanding” list of 
independent virtues.65 For this reason, the enumeration problem does not threaten the 
account of the virtues that I have proposed. 
 
It is now possible to see that we have good reason to accept the claim that kindness and 
justice are fundamentally virtuous traits, so long as that claim is understood within an 
overall cardinal understanding of the moral virtues. Accepting this overall picture leads 
to plausible accounts of other candidate virtues such as honesty and compassion, as well 
as providing a resolution to the conflation problem. We can now see that a cardinal 
understanding which posits a manageable number of fundamental virtues will also allow 
us to avoid Russell’s enumeration problem. These considerations provide strong support 
for the proposal that I have made in this chapter. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this chapter has been to explain and defend the suggestion that kindness and 
justice are the (only) moral virtues. In order to do this I have appealed to the idea of 
cardinality among the virtues. On a cardinal understanding of the virtues, virtues are 
divided into two classes – the fundamental virtues and the subordinate virtues. Once we 
accept that kindness and justice are the fundamental moral virtues, it becomes possible 
to nevertheless acknowledge the complexity of moral life through the addition of various 
subordinate virtues, including (forms of) honesty, modesty and compassion. The 
virtuous forms of these traits ought not to be viewed as distinct from the fundamental 
virtues, but instead as being specific aspects of those more general traits. I have argued 
that this approach provides a plausible account of specific candidate virtues and of when 
those traits ought to be classed as being morally virtuous. I have also argued that the 
cardinal understanding makes it possible to respond to both the conflation problem and 
                                                                 





the enumeration problem. These considerations provide us with good reason to accept 








The concept of virtue is a vital one for many current debates within philosophy. In 
particular, both virtue ethics and virtue epistemology have come to be viewed as 
legitimate contenders within their respective domains. The task of virtue theory – of 
giving an account of the virtues – is therefore an especially pressing one. If we do not 
have a satisfactory account of the virtues then we will be unable to determine (for 
example) how the morally virtuous agent would act, or what the intellectually virtuous 
agent would believe. That is, we will be unable to evaluate those virtue-centric 
approaches that have come to be accepted as legitimate contenders within both ethics 
and epistemology. 
 
This thesis has engaged with the debate within virtue theory in two important ways. 
Firstly, I have provided a defence of the motivations model of the moral virtues on 
which a moral virtue consists of a deep motivation towards a characteristic end. The 
virtue of kindness, for example, consists of a deep motivation towards the protection 
and promotion of well-being. I defended this account firstly by arguing against two rival 
approaches – the skills model and the composite model – in order to demonstrate that 
the possession of a component of intellectually demanding skill(s) or know-how is 
neither sufficient nor necessary for moral virtue. I then considered some especially 
challenging objections for the motivations model and argued that plausible responses 
are available for each of these objections. This thesis demonstrates that the motivations 
model is a legitimate contender within this debate and a live option for those working in 
virtue theory. This conclusion is significant given the pervasive influence of Aristotle on 
contemporary virtue theory, and the related assumption that the possession of moral 
virtue requires the possession of intellectual expertise. By presenting a plausible 
alternative model of the moral virtues, I hope to have encouraged a re-assessment of 
this assumption, and a widening of the class of agents who can be rightly viewed as 
possessors of the moral virtues. 
 
The second way in which I have attempted to add to the debate within virtue theory 
concerns the question of which traits ought to be identified as being moral virtues. I 





(understood as a deep motivation to protect and promote well-being) and justice 
(understood as a deep motivation to ensure fair outcomes) are fundamentally virtuous 
traits. I have then expanded upon and defended this suggestion. Kindness and justice 
ought to be viewed as fundamental virtues within a cardinal understanding of the moral 
virtues. All other moral virtues should be viewed as being subordinate to these two 
traits, in the sense that they are restricted forms or exercises of either kindness or 
justice. This suggestion gains credibility from the fact that it leads to intuitive accounts 
of specific subordinate virtues, such as honesty, modesty and compassion, and is able to 
explain when those traits ought to be viewed as morally valuable. The cardinal 
understanding that I have proposed also allows for convincing responses to important 
challenges that face all virtue theorists, such as the “conflation problem” and the 
“enumeration problem”. Given the plausibility and usefulness of this cardinal 
understanding of the virtues, there is good reason to accept the suggestion that we 
should identify kindness and justice as the (fundamental) moral virtues.  
 
I have now provided answers to two important questions within virtue theory. 
Regarding the nature of the moral virtues, I have argued that a moral virtue consists of a 
deep motivation towards a characteristic end. Regarding the identity of the moral 
virtues, I have argued that kindness and justice are the fundamental moral virtues (while 
other traits can be included as subordinate moral virtues). The combination of these two 
answers provides a distinct and plausible approach within virtue theory.  
 
The resurgence of interest in the virtues within the moral domain was prompted by the 
possibility that focusing on the virtues could provide an important alternative to 
deontological and consequentialist approaches. It is worth pointing out again that this 
thesis has been a contribution to virtue theory as opposed to virtue ethics. That is, I 
have not been looking to provide an account of morally right action which gives a 
central role to the moral virtues. However, the approach to virtue theory that I have 
provided in this thesis will hopefully be of interest to those working within virtue ethics, 
as well as those who are interested in evaluating approaches within normative ethics 
more generally. Consider, for example, the claim that a right action is one that the 
virtuous agent would characteristically perform. The plausibility of this claim will be at 





which traits are taken to be virtuous. I have not here argued in favour of any particular 
form of virtue ethics, and I have also not provided responses to the many independent 
objections that have been raised against virtue ethics (such as the difficulty of 
accounting for supererogation, or in providing action guidance in cases where the 
virtues conflict). However, it is clear that the virtue theory one endorses will have an 
impact on the plausibility of the forms of virtue ethics that are available. Examining the 
consequences for virtue ethics of accepting the virtue theory that I have defended in this 
work is one possible and appealing avenue for future research.  
 
For now, however, my focus has been at the level of virtue theory. I have shown that 
there is good reason to accept that moral virtues consist of deep motivations towards 
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